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Millets from the Margins: Value, Knowledge and the Subaltern Practice of Biodiversity in 
Uttarakhand, India analyzes what is at stake for small-scale, predominantly women, farmers as 
local varieties of rainfed food grains such as finger millet are being newly commodified and 
valued as a biodiversity resource. With support from a Doctoral Dissertation Improvement 
Grant from the National Science Foundation, I conducted seventeen months of ethnographic 
research with farmers, activists, scientists, NGO leaders, government officials, transnational 
functionaries and agribusiness representatives in segregated yet interconnected realms ranging 
from a village in the Himalayan foothills to transnational institutions in Rome.  
This work demonstrates how, as environmental conditions like drought become more 
generalized and publicized, crops cultivated to meet the changing needs of agrarian producers 
long deemed “unproductive” to capitalist agriculture are being recognized as necessary for 
humanity’s survival. In other words, plant life once categorized as primitive, coarse and unfit for 
human consumption is now imbued with the potential to drive human “progress” and secure 
human futures. Though the marginalized grains in my study – known in Uttarakhand as 
mandua/koda and madhira/janghora (barnyard millet) – are also becoming nationally and 
globally visible, they still grow at the periphery of these processes. Geographically, this 




mountainous north Indian state. Economically, it is a place of compounded marginality. This 
region has been cast as feminine and unproductive, a reservoir of “natural” resources and a 
place where small-scale farm work has long been perceived to be of little consequence. For 
precisely these reasons, it is among the many places where the externalized costs of capitalist 
accumulation strategies onto the dual realms of the environment and the household converge.  
Moving from an examination of the trifecta marginalization of particular plants, people 
and places, I problematize the concept of “biodiversity” and theorize the “subaltern practice of 
biodiversity” as a multi-scalar human and interspecies relation in which power and uncertainty 
are always at play. By doing so, I disrupt the idea that grains and seeds have “genetic material,” 
“nutritional attributes” or “climate resilience” distinct from the human contribution to these 
qualities. The subaltern practice of biodiversity calls attention to aesthetics, temporality and 
everyday life, understanding these as vital to democratic and sustainable human futures. If an 
analysis of millets from the margins complicates narratives of capitalist development and 
commodification, it also challenges assumptions that only things that have been or can be 
"scaled up," mapped or listed on GDP graphs matter in a national or global frame.  
 The ethnography of this work conforms to the life it depicts, emulating forms of 
receptivity, open-endedness and sensory attunement. Through the narrative, I aim to cultivate a 
manner of thinking that problematizes commodity logic and “inevitable” refrains of history or 
“progress” and to enter into spaces of nonlinear logic, extended family ways of relating and 
temporal attunement to multiple species. I attend to “messy” and noneconomic aspects of 
everyday life, which are often out-framed or rendered “unnecessary” by capitalist ideologies but 
which are in fact fundamental to socio-environmental relations. In each chapter, the narrative 
form reflects (and has emerged out of) aspects of the social relations that underpin its content. 
Thus, each chapter engages differently with ethnographic material, time and space. As the 
argument of this work does not follow a linear trajectory, this work invites the reader to 
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SEVEN THESES and an observation1 
 
one 
human-human relations are intertwined at the roots with human-nonhuman 




“remote” places and “small” scales that do not appear to add economic value play 
a foundational role in sustaining capitalist development and agriculture 
 
three 
forms of social life and (agri)cultural labor that have continued through and 
against processes of marginalization are imbedded in the “genetic material” of 
food grains now being commodified; traits like “climate resilience” are not 
intrinsic but born in part of human resilience, agency and change 
 
four 
biodiversity is a practice; this is also to say it is historical, socially differentiated 





                                                          





the practice of biodiversity occurs at the site where externalized costs of capitalist 




the loss of the biodiversity which comprises the basis for human sustenance 
reflects a hegemonic narrowing of human forms of life, human ways of relating to 




socio-environmental contingencies cannot be eradicated but only denied, displaced or 
temporarily contained  
 
 
each statement above concerns patriarchy, colonial violence, “uneven” capitalist development, 
racism, class and local forms of exploitation2 
                                                          






1. Map of India: The central Himalayan hill state of Uttarakhand, 








2. A closer look at Uttarakhand’s two ethnolingustic regions, 



















OPENING                 
 
 
The Time of “Added Value” 
 
When I returned to New York in September 2014 from my longest period of fieldwork in India, I 
was struck by the widespread use of a term that I had encountered frequently in the milieus of 
my research pertaining to small-scale food production and contentions over biodiversity.1 This 
term was “added value.” “Good employees” were being encouraged to “add value” to their 
companies by exhibiting “high levels of self-esteem, self-motivation, and self-reliance.” Teachers 
of “core” subjects were being assessed for the “value” they “added” to their students' test scores 
and art teachers were expected to “add value” by incorporating Math or English into their 
lessons.2 A radio talk show host said for the first time I noticed, “Your comments… added value.” 
In other words, the caller's words were worth the listeners’ time. 
 Vernacularized in many arenas, “added value” and its inverse “value added” seem to float 
free of historical and ideological strings, even as they remain knotted in threads of intellectual 
genealogy. In the field of economy, “value added” has indicated revenue generated at a 
particular stage of production or the utilitarian “enhancement” of a commodity, whether 
product or service, which distinguishes it from competition and “adds” to its functionality or 
consumer appeal. In development, the concept of “value-added” goods has played an important 
role in shaping policies that connect marginalized people and places to the market in a world 
increasingly driven by economic necessities. However, particularly relevant to this work are the 
ways these specific meanings conjoin with a broader signification: “added value” belies the 
                                                          
1See my “Reflections on Methodology” for a description of how I conducted fieldwork over 17 
months. 
2For example, refer to the article “New Study Strikes Latest Blow Against ‘Value-Added’ Teacher 




anxiety to perform, produce or be productive in the liberalized global economy – intimating, in 
other words, the “anxiousness” of capitalism.3  
Capitalism is, as David Harvey reminds, a process of (adding) “value in motion.” While 
commodities retain “use value,” or utility to humans, it is their “exchange value,” or competitive 
“worth” as measured by an equivalent (such as a money, itself a commodity) that most matters 
in the market. One of Marx’s abiding insights is that capitalist processes of adding (exchange) 
value occur through corresponding subtractions, which extend far beyond the cost of 
production. In the global network of social “equations,” a host of ideological “subtractions” are 
less quantifiable. These include obscuring forms of exploitation and dispossession and eclipsing 
alternative and non-calculative ways of relating from the purview of visibility, legitimacy and 
imagination.4 Thus, commodities appear to possess their own mystique untethered from the 
living labor that produces them or the conditions in which that labor was performed.5 As critical 
human geographers have laid bare over the past four decades, these subtractions also occur 
through divisions, both socio-spatial and epistemological.6  
 The pervasiveness and global circulation of “added value” discourse today evinces the 
extension and intensification of capitalist relations and the proliferation of financial calculations 
in people’s work, homes and lives. It reflects an ideology that understands the "booms and 
busts" of the market, and resulting "collateral damage" on humans, other species, the earth and 
beyond, as inevitable.7 It reflects a proliferating "common sense" that registers economic value 
                                                          
3 I borrow “anxious” from Gidwani’s (2008) “Capital’s Anxious Whole.”  
4 through institutional, legal, ideological, technological, cultural and socio-spatial means. In this 
work, both “primitive accumulation” (a term coined by Marx at a time of rapid industrial 
expansion in Britain) and “accumulation by dispossession” (a term coined by David Harvey to 
help understand changing regimes of accumulation in the neoliberal era) are at play. I discuss 
these more in Chapter One. 
5 Marx’s (1992) “commodity fetishism.”  
6 Work on political economic subtractions and divisions by critical human geographers that is 
influential on my thinking in this project includes that of David Harvey, Neil Smith, Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, Neil Smith, Doreen Massey, Vinay Gidwani and Cindi Katz. 




as the only kind of value and market-based solutions as the only answers to challenges and 
problems in our world. Thus, projects to “improve” the lives of those impoverished by market-
dominated relations and attend in the most basic ways to sustaining life get yoked to projects 
centered on the profit motive.8 This is certainly true when it comes to crises related to food, 
“rural livelihoods” and biodiversity in our world today – crises situated at the critical “human-
nature” interface – even though it has been widely acknowledged that these very crises have in 
part developed out of capitalist “globalization.”9 For the purpose of this analysis, two historical 
currents of "added value" are most relevant.10  
First, a current of social values. This flows from an 18th-century Enlightenment idea of 
progress that has shaped much of what we know as “development.” Today a globally circulating 
sentiment is that people, experiences, relationships and things in and of themselves lack – and 
therefore must perform and “add” – some quantifiable worth. Exemplified in the opening 
examples, standardized rubrics do not just determine value but impart it by making subjects 
individual, attributes discreet and thought legible to particular, socially positioned, codes of 
evaluation.11 As formalized markers of individuation become “public information” through 
media and policy, they appear to be widely or “equally” accessible, even in the face of profound 
social disparities. Against this homogenizing tendency, “finding oneself” or discovering a 
                                                          
8 For example, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) “helped” impoverished countries raise money by employing neoclassical 
development theory to promote privatization, trade liberalization and austerity measures. 
9 I join others including Tim Ingold, Phillipe Descola, David Arnold and Donna Haraway in 
challenging the ideological line drawn between humans and “nature,” hence I put this phrase in 
quotation. 
10 In Chapter One, I elaborate on aspects of present trends in neoliberal capitalism most relevant 
to this study.  
11 See Foucault’s (1995[1975]) Discipline and Punish. These notions correspond with systems of 
industrial production in which “people’s productive capacities and nature’s resources have to be 
organized into markets and rationalized in accord with cost accounting: the unity of production 
and human life is broken into smaller and smaller quantifiable subcomponents” (Taussig 
2010[1980]:4). The subject, who “adds value,” must express their/its skill, efficiency or 
uniqueness even as the conditions of life become increasingly precarious (the possibility of 




group’s, place’s, commodity’s or experience’s unique and intrinsic expression bestows that touch 
of character to distinguish it from the pool of standardized merit. Herein lies its possibility for 
“innovation,” marketability, wealth or even security. 
Second, a current of global economic value. This flows from the era marking the end of 
World War II and the culmination of many liberation struggles.12 Many scholars have 
understood this as a period of global possibility and Keynesian prosperity, as multilateral 
agreements were negotiated and leaders of "darker nations" collaborated to design a world that 
rejected colonial inequities and follow a course of nonalignment at the onset of the Cold War.13 
While more than a half-century later the transnational sphere reflects complex and shifting 
regimes of power, the multilateral institutions, agreements and banks forged through the hope 
and fire of that mid-20th century moment have nonetheless enabled the United States, its allies 
and countries whose wealth accrued though centuries of colonial and settler colonial occupation 
to continue to wield considerable geopolitical power – whether through institutional 
mechanisms like the veto power of the UN Security Council or through unofficial economic and 
political power accrued in part through historical conquests.14 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
also implemented in this era, exemplifies this refrain of “added value.”15 Like the standardized 
rubrics that assess an individual’s worth, GDP quantitatively measures the "output" (goods and 
services) of nation-states. Within that, categories denote the “added value” of categorical sectors 
and regions. This measure, in other words, hails the nation-state as the fundamental economic 
                                                          
12starting with Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944.  
13Representatives from India played a key role in originally drafting of the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights. See Bhagavan (2013) and Prashad (2008). 
14 The UN Security Council, comprised of five permanent members and six rotating members, 
has the power to veto any agreement made by the general body, and the structure of the Security 
Council itself cannot be changed unless this group ratifies this amendment. This has raised 
many objections. For example, South Asian countries contribute a large number of on the 
ground UN Security forces, yet none has a permanent representative. Furthermore, the 
decisions of the majority cannot override the Security Council and resolution passed by the 
majority are “recommendations” not binding legislation (tour of United Nations, NYC 
November 24, 2015). 




unit and encourages global comparison by criteria important to those with a stake in 
maintaining geopolitical inequities. Yet, the mathematical averages and financial equivalents 
used to determine GDP "subtract" from view the class disparities within regions and the forms 
of labor that do not appear to add economic value. Furthermore, this measure encourages 
governments to pursue highly destructive and wasteful activities as they follow a course of 
undifferentiated growth, externalizing costs into unseen realms of human and nonhuman life.  
In the mid-1900s when the multilateral architecture of “globalization" was being 
designed, India was among those countries that joined the “Third World” Non-Aligned 
Movement to defend against colonial and neocolonial exploitation in the emerging world 
system.16 India was also among those countries resolutely focused on their national economies 
in ways that mixed Keynesianism with elements of the Soviet model.17 Contending with and 
forging new geopolitical relationships upon India’s independence from British rule, the Indian 
government was also balancing national goals of economic development with establishing the 
world’s largest democracy and forms of distributive justice. 
In less than seventy-five years since, India has made a remarkable economic rise. This 
“developing country” has gone from being debt-bound and dependent on US Food Aid to being 
one of five “newly industrialized” countries that now account for 20 percent of the aggregate 
Gross World Product.18 However, this geopolitical trajectory has brought a host of socio-
                                                          
16 Twenty-nine countries met for the first time in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955 in the name 
of Afro-Asian solidarity and to advocate for non-interference in other countries' domestic 
affairs. However, they faced intense geopolitical pressures in the emerging cold war between 
NATO and the Communist Bloc.  
17 Despite the inclusion of agriculture in its initial five-year plans, the Indian government 
invested little in developing its agricultural infrastructure until the Green Revolution of the 
1960s because it was following a Soviet style course of heavy industrialization to move people 
out of the peasantry. 
18 The acronym BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) was coined by the chairman of Goldman 
Sachs in 2001, and South Africa was added in 2010 to make it BRICS. They are “developing” 
countries with fast-growing economies and current members of the G-20; hence, they hold 
considerably more power over global and regional affairs than most other “developing” 
countries. The coining of the term signified shifting global economic power. Collectively, BRICS 




environmental challenges that raise deeper questions about how value should be produced and 
what “progress” should mean. At the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 
December 2015 representatives of India called for “climate justice” for developing countries 
which have not primarily benefited from the centuries of environmental degradation wrought by 
industrial coal and oil use; they claim it is the obligation of “developed countries” to foot the bill 
for a global turn to renewable energy. At the same time, India is now among the group of 
"developed and developing" countries responsible for 90 percent of current global emissions 
whose effects, many scientists agree, will become irreversible and catastrophic unless 
substantial action is taken to reduce them.19 Furthermore, large segments of the India’s 
populace and democratic polity, in particular the rural poor, have not benefited from India’s 
economic success and contend daily with its social and environmental impacts. Indeed, since 
2000, national entitlements – through legislation such as the 2005 National Rural Employment 
Act and the 2013 National Food Security Act – have been so important because they help to 
mitigate the harmful social consequences of industrialization, urbanization and development.  
Agriculture has played an important, and paradoxical, role in India’s geopolitical ascent 
and the corresponding decline of biological diversity within its borders.20 In the 1960s, 
industrial agriculture helped to launch the slow upward trajectory of India’s GDP. The Green 
Revolution enabled India to become nationally “self-sufficient” in grain production and to 
increase agricultural exports that catered to global markets. From the 1980s, the increase in 
                                                          
There are varied opinions about how quickly and what kind of social power this collaboration 
will accrue.  
19The actual agreement will have four components: a legal agreement; national greenhouse gas 
emissions reduction commitments for 2025 or 2030; an economic plan and concrete 
commitments by non-governmental groups to help execute the plan. Global temperatures have 
continued to rise throughout the sequence of talks from 1997 Kyoto (which the US did not sign), 
to Bali 2007, to 2009 Copenhagen (which the US took a long time to sign and which was 
adopted in 2010). For basic information, see articles by Hepler (2015) and Harvey (2015). 
20 and has contributed to India's "climate" impact: India is the world's major producer of rice, 
primarily through flooded rice paddies, whose methane emissions contribute to the world's 




India's agricultural "output" has derived from shifts in the crops in the face of plateauing crop 
yields.21 Even as agriculture continues to play a major role in India’s economy, the country’s 
skyrocketing GDP since the mid-1990s has coincided with the decline of agriculture’s relative 
contribution.22 This shift coincides with the Indian government opening doors to foreign 
companies, developing "special economic zones" for industry and accommodating to 
multilateral stipulations that significantly reduce tariffs on trade and agricultural subsidies.23  
As the “information age” has inaugurated transgenic or “GM” technologies, agriculture is 
poised to make a leap in the value it adds to India’s “output.” Now researchers can combine bits 
of genetic information to "design life" according to highly specific criteria, and officials can 
collect and store vast amounts of geographic and personal data. Legal forms of land 
dispossession are moving in tandem with of legal forms of “biodiversity” and seed 
appropriation, and in a context of rapid climactic change. In 2014, among the final acts of the 
outgoing National Congress Party was to set in motion the approval of field trials on transgenic 
food crops, which activists had managed to halt by arguing that the trials undermined biosafety 
protocol India had multilaterally agreed to uphold.24 Among the first acts of new Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi’s BJP administration was to enact an eminent domain law to seize rural land to 
create industrial “agriparks.”25 These governmental decisions are meeting with forceful dissent. 
                                                          
21 K. Siviramakrishnan (2015) commented on this in his role as discussant in the panel “New 
Intermediaries and Changing Regimes of Agricultural Production in South Asia” at the 114th 
American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in Denver. 
22 India is the world’s greatest exporter of rice. 
23World Bank (2015) data estimates that “agriculture” comprised roughly 17% of India’s GDP in 
2014 (India is still major producer of world’s cotton and rice), though this appears to be falling. 
India’s farming population fell from roughly 77% in 1980 to 68% in 2014. For recent analysis of 
SEZs in India, see the works of Michael Levien and Jamie Cross, as well as the collection Power, 
Policy, and Protest: The Politics of India's Special Economic Zones, edited by Jenkins et al. 
(2014). 
24 I discuss this later in the introduction and in Chapter Three. There are also scientists who 
argue that biosafety for transgenic technologies has been tested and they are safe. See Hartung 
et al. (2014). 
25 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed Land Acquisition Amendment Bill (to use eminent 
domain in part for the purpose of creating agriparks) has met with great resistance in India’s 




For this political moment is also one of transnational protests against the power profit-driven 
corporations hold in multilateral negotiations; it is one of highly publicized information about 
farmer suicides in India’s cotton belt, of documented declines in India’s plant genetic diversity, 
of drought, of plummeting farming populations and of plateauing crop yields. It is a moment, in 
other words, when the unaccounted ecological and human costs of decades of capitalist “added 




From “Orphan Crop” to “Comeback Cereal”: Millets in the Time of “Added Value” 
 
If “added value” tells a story of market visibility, the food grains that are the focus of this work 
have hovered at the margins of this tale. They are dryland cereal or pseudocereal crops 
informally categorized as “millets,” which farmers have domesticated and grown primarily in 
Asia and Africa for roughly 4000 years.27 Their common English names include finger millet, 
barnyard millet, sorghum, pearl millet, foxtail millet, among others. Their continued cultivation 
through the European colonial era until the present reflects forms of labor and ways of life that 
comprise the “unseen acts” which Gandhi argued constitute the force of history.28 Their history 
of cultivation is a history entangled with present democratic unrest and climate anxieties; it is 
the history of farmers, grains and places that have been marginalized by colonial and national 
policies; it is a history written into land. 
My primary field site in the west-central Himalayan foothills of Uttarakhand in north 
India, where women are the predominant farmers, is among these places. Though particular in 
its socio-environmental history, it can be understood as kin to other mountainous regions where 
                                                          
26 See Howard, (2009) and UNCTAD (2013). Also Devinder Sharma writes a great deal about 
farmer crises in India’s public media. 
27 In Chapter One, I theorize the category of “millets.” Pseudocereals also include amaranth and 
quinoa.  




fields are small and not “scaled up,” and thus have not ostensibly contributed to the “national 
output” of agriculture. Whether categorized as “ecological refuges” or “biodiversity hot spots,” 
these regions are profoundly rich in variations of plant, animal and social life. Here the diversity 
of forest in profoundly varied microclimates abuts terraced fields – passed down through 
patrilineal lines – which have historically reflected diversified and mixed crop variations.29 
Despite their long agrarian histories, these places have often been construed as “nonproductive” 
or even “nonagricultural” because their forms of agriculture – or social practices on the land for 
the purpose of human sustenance – have largely not added capitalist value.30  
 Similarly disregarded, the production of millets and the human consumption of these 
food grains in India fell through the British colonial era and more sharply since India's 
independence. However, they continued to grow at the margins and in the shadows of industrial 
agriculture, economic exchange and “refined” grains, whether in remote, dryland or 
mountainous regions such as the hills of Uttarakhand, or at the perimeters of cash crop plots. 
That millets are now becoming more central to market-based agriculture is evident by how often 
the words “added” and “value” affix to mention of them. These include “value added” 
mechanisms intended to link millets to the “value chain;" “added value” processing to make 
flour, sweets, malts and biscuits; endeavors of farmers to “add value” through cooperatives or 
high yield millet varieties; national and regional projects to “add value" by promoting new 
modes of millet production and new forms of millet consumption; and entrepreneurial and NGO 
plans to sell organic “added value” millet products, at times marked with geographic indicators. 
This motley spectrum spans from grassroots projects to combat rural poverty through aspects of 
cultural heritage (noneconomic value) to projects to drive profits by bringing those same 
                                                          
29 James Scott (2010) also writes about this aspect of mountain geographies. The theory of 
“refuge regions” had brief popularity in Mexican anthropology (Aguirre Beltrán, 1979). 
30 but for a few exceptions, such as tea estates. But these are more prevalent in other northern 
regions like West Bengal. While fruit orchards are beginning to expand in Uttarakhand, which 
many attribute to warming temperatures, they are not as common here as in the neighboring 




farmers into the realm of debt and exchange. And as definitions of “value added” and networks 
of social actors collide, often both these goals are at play simultaneously. 
These crop varieties still exist to “add value” because farmers have continued to grow 
and consume them despite and indeed because of their market exclusion. Indeed, after decades 
of decline, India remains the world’s largest producer of finger millet, widely known in India as 
ragi or in Uttarakhand as mandua or koda. The relationship between farmers and these crops 
has been one of mutual sustenance under increasingly precarious conditions. Through periods 
of social upheaval, millet varieties represented and reproduced cultural heritage and forms of 
sociality. At times of economic and environmental distress, they signified and materialized 
forms of security and survival. Grains like finger millet have been called “poor person’s food” not 
only because they were often "free" or "cheap" and could grow in the poor soil cultivated by the 
rural destitute, but because their heartiness could relieve hunger with smaller quantities and for 
longer stretches than the market varieties of wheat and rice.31 Year after year, under conditions 
of marginalization and volatility, the seeds of those plants that most met the changing 
nutritional and environmental needs of some of those people most in need were selected, saved 
and sown. 
Now the ecological and economic conditions in which millets survived have become 
more generalized and publicized; these include drought, malnutrition and existential precarity. 
In other words, plant qualities cultivated through sustenance farming practices that bore and 
diffused the costs and contradictions of various colonial and national “subtractions” are being 
recognized as necessary for humanity’s food security and environmental survival. And the 
technological and institutional means now exist to incorporate their necessity into national 
development plans and capitalist agriculture.32 During my research from 2011 to 2014, millets 
                                                          
31 Millets “require few inputs and withstand severe biotic and abiotic stresses” (Padulosi et al. 
2015). 
32 At the same time we see the social organization of the global economy rapidly affecting major 




were included as subsidized food grains in India’s new Food Security Act; almost daily a 
headline proclaimed their nutritional or environmental benefits, promoted projects to 
industrially produce them or hailed the importance of their small scale or organic production.33  
If even twenty years ago, the “fact” of millets’ health and environmental benefits was not 
broadly recognized because it was not quantified, written or passed down from the elite or ruling 
classes, today those attributes possess internationally acknowledged value. Scientific studies 
conclude that finger millet (ragi, mandua) is “rich in phosphorus, potassium and iron” and has 
up to thirty times the calcium content of most other cereals. The human body can easily 
metabolize its eleusinian protein. Scientists confirm it contains important amino acids such as 
tryptophan, cysteine and methionine. The phytochemicals and polyphenols found in its seed 
coat make it rich in fiber and have been labeled “diabetes-resistant.” Research continues on its 
anti-microbial and antioxidant qualities.34 An article in UC Berkeley News entitled “Millets, Not 
Just Bird Food” described efforts of a six-member team to grow and promote millets in 
California as the state faces the prospect of intense, long-term drought. These studies often 
celebrate nutritional and climactic “components” as if they were intrinsic to the grains 
themselves; thus, the new importance given to marginalized food sources often detaches them 
from farmers’ lives, historical context and their conditions of production. 
To say millets are “adding value” is also to say that plant life once largely categorized as 
primitive, coarse and unfit for human consumption is now imbued with the potential to drive 
human “progress” and secure human futures. Consider the caption I recently found on the 
homepage of the multilateral research institute ICRISAT: “Orphan Crops Have Become Sexy.” It 
                                                          
33 As the team leader of this Berkeley project Amrita Hazra explains, “California is in a drought. 
And given that a large percentage of the state’s water goes toward agriculture, growing drought-
tolerant crops such as millets is a natural first step to diversify agriculture” (Kell 2015). 
34 “Nutritionally, they have high micronutrient content, particularly calcium and iron, high 
dietary fibre, higher amount of essential amino acids and low glycemic index and thus play an 
important role in the food and nutritional security of the poor” (Mal et al 2010). For more on 
how these nutritional qualities are described for the public and for promotional reasons, see 




was printed below a photo of a woman farmer apparently somewhere in Africa smiling in a 
field.35 This image presents the hope of project “HOPE” or "Harnessing Opportunities for 
Productivity Enhancement in Sorghum and Millets in South Asia and West/Central and 
Eastern/Southern Africa.36 It is the hope of financial backers such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation that incorporating sustenance farmers into the “value chain” through access to 
credit, fertilizers, transgenic and hybrid seeds will save them and make the world food secure as 
it adds value for investors and national economies.37 It is the hope that by becoming the object of 
consumption and desire, a formerly excluded small-scale farmer will be welcomed into the 
family of humanity, and the grains she cultivates into the family of modern consumption.  
This ingress does not indicate a unidirectional shift from a peasant mode of production 
to capitalist agriculture. The importance of millets and small-scale agriculture today has 
emerged out of rural social movements that have been expanding exponentially over the past 
two decades, with the largest transnational movement, La Via Campesina, now over 200 million 
farmers strong. In India these struggles have also been organized around millets and their 
future trajectory. Indeed, the temporality of sustenance agriculture has become perceptible on 
the global “clock.” On the one hand, this reflects changes in and contentions over how that clock 
marks time. On the other hand, as earlier noted, this signifies new forms of capitalist 
appropriation; for, the mark of consumable difference – of parochial particularity – now elicits 
the commodity’s allure. With millets, this mark is imbued with humanitarian urgency, “climate 
                                                          
35Syngenta is a major seed and chemical company based in Switzerland. Its Foundation is 
funded by it but claims to be administered independently. One of their webpages cited research 
on millets and agroecology in Uttarakhand. After a stretch of “wrong emails,” “out of service” 
numbers and “switched off” phones, I got in touch with one of the Directors of Syngenta 
Foundation India who said: “You know, they are called orphan grains.” I eventually discovered 
the project was an initiative of the M.S. Swaminathan Foundation and Bioversity International, 
and only partially funded by SFI. Another SFI Director later met with me and spoke to me at 
length about their agroecological efforts.  
36 http://hope.icrisat.org/ 
37The Gates Foundation along with Rockefeller Foundation has invested significantly in 




resilience,” exoticism, and “healthiness.” As illustrated by the photo of the smiling woman in the 
field, adding market value no longer compels a turn to mass production or mechanized fields, 
but also might maintain the characteristic remnant of peasant life, femininity, remoteness or 
intimacy. Such images accompany present efforts by industry and developed nations to promote 
small-scale agriculture in developing countries as a way to mitigate the effects of their own 
undifferentiated growth (for example, through carbon trading).  
The pejoratively labeled “minor” millets in my study –mandua/koda (finger millet) and 
madhira/janghora (barnyard millet) – are also becoming coveted. These marginalized grains 
are stamped with Himalayan or pahari (of the hills) mystique. Nonetheless, they still grow at 
the periphery of these processes. Geographically in my study this “periphery” is rural Kumaon 
and Garhwal, the two ethno-linguistic sides of the small and mountainous north Indian state of 
Uttarakhand. Economically, it is a place of compounded marginality. This region has been cast 
as feminine and economically unproductive, a reserve of “natural” resources like water and 
forests and a place where small-scale farm work has long been perceived to be of little 
consequence.38 For precisely these reasons, it is among the many places where the externalized 
costs of capitalist accumulation strategies onto the dual realms of the environment and the 
household converge. 39 On various occasions in this work, I refer to this interstitial site – where a 
great deal of agricultural biodiversity is produced and practiced – as “sustenance work.”40 
Sustenance work in Uttarakhand, and more broadly in India and other regions of the 
world, has become predominantly women’s work as men migrate to towns and cities for wages; 
thus, it reveals the gendered socio-spatial effects of the globalization of agriculture, 
                                                          
38Soon after its separation from Uttar Pradesh and achievement of statehood in 2000, the state 
government declared Uttarakhand an “organic state.” This was in part a way of claiming an 
agrarian identity both internally and nationally. However, in my fieldwork I found that chemical 
inputs are still used by many farmers and promoted by some government officials and branches.  
39Agarwal (2013), Federici (2012), Shiva (2005), Razavi (2002). 
40 I use “work” here instead of “labor” because this work is life and (though deeply connected) is 
not imbedded in capitalist relations. However, the boundary between these terms is porous, and I 




industrialized food production and capitalist development on rural places. Sustenance work 
sustains capitalism yet inhabits the invisible realm of externalized costs. Sustenance work is how 
rural families on the losing side of industrial agriculture and capitalist development have 
sustained themselves in part through (agri)cultural practices and noneconomic ways of relating 
and knowing; conversely, through “sustenance work” one sees how local hierarchies, patriarchy 
and capitalist development interlock to make life hard for those tasked with sustaining the 
majority of humankind.41 Sustenance work is imbedded in the “plant genetic material” of food 
crops that are now recognized as necessary for global “food security” and plant biotechnological 
innovation. “Biodiversity loss” is, in part, the transformation of this work as globalized 
agriculture and climate change (the two are related) exacerbate the precarity of rural lives.  A 
telling irony in the world today is that the majority of people in the world living in hunger or 
malnutrition are food producers. This raises profound moral and practical questions about what 
“progress” and “democracy” have come to mean – questions that bind human lives and human 
futures to the lives and futures of plants, animals, insects, bacteria, oceans, rivers, lakes, dirt, 
soil and much more. 
This work understands the sustenance work – and mandua and madhira – in 
Uttarakhand, India to be part of a vast network of rural regions, crops and producers whose 
marginalization has masked their centrality to capitalist development and accumulation. As this 
centrality takes more visible forms, as small-scale farming becomes “important” to global food 
production and reducing carbon emissions, as millets “add value,” what does it make possible, 
foreclose and mean for those who are emerging as protagonists? What can an investigation of 
millets from these margins illuminate about ongoing processes of capitalist “subtraction?” What 
                                                          
41 “Noneconomic” forms of relating are not inherently less exploitative. In Chapter Two I depict 
how caste and patriarchal relations in the local arena get exacerbated when compounded by 
consumer culture and widening divides between those who have and those who do not have 




might the endangerment of “biodiversity” and sustenance work tell us about how dominant 
perceptions of “human progress” impede possibilities for democracy? 
 
 
The Subaltern Practice of Biodiversity: An Analytical Framework 
 
Over the four years in which I conducted this seventeen month study, I became convinced about 
the importance of issues of “biodiversity” to food production and consumption in our world; I 
also became convinced that biodiversity is about human relationships as much as anything one 
might call “nature.” Moving through divergent social environments made me aware of power as 
a key issue, one that undergirded any conflict related to technology or cultural heritage. It also 
made me aware of the importance of bringing to light the intimate ways in which human and 
nonhuman life are entangled at their very roots. 
Problematizing the concept of “biodiversity” in this work, I understand the living labor, 
social life and practical philosophies of agrarian life to be seared into “seeds,” “crops,” "grains" 
and “plant genetic material” – and the opposite to also be true. "Climate resilience," “plant 
nutrition,” and "plant genetic diversity," in other words, speak of human sweat, human 
knowledge and human diversity. If “biodiversity” as “natural resource” accommodates to 
capitalist accumulation strategies because of its ideological severance from the human 
contribution to nonhuman life, the “practice of biodiversity” offers a heuristic counter frame. I 
am not concerned here with classifying or policing what falls inside or outside the borders of this 
term, but rather with opening up spaces for reflecting on how power works and how food is 
produced in our world.  
Though one could argue that an analysis of millets "from the margins" of Uttarakhand, 
India cannot be “scaled up” to a generalization, biodiversity is precisely about social and 
geographically situated niches that: (1) reflect something about broader processes of 
globalization because of their crucial situatedness within these processes; and (2) are important 




capitalist development and commodification, it also challenges assumptions that only things 
that have been or can be "scaled up," mapped, valued on GDP graphs or assessed on 
institutional checklists matter in a national or global frame.  
The subaltern practice of biodiversity expands on "the social production of nature," a 
critical geographic theory of how evolving capitalist relations produce nature ideologically and 
materially. As Neil Smith writes,  
...with the progress of capital accumulation and the expansion of economic 
development, this material substratum is more and more the product of social 
production, and the dominant axes of differentiation are increasingly societal in 
origin. In short, when this immediate appearance of nature is placed in historical 
context, the development of the material landscape presents itself as a process of 
the production of nature.42 
 
The subaltern practice of biodiversity reveals how “nature” is becoming “more and more a 
product of social production” through the effects of the globalization of food and agriculture on 
small-scale agrarian regions and lives. It also exemplifies how the social production of nature is 
intertwined with "uneven development" propelled by the drive to profit; infrastructures that 
“revitalize” or “develop” particular places simultaneously endanger and deplete others. 
 Specifically the subaltern practice of biodiversity attends to human contributions to, 
and direct co-existence with, the breadth of other life forms, particularly in rural realms of the 
“Global South” where the majority of the world’s biological diversity resides and from where it 
has historically been siphoned to European, settler colonial and national metropoles. The 
subaltern practice of biodiversity offers an analysis of global capitalism from the “margins” and 
at a moment when information has become a major technological and institutional vehicle of 
cultural appropriation. Furthermore, the subaltern practice of biodiversity emphasizes the 
under-acknowledged importance of aesthetic sensibilities, everyday life, social reproduction and 
economically “unproductive” work to broader political economic and social processes, and to 
human futures.  
                                                          




As a framework of analysis, the subaltern practice of biodiversity reflects solidarity with 
scholars who make de-colonial, anti-racist and feminist arguments. In addition to the “social 
production of nature,” a few others guide this political economic analysis: (1) Cedric Robinson’s 
claim that capitalism is and from the start has been racial capitalism has helped me to make 
sense of geopolitical phenomena with colonial histories.43 (2) Stuart Hall’s “Race is the modality 
through which class is lived” has enabled me to see manifestations of caste as social and 
historical articulations rather than as grounded in static identities.44 (3) Chandra Mohanty’s call 
for conjoined feminist and political economic critiques has encouraged me to better recognize 
the underside of capitalist development in places I have been conditioned to think of as 
“domestic” or “small.”45 (4) The importance Antonio Gramsci gives to education, thought and 
belief has emboldened me to focus much of my analysis on these unseen realms of struggle.46  
Through the subaltern practice of biodiversity, I aim to: (1) complicate the belief that 
commodifying and classifying food crops or “natural resources” through quantitative and 
economic methods is the answer to the problems threatening human and nonhuman life in the 
world; and (2) bring into view the everyday life, sustenance work and power relations that 
constitute biodiversity as a practice. Ultimately, I hope this raises more questions about the 
“ideologies of nature” that underpin social inequities through “democratic” means, as well as 
provokes more conversation about how “saving biodiversity” entails bringing attention to the 
quality and vibrancy of our democracies in and through how we organize our relationships with 
nonhuman life.47  
 
 
Subaltern * Practice * Biodiversity 
                                                          
43Robinson (1983). 
44 Hall (1980). 
45 Mohanty (2003). 
46 Gramsci (1993). 
47 Ecuador and Bolivia have formed constitutional “Rights of Nature” and “Rights of Mother 
Earth” frameworks. This has no doubt been bolstered by the strong contingent of indigenous 





By briefly elaborating on key words of my underlying framework, I want to underscore and 
clarify the analytical threads and political exigencies that weave throughout this work: 
 
"SUBALTERN" brings power front and center into the conversation about 
“biodiversity;” understands the practice of biodiversity to be historically situated 
in complex global, national and local circuits; and, attends to the exploitation and 
ideological subjugation that accompanies the endangerment and survival of 
sustenance work. 
 
If words, as Mikhail Bakhtin claimed, reside in contexts embedded with histories and 
anticipations, those of “subaltern” evoke particular complexities.48 It is precisely for this reason 
that no other term – “subjugated,” for instance – could perform and enable the same analytical 
work. This term has a long and varied past, one that extends earlier than its use by Marxist and 
one-time leader of the Communist Party of Italy Antonio Gramsci with whom it is often 
associated: 
In late-medieval English, it applied to vassals and peasants. By 1700, it denoted 
lower ranks in the military, suggesting peasant origins. By 1800, authors writing 
'from a subaltern perspective' published novels and histories about military 
campaigns in India arid America; and G.R. Gleig (1796-1888), who wrote 
biographies of Robert Clive, Warren Hastings, and Thomas Munro, mastered this 
genre. The Great War provoked popular accounts of subaltern life in published 
memoirs and diaries; and soon after the Russian Revolution, Antonio Gramsci 
(1891—1937) began to weave ideas about subaltern identity into theories of class 
struggle.49  
 
In the South Asian context, it is impossible to escape this word’s deep association with 
the Subaltern Studies Collective, an interdisciplinary conversation among Indian and English 
scholars (most prominently associated with the work of Ranajit Guha) that began in the 1970s 
and became more globally popular in the 1990s. Subaltern Studies reflects numerous strands of 
thought that cannot be neatly categorized but have together offered a postcolonial critique of 
                                                          
48 Here I am particularly drawing from Bakhtin’s (1982) work in The Dialogic Imagination, but 
certainly Raymond Williams (1978) reminds us of the same.  
49 See Ludden (2002) and Sivaramakrishnan (2005). Amitav Ghosh’s Ibis Trilogy (Sea of Fire) 
employs a military use of the term. Gramsci’s renovation of “subaltern” in his Prison Notebooks 





history and modernity.50 At the same time, this body of work, taken generally, has been 
criticized for effacing class struggle and rendering the “subaltern” and “peasant subjectivity” as 
residing in a substratum outside of politics.51 Importantly, as David Ludden notes, “the 
intellectual history of subalternity has emerged outside and in opposition to Subaltern Studies 
as much as inside it.”52  
Certainly, the prolific work of the Collective has shaped this project and my broader 
thought. However, if “historians outside the project [have tended] to locate subalterns more 
carefully in changing environments that include economic, political, ecological, technological, 
and social history,” then my concerns are also located “outside.”53 I interpret “subaltern” similar 
to how Marcus Green reads “subaltern” in Gramsci’s writings. Green argues that the term is not 
simply “a stand in for ‘proletariat’” that was meant to escape prison censors and, furthermore, 
that it is “not limited to class relations” as it has often been assumed. Instead, it “encompasses 
an intersectionality of race, class, gender, and religion. For Gramsci, subalternity is constituted 
through constructions of identity, otherness, and marginality that are reinforced within an 
ensemble of social, political, and economic relations.”54 Similarly, I use this concept to analyze 
contentions over power, ideas and resources that cut across scales and manifest in material 
                                                          
50 As Ludden (2002) explains, the Subaltern Studies Collective (with the first collected volume 
published in 1982) began as a critique of the “Cambridge School” of Indian history during the 
intellectual shift to “histories from below” and when the theme of peasant insurrection in India 
was becoming popular. Its analyses of resistance to state power later became more focused on 
“recuperating subaltern subjectivity,” as well as a critique of modernity and linear time through 
the influence of Foucault’s work. With the flow of scholars in and out, variety of global audiences 
and diverse and changing preoccupations of the core people in the conversation, “Subaltern 
Studies” does not mean today what it meant in 1982, 1985, 1989, or 1993 (pg. 2). See the work of 
former member Sumit Sarkar (1997) or, more recently, Vivek Chibbur (2013) for critiques.  
51 Ludden (2002: 14): “state institutions, texts, personnel, and discourse, including those of the 
nationalist movement, stand in stark opposition to subaltern India and its indigenous culture.” 
52 Ibid (3). 
53 Ibid (26). This space outside, as Ludden alludes in the previous quotation, is nonetheless 
deeply related to the “inside.” Furthermore, by “outside” in this instance I do not mean “in 
opposition to.” My stake here is not to critique of Subaltern Studies but to explain the how 
“subaltern” works in this text. 




ways. “Subaltern” in this study underscores how the everyday life and practices live within a 
complex geopolitical web in which local class relations and struggles over resources play an 
important but not absolute role.  
 “Subaltern,” in other words, evokes the inalienable yet profoundly versatile relationship 
between social values and economic value and the ways in which that relationship is always 
changing. While there are no “subalterns” in this text – as I want to highlight historical 
processes not social identities – “subaltern” as I employ it gestures towards the potential for 
solidarities born of practical and socially situated work/labor and experiences of subjugation. Its 
broad and prolific use among scholars of rural dispossession and rural social movements 
throughout the “Global South” (Wendy Wolford and Michael Watts provide examples) and for 
political purposes such as fighting for land rights illuminates points of connection.55  
Finally, and importantly, “subaltern” here evokes a theory of space posited by Prema 
Devi, a farmer who later appears in this work. Sitting in her courtyard one evening, she asked 
me to describe my journey from New York. My imagery drew on the globe and the language of 
equivalents. She replied, "That's not how I see." She described islands floating in layers and 
suspended in space. I had come from a layer "above.” Her description emphasizes the practical, 
relational and phenomenological effects of space with attention to power, mobility and gender. 
Put differently, Prema was remarking on the direct relation of our homes to each other from the 
positioned experience of living that relation. In addition, her islands are entire. Each fully 
encompasses life. This “wholeness” is not harmonious or closed, but tentative. It is a condition 
of erupting and resolving tensions. However, no “life world” or social world is more complete 
than any another is.56 
                                                          
55 In Chapter One and the concluding chapter, I make a similar argument about the category of 
“millets.”  





With her reference to “above” and initial inquiry into my presence, Prema posited that 
people, ideas and commodities move from one “island” to another in flows that are not "equal.” 
As someone who lives in pahar (the hills), she knows, physically and intellectually, that it takes 
more energy and resources to climb than to descend. And her situatedness as a pahari woman 
informs a perspective that one's ability and inclination to “move” changes based on one’s gender 
and the socio-economic context of that identity; hence, she and I were different. Moving from 
one island to another requires leaps: subjective, social, experiential, cognitive, philosophical. 
With that leaping, the “islands” themselves (trans)form. This perspective on life and space, 
which emerges out of an awareness of being “below,” is suppressed by mechanisms that also 
limit the imaginative horizons for those positioned “above.” 57 For example, many would 
consider Prema’s map “wrong,” and that judgment of error circumscribes the possibilities for a 
shared subjectivity and ways of organizing our relationships.  
 
"PRACTICE" brings the “messiness” of everyday life and the “domestic” into the 
frame of politics and biodiversity; shows local forms of exploitation and 
patriarchy to work with and against capitalist accumulation strategies; and, 
understands (agri)culture to be a form of education. 
 
My use of “practice” builds on what various scholars and farmers have called 
"agricultural biodiversity practices" or "agroecological practices" — in this case those related to 
cultivating mandua (finger millet), madhira (barnyard millet) in mixed crop fields in rural 
Uttarakhand, India.  
Agricultural biodiversity is the basis of all food, fibre and other products of 
ecosystems used by people, their livestock and other farmed, fished and 
harvested species (PAR and FAO 2011) and it has critical, but often under-
recognised, linkages with culture, spirituality and livelihoods (Pimbert, 2006). It 
is a creation of humankind whose food and livelihood security and food 
sovereignty depend on the sustained management of the biodiversity that is 
important for food and agriculture: the origins of agricultural biodiversity are 
through the careful selection and inventive developments of women and men 
                                                          




small-scale food providers over more than 10 millennia, since the dawn of 
civilisation. (Mulvany, 2001; ITDG, 1996).58  
 
These are methods associated with small-scale farming, local production-consumption circuits, 
mixed crop systems, networks of farmer saved seeds and seed reciprocity, densely interwoven 
domestic and agricultural labor and (often) legacies of cultural heritage, which are also 
connected to their own legacies of patriarchy and social inequality.  
I also employ "practice" to connote something beyond these features. Practice is 
practical, and therefore prioritizes lived effects over ideals. Drawing from Prema Devi's islands, 
"a practice," signifies modes of living, or situated philosophies and shared life views that bring a 
sense of coherency to life and reflect practical understandings of one’s place in the world. 
“Practice” reflects the practical work involved in small-scale food production, which often 
cultivates forms of attunement and receptivity to the temporalities and needs of nonhuman 
species and actively incorporates notions of human restraint. “Practice” entails practicing – 
something at play in all aspects of life, as the body and mind accommodate to and produce 
socio-environmental temporalities and effects. During my time in rural Uttarakhand, I found 
this involved kinds of experimentation that emphasize process, learning through absorption, 
informal apprenticeship and direct connections between sensory and intellectual knowledge; 
these existed in the context of patriarchy, violence, caste exclusion and class exploitation. In 
other words, the practice of biodiversity does not offer a cure for the ills of capitalism and 
colonialism, nor does it stand outside or before them.  
Of the theories of "practice" that inform this text, two are foundational. First, Judith 
Butler's analysis of gender and subject formation in which iteration is both habituating and 
transgressive; by conforming to what Foucault understood as temporal "disciplining," the body 
and mind consciously and subconsciously also open up spaces for and enact rebellions.59 
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sovereignty at the International Institute of Social Studies at The Hague.  




Second, Gramsci's exposition on education and "praxis" in which experience is practical and 
emerges dialectically through socio-historical tensions that are, in Stuart Hall’s words, 
“structured in dominance.”60 It is through living in the practical sense that one becomes 
educated into and potentially conscious of one's social position, social values and the 
situatedness of one’s intellect, desires and repulsions. Shame, pride, blindness to and awareness 
of one's "place" causes one to jettison, seek, reinforce or appropriate particular practices or a 
generalized practice of living.  
 
"BIODIVERSITY" highlights time and modes of living; recognizes that the 
endangerment of plant varieties has accompanied the narrowing of ways of 
relating, understanding nature and forging democracy; and, underscores the  
work that sustains human and nonhuman life. 
 
 “Biodiversity” is a site through which transnational and national contentions over seeds, 
food and intellectual property intersect; it raises questions about democracy and citizenship in 
the era of globalization. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992, India was among the early countries to 
ratify the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) when it was opened for signatures at the "Earth 
Summit.” This multilateral treaty, which emerged in part out of civil society concerns and now 
has 196 parties with the notable exception of the US, was the first piece of international 
legislation to articulate biodiversity as "a common concern of humankind”:61 
The Earth's biological resources are vital to humanity's economic and social 
development. As a result, there is a growing recognition that biological diversity 
is a global asset of tremendous value to present and future generations. At the 
same time, the threat to species and ecosystems has never been so great as it is 
today. Species extinction caused by human activities continues at an alarming 
rate.62 
 
                                                          
60 Hall (1980). 
61 The CBD developed out of an ad hoc working group from the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) in November 1988. The CBD remained open for signature until early June 
1993. All UN member states – with the exception of the United States – have ratified the treaty. 
The CBD is associated with the 2001 ITPGRA or “Seed Treaty,” which also seeks to protect 
farmers’ rights. 




The CBD’s iterations mark shifting national and transnational protective measures related to 
evolving industrial innovations, historically specific patterns of deforestation, transnational 
agreements related to global trade and geopolitical regimes. For example, the Cartagena 
Protocol (adopted in 2000) was drafted to guard against the potential biosafety risks to 
biological diversity from living modified organisms (GM or transgenic) with then recent 
breakthroughs in plant biotechnology. Ten years later, due in part to intense civil society 
protests concerning the socio-environmental effects of the extension of “intellectual property 
rights” that protect industrial innovations, the Nagoya Protocol endeavored to provide a 
transparent legal framework for “fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the 
utilization of genetic resources.” This was because those industrial innovations used as their 
base material, and without compensation or acknowledgment, plant life that small-scale farmers 
had contributed to producing through selecting, saving and replanting seeds over thousands of 
years. Making profits by selling this “genetic material” back to farmers in a new form was not 
only unjust, many argued, but also threatened the very practices that produced “plant genetic 
material” in the first place. 
As a written instrument, CBD reflects the widespread acknowledgment in the national 
and transnational arenas of the importance of smallholders, “traditional” knowledge and 
“indigenous and local communities” to protecting the world’s biological diversity.63 However, in 
practice it reveals opposing claims and motivations for “preserving biodiversity.” Countries have 
varying stakes both in benefiting from and in protecting themselves against industrial endeavors 
to use “raw” genetic information to commercialize new forms of life. India and other members of 
the “Global South,” in which the majority of the world’s biological diversity resides, are asserting 
their rights, citing centuries of seed, plant and other “natural resource” extraction through 
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colonial rule and occupation. The United States’ continued refusal to ratify the CBD reflects its 
own geopolitical interest in industrial innovation and maintaining forms of “free” access to the 
world’s plant genetic material. Corporations are using opposing multilateral agreements, in 
particular the UPOV ’91, to pressure national governments to create and enforce seed 
certification laws that restrict farmers from planting saved seed and criminalize farmers if they 
do. This has deeply undermined the principles and effectiveness of the CBD, in particular its 
Nagoya Protocol.64 If national governments have employed the “national resource” claim to 
appropriate land, water, forests and seeds from their populace, civil society groups, including 
those in India, have also used it – and India’s corresponding 2002 Biological Diversity Act – to 
pressure national governments against adopting industry-friendly legislation like the UPOV 
’91.65  
These conflicts have centered to some degree on matters of property. No doubt, claims 
over biodiversity as a resource or as property are not abstract; they have been critical and 
strategic avenues for local groups to protect resources and their access to resources upon which 
they depend (and often vice versa), and they have halted processes of dispossession by private 
and government actors.66 This work furthers understandings of biodiversity as a (human-human 
as well as interspecies) relation in such a way as to deepen those claims and show how they 
extend to farmers who do not claim biodiversity in this way. By shifting the frame away from 
biodiversity as an idea, a state of purity, an attribute of nature, an outcome, a good, a 
harmonious system or a national/natural resource, I highlight how these struggles over 
ownership are also ideological struggles over the organization of time and social values. Prema 
                                                          
64 Many people whom I interviewed, from government officials to journalists, argued this has 
become the case in India. 
65 India’s Biological Diversity Act of 2002 acknowledges the role of local people and local 
governance (through the village panchayat) in biodiversity conservation. The nonprofit the 
Gene Campaign and its Director Dr. Suman Sahai has written widely on this topic and some 
reports are available on the organization’s website. 




Devi, like most paharis whom I met, children included, appreciates and names the diversity of 
plant and animal life that comprises her world, in forests and fields. In other words, she shares 
with others a “common sense” understanding of biodiversity as a practical effect and a source of 
life.67 However, she, like others, does not claim “biodiversity” as a categorical thing. Both the 
content and form of this work conforms to this sensibility. 
 
 
Writing the Subaltern Practice of Biodiversity  
 
Each ethnographic or writing project comes with its own root challenges. In this instance, mine 
has been to analyze aspects of the global political economy and India’s agricultural development 
while minimizing my reproduction of the “commodity logic” that drives quantitative, linear and 
instrumental forms of assessment and countering the valorization of these approaches to truth-
making more broadly.68 Gramsci’s work reminds us that infrastructures of national development 
and political economy also produce and are fashioned out of infrastructures of thought and 
sociality, and they are transformed by the same.  
For me, this task has not only entailed calling attention to what has been outframed – 
i.e., focusing on content, the “what” – but re-orienting the process of framing – i.e., emphasizing 
form, the “how.” In the pages that follow, I engage in a manner of thinking that either overtly 
problematizes “inevitable” refrains of history or “progress” or more subtly enters into spaces of 
nonlinear logic, “extended family” ways of relating and temporal attunement to multiple species 
modeled by pahari practices and philosophies. Taking time to "be with,” the narrative includes 
textural elements of living often rendered “unnecessary” by capitalist ideologies; it engages in 
                                                          
67 Gramsci used “common sense” to mean a shared (common) understanding that derives from 
practical life, saturated in relationships of power. 
68 Marilyn Strathern (1990) brought this question to the table long before me. I also use the 




what Vincent Crapanzano calls a Bakhtinian and dialogic approach to anthropology, one that 
works against a tendency in social research to relegate the matter of life to "subject matter."69 
Furthermore, the narrative form of each chapter delivers, and enacts, a fundamental 
aspect of that chapter’s argument, which cannot be made by simply stating a case. In part 
because in this work a great deal of what I analyze relies on the unstated, what is behind words 
and what words come to mean in social context. Analyzing the unstated realm across spatial 
arenas has necessitated heightened attention to the relationship between my written words and 
their form. Each chapter engages differently with ethnographic material, time and space. 
Together, the chapters attend to the ways mandua, madhira and other crops and animal life are 
embedded in and contribute to producing social life in Uttarakhand, as well as the ways they are 
being pulled into capitalist agriculture and consumption that work to technologically, 
institutionally and ideologically sever seeds and grains from that life. 
Most importantly, writing about the subaltern practice of biodiversity has itself been an 
educational practice. If this project argues that the subaltern practice of biodiversity works 
through and embodies social contradictions, the same can be said of writing about it. If this 
project understands social life to be inherently messy, so too has simultaneously claiming my 
subject position and surrendering to a kind of dislocation from it been a messy task. Bringing 
socially segregated spheres into direct ethnographic contact through my humanness “in the 
field” or on the page70 has involved a series of revised choices and instinctual actions that reflect 
my own ethical and political struggles, biases and reflections on those struggles and biases.71 The 
result reflects moments of crystallization, which on the one hand cannot escape but on the other 
                                                          
69Crapanzano (1991). My approach also corresponds with various South Asian philosophies, art 
forms and religions that incorporate dialogue and the sense of extended networks into 
depictions of the world and the self. One example is Gandhi’s (1909) Hind Swaraj or India 
Home Role. 
70 a humanness that was received differently and evaluated differently and simply was different 
in various settings. 




hand can transform the conditions of their production. As the argument of this work does not 





This work comprises five chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion, followed by 
reflections on methodology. I examine three aspects of the subaltern practice of biodiversity as 
it relates to the production of mandua and madhira in mixed fields in Uttarakhand. These 
aspects are:  
(1) socio-spatial contingencies (conditions that produce subalternity);  
(2) everyday life and labor in context of “feminized” rural distress (the practice 
of biodiversity as social life); and, 
(3) millet commodification and related mechanisms of alienation (the stakes of  
      becoming valuable as “biodiversity”).72  
 
These accompany the earlier mentioned attributes that make rural Uttarakhand a site of 
convergence for the externalized costs of capitalist development onto the environment and the 
household:  
(a) its association with "nature" as separate from humans; 
(b) its perceived economic "unproductivity;” and, 
(c) its proliferation of dryland small-scale agriculture.  
 
While each chapter considers relations between different arenas, as the argument moves from 
chapter to chapter it focuses first on spaces “between;” then on everyday life and farmer fields in 
Kumaon, Uttarakhand; and finally on the movement of seeds away from the hills. 
Chapter One “Pahar-Bahar [Hills-Outside]” depicts socio-spatial contingencies that shape the 
past, present and future of rural life in the hills. Here, I examine what I call the “triple 
marginalization” of pahar, pahari farmers and pahari grains, which constitutes a triple 
marginalization of place, people and the practice of (agricultural) biodiversity. I analyze the 
ways in which these forms of marginalization (being made “remote,” “unproductive” or 
                                                          




invisible) are interlinked and occur in relation to places, people and modes of agricultural 
production constituted as central to the nation or industry. This chapter begins with two 
detailed ethnographic events that evoke two apparently disparate milieus. The first one occurs 
in pahar, in the fields with women farmers who are trying to protect their crops from suar (wild 
boar) at night. The second takes place bahar (outside), far away from the hills at a 
national/transnational meeting on “family farming” in south India. Moving out from these 
events, I examine four crosscutting contingencies – “Pahar/Bahar,” “Mandua/Millets,” 
“Economy/Ecology” and “Food/Security (Sovereignty)” – that relate them historically and in the 
present.  Through this relational framework, I make the broader case that narratives depicting 
India’s Green Revolution and current biotechnological projects as “inevitable” or “necessary” 
work to narrow the scope of democratic possibility by eclipsing the roles of agrarian labor and 
political struggle. This “narrowing” has accompanied a decrease in plant varieties as well as 
moves by industry to contain and control the contingencies of seeds and plant life. 
Chapter Two “Jan Gyan [People Knowledge]” examines how deeply the practice of 
biodiversity in Uttarakhand is intertwined with patrilineal and patriarchal relations, broader 
social life, religious beliefs and cultural rituals – such that pahari grains embody what is 
material, ideological, practical and spiritual. In this chapter, I depict how the practice of 
biodiversity changes in the face of national and capitalist development and globalized 
agriculture. Keeping in mind Prema’s framing, I attend to the robustness and “messiness” of 
everyday life in rural pahar while examining how subaltern forms of life, thought and education 
are being endangered. This chapter weaves interrelated narratives of human and plant life, as 
the ethnography performs and emerges out of the modes of life it depicts, mirroring forms of 
receptivity, motion, open-endedness, dynamic and dense social relationships and sensory 
attunement. Veering away from a tightly bound linear argument, the chapter’s four narrative 
sections highlight the importance of social reproduction and patrilineality to mandua and 




simultaneously devalue and rely upon sustenance work and rainfed crops; (b) pahari practices 
and ways of knowing are both devalued and reinforced in a context of “feminized” rural distress; 
(c) women face competing pressures to perform class through whiteness and consumerism on 
the one hand, and through physical strength and hard work on the other; and, (d) NGO 
fieldworkers inhabit the contradictory social positions as they attempt to revive “traditional” 
crops. 
Chapter Three “Kheth Khaana Beej [Field Food Seed]” analyzes the major contentions 
around “minor” (marginalized) food grains. Here, I examine what happens when mandua leaves 
small-scale pahari production-consumption circuits as “(agricultural) biodiversity” in the form 
of seed, grain and genetic information: what happens when the lives, work and knowledge 
related to the practice of biodiversity crystalize into the mobile “millet,” a “biodiversity 
resource” or “plant genetic material.” This chapter illustrates how, as they grow in places and as 
they travel through space and time, seeds are practical and political sites of democratic struggle. 
In this chapter, nine “Portraits” and nine “Passages” portray the kinds of dislocation and 
containment that accompany the new mobility and social/economic value of marginalized 
grains. As the "Portraits" move from a kitchen in pahar to an NGO seed bank to a vault in the 
National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources, they do not follow an individualized "seed” or 
"grain," but call on the reader to imagine the social realities this progression entails, excludes 
and makes possible. Corresponding "Passages" of analytical text illuminate processes that 
spatially, temporally and ideologically (dis)connect; in other words they represent passages 
(movement) of time and space.  
The concluding chapter “Jal, Jangal, Zameen [Water, Forest, Land]” arrives at a looking 
glass take on capitalist “added value” development and agriculture, one that gestures towards a 
more expansive view. The title of this chapter is a historical and contemporary pahari chant that 
voices a political claim to local resources and a common pahari wisdom that categories of 




Zameen” as an example, I look to the subaltern practice of biodiversity as an intersectional 
spatial and temporal node through which certain impracticalities and contradictions of capitalist 
logics and ideas of “progress” are unearthed. I contend that the subaltern practice of 
biodiversity (the practice, not the concept) opens up practical, intellectual and political 
possibilities. For this reason, “counter-topographies” and transnational rural alliances, such as a 
national farmer seed exchange and an Afro-Asian millet network, have formed across vast 




                                                          






5. An example of the resurgence of interest in “orphan crops” described in the Opening.1 
 
 
6. Millets are entering a new “improved” status, as analyzed in Chapter Three.2 
 
  
                                                          
1 Kebebew (2014). 




7. As this Google search illustrates, numerous sites now advocate the health benefits of  







Chapter One                   Pahar-Bahar  
           [Hills-Outside] 
 
 
SUBALTERN practice of biodiversity 
This chapter depicts socio-spatial contingencies that shape the past, present and future of rural life in 
the hills of Uttarakhand. I examine the “triple marginalization” of pahar, pahari farmers and pahari 
grains, in other words a “triple marginalization” of places, people and the practice of (agricultural) 
biodiversity. I analyze the ways in which these forms of marginalization intersect and occur in relation 
to places, people and modes of production deemed significant to national development or industry. In 
other words, they are made subaltern and rendered “remote,” “unproductive” and invisible. To 
understand subalternity is relational is to recognize that pasts and futures are historically contingent 
and produced through collaborations and contestations. 
 
 “Pahar-Bahar” 
The title “Hills-Outside” calls attention to the relationship between the hills of Uttarakhand and the 
places paharis (hill people) refer to as “bahar,” or outside. The hyphen between the two words 
signifies lines of (dis)connection and undercurrents of unequal reciprocity that comprise the history of 
this relationship. At the same time, this hyphen signifies a recalibration of understanding – an 
attempt to challenge hegemonic tropes that characterize the “pahar” as “less”: less developed, less 
important to agriculture and less significant to India’s growing urban centers. Of the two terms in this 
chapter’s title, “pahar” comes first, as it is a place that has sustained India’s capitalist development. 
Here, I use “pahar” and not “Uttarakhand” to illuminate how it cannot be defined simply within the 
political terms of the nation-state. 
 
In the Frame 
In the pages that follow, I demonstrate the marginalization of pahar, pahari farmers and pahari 




“Pahar/Bahar,” “Mandua/Millets,” “Economy/Ecology” and “Food/Security (Sovereignty).” These 
examine the relationship between: 
1. a “remote” hill region and colonial and national development; 
2. forms of classifying and understanding marginalized crops/foods/grains and how political 
economic projects are enacted; 
3. global processes of seed commodification and crop varieties grown by pahari farmers;1  
4. current patterns in pahari food production/consumption and India’s recent national food 
security legislation. 
 
Through this relational framework, I make the broader case that narratives depicting India’s Green 
Revolution and current biotechnological projects as “inevitable” or “necessary” work to narrow the 
scope of democratic possibility by eclipsing the roles of agrarian labor and political struggle. This 
“narrowing” has accompanied a decrease in plant varieties as well as moves by industry to contain and 
control the contingencies of seeds and plant life. 
 
On Form 
This chapter begins with two detailed events that evoke two apparently disparate milieus, recalling 
Prema Devi’s theory of social “islands” that are separated and connected through relations of power.2 
The first event occurs in pahar, in the fields with women farmers who are trying to protect their crops 
from suar (wild boar) at night. The second takes place bahar (outside), far away from the hills at a 
national/transnational meeting on “family farming” in south India. Moving out from these events, I 
examine the four crosscutting contingencies that relate them historically and in the present.  
  
                                                          
1 Razavi (2002). 






Kashtee Didi surveyed the terraced fields beneath the cluster of village homes.3 “In a few days, we'll 
have to do it,” she said. Neema, who was standing beside her in the adjoining courtyard, agreed. “Will 
you come?” she asked me. They both laughed.  
 The village, Gow, was perched at an altitude near 2000 meters in the Himalayan foothills of 
Kumaon, Uttarakhand, where India flanks China and Nepal. It was late August 2014. The most 
prominent crops below were the pahari food grains of mandua, followed by those of madhira, as well 
as different dhals (lentils) and some irrigated and unirrigated dhan (rice). All are kharif crops, 
meaning they grow in times of heat and rain, in the bhaarsat, the monsoon. In a place of stark 
seasons, mandua reflects the turn to winter's nourishment, along with moongflee (groundnuts), store-
purchased gud (raw brown sugar), wild growing bichugaas (stinging nettle), and other things that 
"make you warm.” Mandua here was still plentiful, though the hills were dotted with “ghost towns” 
where so many inhabitants had left you hardly saw it anymore. These crops had been grown from 
seeds saved from the previous harvest; they had dug their roots where they had landed after having 
been tossed into the air by someone in whose home they had likely been stored – in wooden barrels, 
small aluminum tins, beaten plastic canisters, mud pots, or tightly bound woven sacks – separate from 
what was meant for eating because they came from “the best plants.” And at the end of this season, 
once their promise was fulfilled, the “seeds” among them that had been saved but not planted would, 
in a soft shift of identity, be added to the stock of “grain” to be ground into flour, and eaten in rotees 
(flat breads) by humans or fed to the cows. Varied as their life trajectories could be, they had this in 
common: if it could at all be helped, they would produce something in the form of sustenance. 
 Mandua, like madhira, was not picky. In times of more rain and in times of less (as was now 
the case), it could be counted upon to grow. Three months after sowing, it seemed like the plants were 
sprouting higher every day. Recently the baal (the head of the plant) had appeared and now you could 
                                                          
3 Spoken names here connote relations, as well as hierarchies of status. “Didi” means older sister. In 
other chapters I use “Devi,” signifying a married woman rather than the relational word (“didi”). I 




see the little pearls of grain. Predictable, yes, but it was also like magic; to watch a plant grow is to 
know it has its share of drama. However, what was most striking today were the swatches of red, 
orange, and purple cloth in the fields, some propped on sticks and billowing like flags. Two days back, 
they were not there; so something had happened. Life for a farmer is a practical enterprise, if marked 
by patterns then also by uncertainties. And change is expected. Just a few months ago, these fields had 
been wheat as far as the eyes could see, and then the wheat had turned to millets.  
 What had happened was that suar had returned. Suar are wild boar that live in the forests that 
cover upwards of 60 percent of this mountainous state. They come out in troupes – of five, ten, 
twenty. They come out at night, at all times of year but can be a particular nuisance when humans 
anticipate a harvest. Suar of pahar have become like mythological creatures – a folklore-inspiring 
status their brethren have also claimed in places as far as Italy and Greece. It is not just that I had 
heard people talk of sightings; I had heard them talk of talk of sightings, talk of missed sightings, and 
talk of talk of missed sightings. Two mornings ago, Kamla had seen them in a pack of ten or twelve as 
she was headed into the fields, and she and the others scared them off. Chetna, the twenty-four year 
old daughter of the woman in whose home I was residing as a paying guest in a neighboring village, 
almost tripped over one that was sleeping while making her five-kilometer trek through the forest to 
her job in the “livelihoods” division of a local NGO. People had told me that suar had killed someone 
on the path to the nearby Shiva temple that was frequented by Hindu pilgrims at auspicious times of 
year.  
 Inhabiting that liminal recess where real commingles with imagined and natural with 
supernatural, a myth must have its requisite doubter. I had met mine a few months earlier when I 
interviewed a German entrepreneur for the first time. He has been settled in the hills for almost a 
decade and co-owns a successful company that produces organic beauty and food products to tourists 
and well-off Indians. They had found a way to package mandua flour, which might go for only fifteen 




“Himalayan Finger Millet” and sell it for twenty times that price.4 He said that he had “never seen a 
boar,” adding provocatively that Uttarakhand's biggest problem” is human.” His disdain for nonprofits 
was no secret. He could talk at length about a smarter and more environmentally sustainable business 
model, using his implementation of water harvesting techniques as an example. But then, he was not a 
farmer who labored in the fields; his interventions were circumscribed by his small production; and he 
managed to get his necessary ingredients from one village if not another. People like him did not need 
to believe in suar. 
 I, on the other hand, had seen them. Two of them. From the window of a rickety early morning 
bus. They were enormous, each with a line of long hair trailing its spine. They were running through 
the pine trees faster than seemed possible for creatures of their size. Then they disappeared. My 
having seen them did not detract at all from my awe. For me, their mystique lay in the combination of 
their material and symbolic power. They performed their acts of destruction at those tender hours 
when humans were released from their waking obligations or most burdened by the weight of them. 
When suar tore up fields, they exposed more than a crop's roots; they exposed fears that had become a 
part of daily living: the fear of so much mehenet kaam (hard work) being trampled. The fear of food 
being tighter, of expenses at the store, of money that might not come home because it would go to the 
government liquor store, of the expense of a daughter's wedding, of what might happen to husbands, 
fathers, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, and grandchildren who lived far away, of things that needed 
communal solutions when families were becoming insular. The problem of wild animals hardly 
existed before, older villagers consistently told me, though I had found numerous archival references 
to the nuisance dating back more than a hundred years.5 Whether things had gotten better or worse 
since then, it was clear that the problem now was bigger than anyone could remember. And the history 
of most concern was that of living memory.  
                                                          
4 In 2013-2015, 58-65 rupees have “equaled” $1 US. 
5 Managing domestic and wild animals has been a preoccupation of farmers since the beginning of 
domesticated agriculture – and this has certainly been true of wild boar, the evolutionary siblings of 
domesticated pigs. Myths, complaints and studies of wild boar throughout Eurasia abound, as 
exemplified in the work of Heinz Meynhardt and current research of Thomas Fleischman. Radhika 




 No one seemed to really believe that draping old saris and shirts on sticks would do much to 
dissuade suar. It was not a “real” solution for the diminishing forest diversity or the thirstiness of the 
now dominant chir pine whose resin was sold to turpentine factories. It was not a “real” solution for 
the “changes in weather” – the extremes of droughts and floods. “Real” solutions were being 
discussed. Some environmental activists had begun advocating for a state plan to kill suar, and in 
neighboring villages men had purchased guns because many people ate suar meat. Local government 
representatives were considering building walls or fences or setting up nets between forests and fields, 
which – in a place where human life has depended on this precise entanglement – sounded akin to 
severing heart from lungs. It seemed to me that the display of cloth communicated something to 
fellow humans as much as to suar. That things had gotten bad enough to call for collective action. 
That labor here produced something valuable and worth protecting, even if the younger generations 
did not see it.  
 The “it” Kashtee and Neema were talking about was patrolling the fields between 10 p.m. and 1 
a.m. as they had in April for the wheat. Married women from various households had rotated every 
other night for almost three weeks. It made them laugh, even still, that I had expressed interest and 
volunteered to participate in something they associated with drudgery, leg pain, and sleep-
deprivation.  
 They were remembering, I knew, an April night whose denouement people still mentioned, 
when I had accompanied Heera and Nirmila on the patrol. That afternoon their twelve-year-old 
neighbor had taken me into the fields so I could see the damage wrought by suar for the first time; the 
fields looked like they had been hit by an erratic and determined tornado. My young guide revealed 
herself to be far less interested in this evidence of destruction than in the trees and bushes that would 
soon produce new life: “In hamare waha (our place/home),” she declared, “you can find everything to 
eat.” That night while we were flipping through TV channels waiting to head out, she showed up at 
because her father – whom I had encountered occasionally when he was plowing other people's fields 




 When it was time, Heera and Nirmila wrapped woolen shawls over their heads, as it was 
considerably colder beyond the insulation of the mud walls, and Heera summoned me with a nod. On 
the way out, Nirmila grabbed a plastic canister and stick, and beat them together to check the sound. 
It was hollow and loud. She seemed satisfied.  
 We trudged up and around the main footpath. Nirmila made music with her canister and 
Heera Didi called out names in the way they do in these hills, adding “ooooooo” at the end of each one. 
Taptaptaptaaaaptaptaptaptaaap..... Nandooooonandoooooo.... Taptaptaptaaaaptaaap.... 
Manjoooomanjooo.... ooohhhh.... Deepoooooodeepooooo. With my eyes focused on the path ahead so 
as not to twist an ankle, I did not know how many had joined us; but I could hear the volume rise.  
 We passed the final homes and climbed over a few boulders to enter the area planted with 
wheat. The stalks parted like water with each body that passed through the narrow footpaths that 
separated the fields then swayed in again to brush against the body that followed. They varied greatly 
in size; some came to my face and others to below my chest. The season, thus far, had been kind – 
seeds had sprouted; sunshine and rain had been sufficient; and grains were ripening just in time to 
initiate the wedding season and relieve people's minds after last year's stock had run out. It would 
turn out to be what many called “the best wheat harvest in twenty years” – a marker of time that I 
learned had less to do with dates than with a perceived line that separated the dearth of “now” from 
the plenitude of “before.” It was the potential return to abundance that made theft unacceptable. 
 Though she could well be taciturn in daily life, Nirmila was among the most animated. She 
called out things, often to a tune, then those behind us hollered or laughed and played their 
improvised instruments. Every time she struck the canister, it expelled a blast of cool air against my 
cheek. 
 As we passed their families' scattered fields, women pointed out to me, "This is mine," “This is 
mine.” I knew that, despite changes in India’s laws, no woman in Gow had a property title in her 
name. Therefore, this my-ness spoke of a sense of belonging born of labor, affiliation and social 




that precluded forms of collaboration that crossed caste lines or undermined aspects of men’s power. 
It spoke of the way those forms of power has congealed to become truth. 
Most of the fields had been planted. The wheat, like the mandua, was grown from farmer-
saved seed, and it was a prized staple.6 Families that had left or that did not have enough working 
hands loaned their plots to others or hired the poorest in the village – like Geeta, a woman I had 
recently met – to work for 100 rupees ($1.50 US) a day. Most of those laborers came from “Scheduled 
Castes” (caste groups officially designated as historically disadvantaged) and lived in the tala (lower) 
side of the village. I remarked that no one from those roughly seventy-five families had come though 
they also grew wheat, albeit on smaller holdings. Two women next to me shrugged. “We don't know 
why they don't come,” one said. There were reasons for this lapse of solidarity, and it seemed to me, 
when it came to understanding the current decline and resilience of “traditional” pahari grains, those 
reasons mattered.  
 I didn't realize there was another group until we saw lights and heard voices below. We 
hollered down and waved. They hollered up and waved. We all made more noise. Our two groups 
arrived at the grounds of the “intercollege,” the government high school, at precisely the same time. 
The singing, drumming, and chanting got louder. People yelled whatever came into their minds – like 
jokes, names or phrases from Kumaoni songs – and it was matched by a response. With the bodies, 
the voices, and the focused energy, the gathering felt distinctly political. However, if it was a protest, 
there was the question of audience. Towards whom was it directed? Suar? Each other? Those still in 
their homes? Those beyond the reach of voices?  
 As if on cue, things took a more obvious political turn. Nirmila Didi began with “Modi sarkar, 
Modi sarkar, ayeega. (Narendra Modi's government – the Hindu Nationalist BJP party – will 
                                                          
6 Both local wheat varieties and some Green Revolution wheat varieties have been and are grown in 
the hills; however even the latter are often (not always) used without chemical inputs and are saved 
and replanted by farmers. Though Uttarakhand was declared an “organic state” after it achieved 
statehood, many farmers still use chemicals and some government officials still promote it, especially 




come).”7 "Out with the Hand!” yelled a few others, alluding to the symbol of the Congress Party. In the 
past few weeks despite all the talk about the impending national election, I had not heard either major 
party referred to by name – the former was associated with its charismatic and controversial male 
leader and the latter with its symbol, which had historical resonance and legibility. Both parties had 
supporters in both sections of the village, but there were more “Hand” supporters among the 
“Scheduled Castes” and more “Modi” supporters among the “Caste Hindus” and, it seemed to me, 
more Modi supporters overall. A forest activist based in the pahari city of Almora had told me that the 
support for Modi had nothing to do with his policies; it was about a “longing for change” and “a 
feeling.” It was true that, though some – particularly men who gathered at the shops that lined the 
motor road – gave me specific reasons for their affiliations, most people expressed something vaguer. 
When I had commented that many people considered Modi's party to be pro-corporate rather than 
pro-poor, Heemansee, whose family had lost its income when her husband returned home from Delhi 
with tuberculosis, said, “You have to vote for who you doubt will do anything for you versus who you 
know will do nothing.” It was a kind of hope. In local elections at least things were clearer: alliances 
determined outcomes and in very practical ways.  
 A male voice boomed from across the grounds. "Modi, kaun hai (who's he, what's so big about 
him)? Why are you calling Modi's name and making so much noise? Come here!" 
 Nirmila said, "What do you mean who is Modi sarkar? Are you telling us what to say?"  
 We stopped walking.  
 She and the man began yelling at each other. It became obvious soon enough that he was 
drunk.  
                                                          
7 Nirmila's “Modi Sarkar,” Hindu Nationalist BJP party would sweep the national elections (and win 
in Uttarakhand) a month later. Its rise, as scholars have argued, cannot merely be attributed to 
communal politics; those politics (and caste Hindu nationalism) have been tethered to middle and 
upper class projects as India has risen an “emerging national economy” in the transnational sphere, 
exerting increasing influence on international affairs as a member of BRICS (Brazil Russia India China 




 Nirmila said, "We didn't get anything from the control (the government ration shop). What is 
Haath (the Hand) doing? Are they giving me rotee? Are they giving my family food to eat? What did I 
receive in the control? These are our fields, this is our land!”  
 Ironically, just a few months earlier Congress, had pushed through a National Food Security 
Act, which some saw as a dying political gesture. One of its aims was to reform India's massive public 
distribution system (PDS), but nothing here, yet, had changed. The PDS distributed to consumers, at a 
nominal cost, wheat and rice grown in cash crop regions that had become pivotal to India during its 
“Green Revolution.” The ration shops, administrated through state governments and local contractors, 
were notoriously variable. The one here had not been open in two months, even as the one for another 
village just down the road was functioning without hitch. If paharis tended not to eat mandua in these 
hot months, many were now mixing their extra mandua flour with wheat to make it “stretch longer.” 
On top of that, storeowners told me that the prices of other foods were spiking because big market 
owners in cities were donating sums to political parties or stirring the pot of consumer anxiety to sway 
votes.  
 We heard a bang. The man ran out towards us with a flashlight and a stick.  
 Most of the women who had remained with us stepped back. Nirmila stepped forward. She 
said, "We are here because of suar. We [are the ones who] feed our families. What do you do? This is 
our land. Is the Hand giving me atta [wheat flour]?"  
 He fell to his knees and grazed her feet with his fingertips – a sign of respect. "This is my job," 
he said. He was the watchman and lived on the premises, though no one knew him.  
 Nirmila, in a clear position of strength, did not let it go. We stood there for what felt like a long 
time. Every so often, she called out "Modi sarkar!" and a couple of the younger women who had stuck 
around beat their canisters and yelled, “Ooooooh!”  
  Eventually, people got restless and we moved on. We climbed up a narrow path and walked 
until we found the others. In addition to the initial group, another ten or fifteen women had joined; 




happened a few times, focusing on the way he had initially questioned her. One woman said we should 
have left. They argued, briefly. 
  We walked up a bit further and sat facing each other in a misshapen circle on some dirt and 
rocks. Someone lit a couple of small fires. Someone else ran into the center of the circle and danced; 
she got laughs. People started singing. Nirmila, who had stopped telling her tale and was sitting 
quietly, occasionally improvised a line to a Kumaoni tune. A few others did the same. The circle 
devolved into separate conversations. We kept talking until someone said, “Shhh! Be quiet!” She had 
spotted lights in the direction of the intercollege, and it looked like they were moving towards us.  





Dr. Robert Turner surveyed the crowd beneath the podium and said, “I have had the honor to stand 
here on this occasion...” He paused for effect. “Every year for the past three years.” He smiled. 
 We were seated on padded chairs in a conference hall of the M.S. Swaminathan Research 
Foundation, a small campus nestled amidst the thick foliage and humidity of Chennai, Tamil Nadu, at 
India's southeastern coast.8 It was early August 2014. Roughly 150 of us had gathered to 
commemorate the “International Year of Family Farming” and the importance of small farms to “food 
security” in Asia. The four-day conference, held in English to accommodate various United Nations 
functionaries, representatives from Asian countries and nonprofit leaders and researchers from 
India's multi-lingual states, began punctually. If this was, as someone beside me observed, 
uncharacteristic for the subcontinent, the gathering was uncharacteristic of its setting in other ways; 
like the terminal of an airport, it had a placeless feel with small flourishes to intimate geography. Here 
those flourishes included the chai and biscuits served outside the meeting room at breaks and the 
spread of Indian curries, breads, and seasoned rice for the first day's lunch. These delicacies 
                                                          
8 In November and December 2015, the city of Chennai – where much of my family resides – 
experienced extreme flooding due from one its most torrential monsoons; as of December 7, 2015 at 




contrasted with the direness of the issues, also particular to this locale, about which the invited guests 
had come to speak.  
Their words relayed a deeply conflicted image of human progress: The history of agriculture 
began in Asia 10,000 years ago, but two-thirds of those living in hunger today are from this continent. 
India is the world's main producer of rice, yet two out of every five children in South Asia will grow up 
“stunted” because of malnutrition. Women farmers comprise the majority of rural producers in world 
and up to 80 percent of those in India, but less than 9 percent of women in this country owned land. 
Rural residents in developing countries who “make their livelihoods from farming directly or 
indirectly” comprise a large segment of those living in absolute poverty.9 In the era of human rights, 
these markers were bleak. 
 Turner, who was from the United States, had worked on issues related to food and agriculture 
in Asia for decades. A few months earlier in his Delhi office, he had told me that he was the only one in 
his cohort of plant biologists to move beyond the laboratory and “into the world.” He had had success 
in promoting organic rice production in Asia and, during our meeting, had given me books, including 
a pen drive with 5,000 pages of B.R. Ambedkhar's collected writings, which revealed his concerns for 
on the ground issues of caste and rural hunger. He had also taken the time to lead me carefully 
through the historical events leading to India’s Green Revolution and M.S. Swaminathan's role in it to 
make me see that “there was no other choice”: India had to follow a course of industrial agriculture in 
the way it did in after Independence, even if that decision meant overlooking certain regions and lives 
– like those of farmers in the hills.  He was extremely convincing; he spoke with conviction and 
support his case with many facts, which centered on India’s precarious position at the end of British 
rule and the compromises those in power had to make.  
                                                          
9 According to the Indian Representative of the Second Committee (Economic and Financial) of the 
United Nations in 2011, developing countries need to focus on agriculture and rural development to 
reduce the “absolute poverty” of the 1.5 billion people in the world, whose social conditions had 





However, in the days afterwards, I found something unsettling about his certainty. It was 
striking that, given his knowledge and interests, he could look back at a period of history before the 
globalization of industrial agriculture would generate its now widely acknowledged environmental and 
social crises and see no other possibility for a future. I knew from interviews with journalists and 
farmer-activists that there were strong contentions then; there were various movements for land 
reform; there were claims that the publicized information about low crop yields was not true. Now 
from the future of that past one could see some of the concerns of those skeptics had come to pass. It 
was as if in its many iterations of retelling, this (hi)story of contested human decisions had, for Turner 
and from his social position, become truth. It inhabited that realm of unquestionable faith, rather than 
a messy world of conflicting “right courses.” It suggested the present was similarly foreclosed. 
 As Turner stated, this was an annual event, which came like the seasons and in a broader cycle 
noted by the speakers: “Recommitting to Beijing” recalled the fourth United Nations Conference on 
Women twenty years earlier; “meeting the millennium goals” recalled the United Nations Summit of 
2000 in which eradicating “extreme” poverty and hunger and achieving gender equity were two of 
eight transnational objectives that each had its own benchmarks and timeline. The speeches also 
cross-referenced each other; like the rhythm of a hoe hitting the earth each time in almost, but not 
quite, the same way. There was a Malthusian refrain and the recognition of impending food crises in 
observations like “food needs will rise by 60 percent” and “the world must meet the challenge of 
feeding an ever-growing population." Combined with references to a “Zero Hunger Challenge” 
recently launched in 2012 by the United Nations, they gave a contradictory apocalyptic and idealistic 
vision of the future. Yet, no one questioned the goal; at issue was when and how humans would 
achieve it. At times one could sense contentions beneath the allied stance, contentions that suggested 
a variety of ways forward: One speaker said we must use “all technologies possible” – implying the 
benefits of transgenic (“GM”) crops – while another referred to the need for “more equity in world 
food system” because power in the hands of “a few countries and corporations” does not help family 
farms – implying that the solutions lay outside of new industrial technologies and might even involve 




 Many speakers mentioned “climate change.” And this environment, too, had undergone 
climactic shifts. Funding flows, world events, technological breakthroughs, pressures from civil society 
and private interests and the swirling winds of environmental anxieties were propelling new entities 
into this social sphere. A discernible breed of phrases were broadcast from the stage: “family farming,” 
“technological inputs,” “market and credit access,” “rural transformation,” “stakeholders,” “value 
addition,” “sustainability,” “market volatility,” “secure and profitable,” “under-nutrition,” “ecosystem 
services,” “land rights,” and “women farmers.” One speaker said that if all we did was give women 
access to credit, technology and land, then the world's food productivity would go up by 4 percent and 
its malnutrition would decrease by 17. Another speaker called family farmers the world's “repositories 
of knowledge and biodiversity.” A third mentioned hill agriculture and referenced Uttarakhand's 
Chipko forest movement of the 1970s and 1980s. The very topic about which people had gathered, and 
that there was an international year named in honor of it, reflected the entrance onto the stage of food 
security a kind of labor deemed marginal even twenty years back. The way in which it was entering 
reflected an evolving financialized sensibility that results are best measured in numbers.  
 Regions once cast as nonagricultural because they did not “produce value” now had space and 
time in the conference agenda. The panel on “hill agriculture” would be led by two people from 
Uttarakhand. One, a man I had interviewed a couple of years earlier, headed a well-respected NGO 
that promoted organic methods and trained farmers on how to make sweets out of mandua or pickles 
out of forest fruit to generate income. The other was a woman whose organization was located near 
the border of the state's two parts, Garhwal and Kumaon. Among other things, it promoted 
sustainable entrepreneurship around biodiversity conservation. Learning of my interest in millets, her 
friend remarked that a few years earlier Japanese businesses wanted sorghum, a “millet” that does not 
grow in the hills, and 200,000 additional acres of it were planted in India. Something similar 
happened in in Uttarakhand, the woman said. The Japanese demand for ragi (an Indian name for 
“finger millet”) soared because they were using it in baby food, and suddenly farmers in Uttarakhand 
could sell their pahari species of mandua at a good price. Then other high protein grains like quinoa 




the demand for mandua plummeted. I had heard similar rumors where I was staying in Kumaon; 
apparently, a few years ago a group of Japanese businesspeople bought a truckload of mandua 
through a local NGO; but no one could give me details or even confirm that this had transpired. 
Mandua in the hills was declining because of drudgery and exploitation, she said. When small farmers 
take their products to the market, intermediaries know there are no other options so they pay as low 
as seven or nine rupees (about one US cent) a kilo. Or they might say leave your mandua here and if 
we sell it then we'll pay you. “So why keep growing it?” She could not say.10 
 The morning worked towards its culminating moment: Dr. M.S. Swaminathan's speech and 
PowerPoint presentation. Turner's reference to the special occasion had to do with more than the 
official proceedings. Before the conference had commenced, a large chocolate cake was cut to 
commemorate M.S. Swaminathan's eighty-ninth birthday. That this annual event coincided with the 
celebration of his life was not a coincidence. He was still prolific, giving speeches and co-publishing 
articles in science journals and mainstream newspapers. If the topic forty years earlier had been the 
miracle of the Green Revolution, today it was the miracle of agroecology, or small, diversified seed 
systems. He had changed with the times or he had changed the times; most likely, it was some 
combination of the two. Regardless, in a country where gurus can be revered as divine, he had become 
a kind of mythological figure, the “Father” of “Mother” India's modern agriculture. While he had his 
share of skeptics, he had remained remarkably unscathed even as the Green Revolution’s veneer of 
perfection has splintered in the face of new criticism of its unsustainable dependence on chemicals 
and irrigation and its exacerbation of rural class divides. Like Turner, he stood by the position that 
these consequences to have been inevitable in a new world order, considering the poor condition in 
which the British had left Indian agriculture. Born as he was to an elite south Indian family when 
India was still a colony, you could look to his life and see the country's post-Independence agricultural 
trajectory, just as you could look to the country's history and see his professional and political rise.  
                                                          




 While covering a range of topics, Swaminathan focused on what he called “cultural, culinary, 
and environmental diversity.” He described foods marked by their “geographic indicator” as having a 
particular flavor and appeal. “Millets” reflected an “enlargement of food basket” and exemplified the 
need to prioritize nutrition and diversified diets. It was a noticeable shift away from caloric-based 
measures that dominated India's food security concerns when he had helped to set it on its course of 
stockpiling wheat and rice. He also called for a diverse set of “revolutions”: We needed a “protein 
revolution," a “pulses revolution” (2016 would be the “International Year of Pulses”), and a “dairy 
revolution.” He explained, “A revolution was not an evolution” because it reflected “a quantum jump 
in yield.” So to create a hunger-free India we needed an "Evergreen Revolution,” an increase in 
productivity without damaging the country's ecological diversity. He explained this meant 
agroecology, but it did not exclude industrially produced transgenic crops.  
 If he slipped in “Evergreen,” the term was slippery. Used by some to indicate “family farming” 
and “agroecology,” it was also the parlance of foundations and agribusiness in new ventures to 
promote “food security” in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia by giving small farmers who had been 
previously “neglected” access to high yield “climate resilient” transgenic or hybrid seeds as well as the 
corresponding chemicals, markets, and credit. With “New Plant Biotechnology Techniques,” a specific 
trait from one plant could be isolated and inserted into the genetic material of a different species with 
which it could not otherwise reproduce.11 This opened doors of possibility for the industrial production 
of new “pest-resistant” breeds of cassava and sorghum in parts of the African continent.12 Drought-
resistant or nutritional traits of various species of finger millets, for example, could one day be 
implanted into the genetic material of other plants. Thus, crops that had survived at the margins of the 
Green Revolution, on rough terrain and without irrigation or chemical inputs, were giving industry the 
                                                          
11 Hartung et al. (2014): “Transgenic plants may go beyond any natural crossing barrier, thereby 
increasing the available genetic variation, resulting in plants (or other organisms) that are not 
achievable by conventional breeding.” These methods have now extended even beyond “gene guns” 
and “genome-editing” tools (Liu et al. 2013).  




chance at an “evergreen” future, one in which, paradoxically, industry would be called upon to save 
the very farmers who produced them.13  
 Opponents cited risks of the unintended and irreversible “genetic contamination” on existing 
life (thereby further endangering existing biological diversity) and biosafety hazards; for example, 
secondary genetic consequences of Monsanto’s “herbicide-tolerant” Roundup Ready crops were only 
detected years after the crops has been widely commercialized.14 Opponents also claimed that the 
problem was not yield but poverty, that these technologies would further privatize seeds and 
consolidate power in the hands of a few corporations, thereby pulling some of humanity's poorest 
members – the very people living in hunger and poverty who those gathered here wanted to help – 
into new cycles of dependence and debt.  
 Swaminathan suggested these “different approaches" could and, in fact, should co-exist. He 
believed in participatory research, expanding non-farm employment, and assuring farmers of 
minimum support prices – a nod to India's recent refusal in Bali to abide by WTO mandates limiting 
farmer subsidies. Technology and agroecology needed each other; both depended upon “diversity.” 
A few months later, I would hear a similar refrain in in Rome, Italy, at the forty-first 
Conference on Food Security of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. At a 
side event concerning “plant genetic resources,” a man representing the CGIAR discussed the 
relationship between farmers and plant gene banks, of which there were eleven major repositories 
around world; I had recently visited the one in Delhi to learn how millet seeds were collected and 
stored in vacuum-sealed bags at temperatures low enough to keep them dormant.15 These gene banks, 
he explained, now held over 750,000 species of seeds and other plant material that were “not just 
sitting there” but being distributed as samples for “public crop breeding.” He spoke about the 
importance of farmers' rights to maintain their genetic resources and have access to what was 
                                                          
13 Thereby giving a second wind to the “second Green Revolution” that the Gates and Rockefeller 
Foundations and the Monsanto Corporation envision for Africa. 
14 See Holdrege and Talbott (2010) for more on Monsanto’s Roundup Ready. For more on genetic 
contamination, one can refer to the online Genetic Contamination Registrar. 




available, and breeders' rights to protect their innovations through intellectual property and patent 
laws. By maintaining this balance, they were opening up to farmers “a range of diversity they haven't 
had access to since the Neolithic."  
 When it was opened up for questions, the hand of the man next to me shot up. He introduced 
himself as a south Indian farmer and member of La Via Campesina, a network of 200 million small 
farmers around the world that has come out unequivocally against transgenic seeds.16 Challenging the 
peaceful vision of co-existence, he said that industrial breeding was in fact making plant genetic 
diversity less, not more, accessible to farmers because it promoted monoculture fields. He talked 
about how the US-based Monsanto Corporation had joined with the Indian-based Mahyco, which was 
not good for farmers' rights. He said that almost 20,000 local varieties of Indian rice had been stolen 
in the “great gene robbery” of the 1980s through precisely the kind of institutional circuits the 
facilitator was advocating. The allusion was to research documented in a well-known article by a 
journalist from Goa named Claude Alvarez. Alvarez claimed that in the 1980s when Swaminathan was 
the Director-General of the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines – which was 
established by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations as an extension of the Green Revolution – the 
yields of dwarf “miracle rice” had plateaued because of its high demands on irrigation and nitrogen; 
meanwhile, attempts to produce new pest-controlled varieties were going nowhere because there was 
not a diverse enough pool of “raw” germplasm available for experimentation. Against the will of his 
predecessor, Swaminathan provided this missing material, free of charge, in the form of seeds and 
plant material collected from farmers through Indian agricultural universities. The influx of industrial 
rice in India since then has coincided with the massive reduction of India's rice diversity (to seven 
predominant varieties), hence the present movement for their revival. He said, “My own university is 
having genetic resources. First the university appropriates seeds, then it is partnering with 
                                                          
16 However, members of the KRRS, a Via Campesina affiliate in Karnataka, south India, plant “Bt” 
(transgenic) cotton. This highlights the regional variations, concerns and class dynamics of various 




corporations.” When the session ended he turned to me and asked, “What did you think of my 
intervention?”  
 I noted that his intervention had been absent at the conference in Chennai, even though it was 
located in his home state. Also absent had been seed and farmer activists and the more radically 
inclined proponents of agroecology whom I had met in other venues and at similar events. Despite the 
many allusions to “women farmers” at Swaminathan's event, the majority of those present had been 
men and those women who had spoken had not been farmers. Most “family farmers” I had met could 
not leave their fields, homes, children, cows, goats, buffalo – all the things that “family farming” 
implied – unless there was someone else who could free them from that day's obligations. 
 While Swaminathan delivered his speech people outside were arranging tents to sell local 
handicrafts and “value added” products made from hybrid and local varieties of rice and millets. 
Before lunch, Swaminathan would declare “the market place officially open.” 
 His closing statement seemed to exist in a different place and time than the one I encountered 
in the morning paper’s depiction of terrorism, arrests, rape and war and to stem from unrecognizable 
history. Like Turner’s assertion that “there was no other choice,” it presented a circumscribed view of 




CONTINGENCIES (one to four) 
I turn now to four “contingencies” – Pahar/Bahar, Mandua/Millets, Economy/Ecology and 
Food/Security(Sovereignty) – that shed light on the two events above and relate these (apparently) 
spatially and socially segregated realms. I will explain each in turn.  
By “contingencies,” I mean those of food, farming, and biodiversity; of human and nonhuman 
relations; of “traditional” and “industrial” grains; of government, business, and civil society endeavors. 
I mean the way the two “worlds” that open this chapter inhere in each other, obviously and subtly. My 




other) bodies and ideas. Interpreting “contingency” in the dual sense of uncertainty and proximity, I 
evoke two irreconcilable meanings: adjacency (connoting relationality) on the one hand and 
chance/risk (connoting uncertainty) on the other. These are “irreconcilable” not because they are 
antagonistic but because they do not fit neatly together; they form no stable whole. The sections below 
highlight “uncertainties” that are shared among humans and by humans and other species. Moreover, 
they are shared unequally.  
In the rest of this chapter, “contingency” also refers to how understandings of the past shape 
possibilities for the future. Conflicts over food and agriculture that undergird the events above and the 
analysis below reflect opposing perspectives and a variety of ways forward. They problematize 
entanglements between “inevitability” and democracy, the latter of which depends on not only 





  “Pahar” (Hills) and “Bahar” (Outside) are the titles and settings of this 
chapter’s two opening events. This section examines the relationship 
between Uttarakhand and the nation-state, and that between a hill region 
and processes of colonial and national development. Here, I show how 
“remote” places, which produce value that is not counted in the national 
GDP, are in fact central to India’s history.  
 
I conducted much of my seventeen months of research at an altitude between 900 and 2500 meters in 
the Himalayan foothills of Kumaon and Garhwal, the two ethnolingistic parts of India's small northern 
state of Uttarakhand, which is largely mountainous and forested. This region, and its broader setting, 
is known by its residents and most people in north India as “pahar.” I also conducted research at 
offices, conferences, seed banks, and research centers that were located in urban centers, in the plains, 
or abroad – in other words, in places that lie “bahar,” or outside, of the hills.  
While pahar and bahar are not conventional geographic categories, they still encourage 
certain modes of thinking about space and steer the mind away from others. My intention is not to 




held in and against the modern “India.” 17 On the contrary, I hope to further disrupt this binary. I do 
follow the paths of Edmund Leach and James Scott, who both theorized the particularities of hill 
regions and hill agriculture in South and Southeast Asia. More broadly, I recognize something unique 
to life that develops on the surface of tectonic convergence. The terrain of such places is often remote, 
rocky, and volatile; it is resistant to commonplace industrial technologies such as tractors and certain 
modes of space-time “convergence.” The soil in such places is often particular to crops that are rainfed 
and hearty, and holds startling variation, even in close proximity, due to the intricacies of 
microclimates, erosion, subtleties of sun and shade, shifts of altitude, patterns of forest growth, and 
the tendency of rivers that cannot easily be detoured or made to flow against a gravitational tug. 
Humans in such places require a heightened awareness of their interdependence. The land, prone to 
seismic activity, rock falls, and mudslides, bears persistent signs of change, an underlying instability, 
and a longer durée than that of human economy and history. 
 The pahar that opens this text is full of the daily concerns of contemporary life. However, if 
you can imagine, these very hills might have come into “existence” 50 million years ago when the 
“Indo-Australian” plate, already in motion for tens of millions of years, began to collide with the 
“Eurasian.” 18 Measured in human years, the resulting mountains might seem ancient but in geological 
time, they are among this planet's youngest. They are geologically fragile, as activists agitating against 
hydroelectric dams in the region often remind.19 The momentum of collision still propels the upper 
plateau up five millimeters a year, which is, if you stop to think about it, astonishingly fast. The glacial 
melt and precipitation from these mountains source some of the earth's major rivers – the Indus, the 
Ganges, the Yamuna, and the Brahmaputra – that are imbued with thousands of years of human 
rituals, sacred and profane, and provide the major source of water for a country of 1.2 billion, plus 
                                                          
17 Drawing from Vedic refrains, scholars and politicians sympathetic to Hindu nationalist and 
fundamentalist projects have promoted “Bharat,” a glorified vision of India’s Hindu past.  
18This is the current thinking among geologists, and is subject to change. 
19In 1991, an earthquake measuring 6.8 on the moment magnitude scale occurred in Garhwal and 
Uttarkashi. Almost 300 villages, upwards of 300,000 people and many nonhuman species were 
affected. In March 1999, another earthquake of the same magnitude occurred the Chamoli region 





many of the over 156 million people in Bangladesh and far more (nonhuman) animal and plant lives. 
The wood from these forests, which still dominate the landscape, were built into the infrastructure of 
British Colonial railroads and ships, and therefore into the infrastructure of the wars, capital 
expansion, and systems of slavery that underpinned it. On a contemporary Government of India Map, 
you would see the pahar that is the present focus delineated from its broader terrain with lines that 
identify India's twenty-seventh state, Uttarakhand, through its simultaneous separation from and 
immediacy to Tibet (China) to the north, Nepal to the east, the state of Himachal Pradesh to the 
west/northwest, and the state of Utter Pradesh to the south/southwest – or, one might say, foreign 
countries, other Indian states, the pahar that this pahar is not, and the plains.  
 Some of what people understand of this pahar has been conveyed by scholars. Madhav Gadgil, 
Ramachandra Guha, Shubra Gururani, Haripriya Rangan, Ajay Rawat, and Vandana Shiva, among 
others, have narrated and disrupted stories of labor, protest and violence related to its forests and 
agriculture. Pahari historians like Shekhar Pathak and Ganga Datt Upreti have documented the 
relationship of its folklore with the land. Jim Corbett made Rudraprayag's “man-eating tigers” famous 
and Radhika Govindrajan has written about contemporary human-animal relations. Anthropologists 
Gerald Berreman and William Sax have analyzed its social systems, caste relations, and rituals. Badari 
Datta Pande painstakingly synthesized whatever documents he could find regarding its human 
history. S.D. Pant has written of its social economy, and more recently, Shaila Seshia Galvin has 
written about the turn to “organic agriculture.” Farmer-activist Vijay Jhardhari has described farming 
patterns in the hills with the intimacy that only a pahari farmer could possess, inspiring films and 
seed saving efforts as far as southern India.  
 Certainly, Gandhi's relationship with pahar – and specifically with this pahar – has shaped 
the character of these hills. He expressed a special fondness for the Himalayas, believing it to embody 
its unofficial name, Dev Bhoomi, or Dwelling of the Gods. As the names of villages and towns dotting 
the hills suggest, events from the Hindu epic Mahabharata are believed to have transpired here. This 
is where the five Pandava brothers spent part of their twelve years of exile before waging war with 




they wandered through a landscape sparse with humans to understand something of life beyond war's 
devastations and deceits and the hollowness of victory. In 1929, when he had already been jailed three 
times in India (and six in South Africa), Gandhi wrote the manuscript for Anasakti Yog over twelve 
days in Kausani – roughly seven hours by bus from the village where this text begins.  
If Gandhi saw the future India as a “republic of villages,” pahar contributed to his vision, just 
as his vision gave pahar symbolic resonance in the formation of a new nation. As a person and an 
icon, Gandhi helped to ally peasants and the urban elite in pahar and more broadly, which enabled 
the Congress-led anti-colonial struggle to gain strength.20 After his assassination, his disciple Sarala 
Behn would follow his advice and return to Kausani to start a girls’ ashram and school to “educate 
rural activists,” and Gandhian-inspired anti-alcohol movements would spread throughout the hills.21 
While communist sensibilities were certainly present before and after Independence, this pahar, 
unlike other places where the Indian government heavily extracts natural resources, has been 
dominated by “reformist” politics, which often incorporates Gandhian language. 22  
  Scholars attuned to issues of caste and class have accused Vandana Shiva, most notably, of 
presenting an idealized image of pahar as an egalitarian society whose encounter with British 
colonialism marked the moment of violence and decline.23 While egalitarian elements might have 
                                                          
20 There were also other “anti-colonial struggles” and “nationalisms.”  
21 Gandhi was assassinated by a Hindu fundamentalist who did not like his vision of an India that was 
neither secular nor dominated by one faith. See Rebecca Klenk's (2010) book Educating Activists for a 
vivid ethnographic account of the Laxshmi Ashram in Kumaon today. Shekhar Pathak (1985) 
describes the changing meaning of anti-alcohol movements in Uttarakhand, as they come to articulate 
systemic critiques. 
22 During my fieldwork three alleged “Maoists” were arrested in a raid in the small pahari city of 
Almora. “Reformist” here connotes attempts to change society from within state and existing social 
structures. This is true of many Gandhian activists in India. However, as a few conversations at 
Lakshmi Ashram showed me – there are various Gandhian movements, and ones that appear 
“reformist” can be radical in their perception and approach to social life and selfhood. Similarly many 
radical movements in India in fact reproduce in their organization the ideological premises of 
dominant society. Nonetheless, many of the “Gandhian” leaders in Uttarakhand represent historically 
privileged castes and a wealthier more cosmopolitan segment of paharis; so they also have wealth and 
status to protect.  
23 Vandana Shiva is a controversial figure. While popular among many activists and scholars in the 
Americas and Europe, many in India are critical of her and have noted that her organization Navdanya 
had a hierarchal structure with her at the apex and functions separately from a great deal of the 
grassroots networks. Her scholarly work has also been criticized for the oppositional manner in which 




existed (and in some ways, as I will show, still do), Badari Datta Pande draws prolifically from Edwin 
T Atkinson's chronicles of British Indian Civil Service in the late 1800s to narrate a history of 
perpetual migrations, changing populations, social hierarchies (that sedimented into caste identities), 
and war in both Kumaon and Garhwal.24 The pinnacle was when the Nepali Gurkhas attacked and 
briefly conquered Kumaon (and parts of Garhwal), imposing high taxes, slavery that included the rape 
of women and girls, and a vastly arbitrary system of justice.25 They deforested trees to expand their 
kingdom and urban centers. Villagers were fined or beaten for climbing to their roofs where they dried 
beans and stalks of grain, which they nonetheless continued to do. This state of terror propelled 
differently situated Kumaonis to forge alliances with the British East India Company; hence, it made 
inroads and eventually established rule in 1815.26 Kumaoni sepoys (soldiers) participated in the 
Rebellion of 1857 that swept through north India and led to the downfall of the East India Company; 
however, the memory of violence preceding the British was fresh enough to deter their involvement. 
 It has been issues of local exploitation, rather than abstract or national causes, against which 
pahari peasants have historically protested. Consider for example, in the first event, Nirmila's concern 
with the availability of grains at the government ration shop and Heemansee's desire to vote in a way 
that might have practical effects rather than focusing on political platforms. When the British Crown 
took over rule after 1857 it did little to alleviate the plight of most paharis, even as it attempted to cast 
itself as the most civil of European colonizers. In its “Kumaon Province,” the British “Raj” established 
its own systems of slavery and forced labor (coolie begar), its own methods of census-taking and 
taxation, its own policies limiting local access to forests (while rampantly cutting trees for colonial 
expansion; by 1861 Britain was the global leader in deforestation); and alliances that encouraged local 
                                                          
shows through historical texts the kinds of violence and struggles over forests that existed before and 
are not only imposed by Europeans. Bina Agrawal (1999) critiques Shiva's lack of caste analysis.  
24 See Badri Datt Pande (1993) detailed two-volume account of Kumaon history, which draws 
prolifically from Edwin T. Atkinson's chronicles in the Himalayan Gazetteer (2002). 
25 Based on Pande’s (1993) account, a pahari scholar I interviewed argues that that the Scheduled 
Castes in Uttarakhand were formerly conquered groups. I use the official term “Scheduled Caste(s)” or 
“SC” rather than the politicized “Dalit” often in this text – whenever it was the chosen term employed 
by the person or groups to whom I am referring.  
26 thus joining Kumaon with the eastern parts of Garhwal; other sections of Garhwal remained a 




officials to act with impunity.27 Meanwhile, it drew “valiant” men of Kumaon and Garhwal for its 
army, and set up sanitations spots, military bases, and exclusive “hills stations” for Europeans to 
retreat in the summer months, tried to establish tea estates (these largely failed), and tried to create 
incentives for European settlements (these also largely failed).  
Tensions flared throughout the early 1900s, with peasants periodically setting fire to forests to 
protest restrictions on their customary rights. The Kumaoni arm of the National Congress Party (led 
by Jawarhalal Nehru and with the critical help of Gandhi) harnessed this discontent towards its anti-
colonial struggle; yet, ultimately the post-Independence Indian government would adopt the British 
forest policy almost verbatim into its new constitution and set on a path of infrastructure building in 
which pahari resources (like water) but not its residents were deemed crucial. At that moment of 
Independence in 1947, British Kumaon (followed a year later by the princely kingdom of Garhwal) and 
its Hindu majority would be sealed into the northern frontier of a new India just as East and West 
Pakistan would be sealed out; as the arbitrary lines were drawn in blood, thousands of Garhwali and 
Kumaoni soldiers would die in a display of a kind of patriotism.28 
 If this brief account conjures a pahar whose history is intertwined, indelibly, with that of India 
and modern empires, then the opening events might conjure a pahar where food and agriculture are 
intertwined, indelibly, with national and transnational undertakings. In other words, pahar and 
bahar are, fundamentally, interrelated; and their inability to elude this relation is why I employ these 
terms (though not exclusively). I do not mean that pahar is located within bahar – as the “local” is 
sometimes perceived to exist within the “global,” or the “particular” within the “objective.” Nor do I 
mean that pahar and bahar are two spatial entities separated by some measurable distance. Rather, I 
                                                          
27 At the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in December 2015, Prince Charles of 
England spoke of the need to save forests, but did not mention Great Britain’s major historical role in 
their destruction or the colonial wealth accrued from it. Presently, corporations (often through 
private-public partnerships) comprise the principle drivers of deforestation (including through land 
dispossession) and consumers of unrenewable energy.  
28The Hindu majority in Kumaon and Garhwal is due in part to conversions of Buddhists from the 8th 
century AD onwards. In 1947, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Chairman of the British Border Commissions, was 
charged with drawing the boundary between Pakistan and India; before his appointment he has never 




mean that their relatedness infuses and produces the very character of their “beings.” They are 
subjective, in that people might conceptualize their meanings differently; but, as Marx contended, 
even these subjective dimensions “flow from [their] social relations.”29 “Kumaon” and “Chennai,” 
names that present an alternate classification for the places that open this chapter, are also relational 
terms. However, aspects of their relation are masked by the way they intimate exterior, presumably 
objective, criteria by which to measure it. They appear as fixed “points” (among an assumed multitude 
of others) whose distance can be attributed primarily to geographic space (and the time necessary to 
travel it), and secondarily to their remoteness (in the case of Kumaon) or centrality (in the case of 
Chennai) to vortices of official political and capital processes (which then gives them a certain 
character). In this line of thinking, “Kumaon: Chennai” would be a kind of reverse image of “Chennai: 
Kumaon,” and the order of the two opening events matters in the way they “flip” the view. 
  Pahar and bahar cannot be viewed in this way. First, they must be located. One cannot simply 
locate pahar or, for that matter, its contingent bahar. Take the history of pahar recounted cursorily 
above. At times when I say “pahar,” I am clearly describing a specific place (what is now called 
“Uttarakhand” or, within that, “Kumaon”) and not all the Himalayan hills or even India's portion of it. 
For example, the Tibetan Buddhist settlements of Himachal Pradesh, or the tea estates of West 
Bengal, are quite different from the social life in the places I depict. At the same time, people from 
these regions are described and call themselves “paharis,” as they too are “hill people” and share with 
other paharis aspects of identity and social organization. 
 “Pahar,” I contend, can function in this way. It can retain its specificity even as it implies a 
broader place. This is the perception of pahar expressed by the majority of farmers in Kumaon and 
Garhwal with whom I interacted (indeed, hardly ever did I hear a pahari farmer use “Uttarakhand” in 
everyday speech, a fact that might relate in part to the newness of the state). In the same breath, 
someone might use “pahar” to identify a most intimate ecological and social terrain as well as to 
connote an unknown place that has the potential for familiarity based on the quality of its terrain. This 
                                                          




fits with South Asian philosophies and religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, that perceive the 
ultimate encounter with the “self” as a moment in which in which the unity of the body disintegrates 
and its distinction from what is perceived to be “outside” disappears. It is not that the self is lost or 
relinquished to an abstraction; rather it is apprehended differently, as flow or change (thereby 
signifying a spiritual-material transformation). 
  “Kumaon: Chennai” presents an equal and independent ontological association (in that the 
disappearance of one would not necessitate the disappearance of the other), while “pahar: bahar” 
presents one that is unequal and inter-relational. Pahar exists without bahar, even as its character is 
shaped to the core by that relation. Pahar is a place most paharis do not define by boundaries, but 
through sensory attributes, forms of familiarity, crops, forests, foods, languages and terrain, among 
other aspects. Most paharis with whom I spoke – whether in cities, towns, villages, or places in 
between – defined “pahar” with terms including “safe,” “clean water,” “fresh air,” “good milk,” and 
“good food.”30 To be pahari, one man explained, means “you can't take heat.” Similarly, paharis often 
defined “bahar” through sensory or relational criteria like “hot,” “dirty water/air,” “good schools,” or 
“more jobs” but rarely with reference to political boundaries or measures of geographic distance or 
even altitude. In both Garhwal and Kumaon, I often heard pahar described with the words “mera 
desh” (my country), reflecting a wholeness that was nonetheless not entire (people, for example, 
“needed to go bahar for work”). This desh both co-existed with Indian nationalism (reflected in proud 
pahari soldiers, negative perceptions of China, or the cricket games of children being played between 
“India” and “Pakistan”) and also conflicted with it (as this work will show). 
 Contentions over the capital of Uttarakhand can tell us something about the meaning of 
“pahar.” In the early 1990s, a renewed movement for state sovereignty emerged out of widespread 
resistance to the news that a significant number of additional seats would be reserved in government 
positions for “Other Backward Castes” (in addition to existing reservations for historically subjugated 
“Scheduled Castes”). In the hills of Kumaon and Garhwal, there were far fewer people identifying as 
                                                          
30 despite widely acknowledged incidents of domestic violence in pahar; here “safety” includes 




these caste groups, unlike in the larger (then home) state of Uttar Pradesh; therefore, many paharis 
felt this would mean further loss of representation and control over local resources.31 The protests that 
ensued were overwhelmingly represented by women and peasants, whose rallying refrain of “jal, 
jangal, zameen [Water, Forest, Land]” recalled earlier historical iterations: when women of Renu 
village in Garhwal stopped loggers from felling trees the Indian government had auctioned to a private 
company in 1974, launching what would be famously called the “Chipko” movement; when, over a 
decade later, environmentalists and residents stalled the construction of India's tallest hydro-electric 
dam in a geological fault zone in Tehri, Garhwal; and, in the countless village- and district-based anti-
alcohol, forest access, forest conservation, and anti-dam protests launched throughout the hills since 
the eve of Indian Independence. 32  
The movement for statehood was a movement about the identity and ownership of pahar; for 
this reason paharis agitated for Garsain, a small town at 2000 meters just inside the Garhwali side of 
the Garhwal-Kumaon border, to be the state capital. It embodied pahar and therefore was deemed 
“close” by paharis, even if poor mountain roads made it logistically hard to access. However, the 
eventual win for state independence required alliances among peasants, urban students and 
politicians. In 2000, when “Uttaranchal” became a state, the (then small) city of Dehradun, at a 
moderate altitude and easily reachable from Delhi by train and motor road, was declared the capital.33 
Now fifteen years later, Uttarakhand can claim to be the second fastest growing state economy in 
India with its wheels spinning on industry, tourism, and land investment. A farmer-NGO fieldworker 
and mother of four, who makes 5000 rupees (less than $100 US) a month, voiced a dissenting 
                                                          
31In addition, there were likely caste prejudices at play; certainly the small but significant population 
of pahari Scheduled Castes groups might have felt conflicted about this cause. 
32 The image of pahari women “hugging trees” in the Chipko Movement was appropriated by 
environmentalists throughout the world; scholars and activists argued that paharis were making 
claims to forest access rather than attempting to protest “deforestation” (Gadgil and Guha 1995, Guha 
1989, Jain 1984, Kedzior 2006, Rangan 2000). The Tehri Dam in Garhwal, Uttarakhand is among the 
largest in the world. It was completed in 2006 after over thirty years in construction: over 100,000 
people were relocated; towns and villages, and large swaths of forest were submerged. Some paharis 
argue that because it has been constructed on a fault line, it could have catastrophic effects on the over 
half-million people who live downstream. 




sentiment: “That is only on paper. If you come into these hills, then you see. They say there's no 
hunger, but if your contractor won't pay you, how do you feed your children? All this is not for us.” 
 Unlike pahar, bahar cannot exist without its reference point. It is, in this sense, utterly 
dependent. To be “outside” means to be outside of (something/someplace). Though people 
participating in the conference in the second event speak of need and poverty in places like pahar, and 
though the statistics suggest the dependence of such places on the humanitarianism and foresight of 
national and transnational agents, one might note the opposite at play. For example, agribusinesses, 
foundations and national governments need the plant biodiversity in places like pahar in order to 
innovate. Promoting and maintaining national, continental and global food security similarly requires 
places and populations to save. Pahar is implicated, transformed and affected in subtle and obvious 
ways by bahar, but its existence (as perceived by many paharis) is not hinged upon it. Conversely, 
bahar appears unfazed by pahar (or equally fazed by all places and therefore neutral, “placeless,” 
unifying) but in fact cannot survive without the latter. In pahar – through the night patrol to ward off 
suar, the silent anticipation of danger, the various protests for access to and control over jal, jangal, 
zameen (water, forest, land) – human power appears constrained in its reach and its effects; in other 
words, necessarily relational and harnessed around immediate or practical needs. Conversely, in 
bahar – through the repetition of words like “zero” and “evergreen,” the setting of goals for all of 
humanity, the discrepancy between the identification of food insecurities and rural poverty as major 
problems and the abundance of food and wealth in that same setting – human power appears limitless 
in its reach and its effects; in other words, potentially reaching all places including every valley of 
pahar and harnessed for the future and the sake of the world and all humanity. 
If the words “pahar” and “bahar” themselves share their intermediary “aha,” paharis and 
North Indians located “outside” the hills also share understandings of place, understandings that are 
themselves contradictory. “Pahar” intimates purity, filth, backwardness, divinity, masculinity, 
feminization, unpredictability, superstition, myth, poverty, and wealth. It alludes to place that belongs 
to particular people; they are “paharis.” It alludes to a place that belongs to Indians, to pilgrims, to all 




bodies, goods, “natural resources” and ideas, shaped fundamentally but not completely, in conformity 
and resistance to political economic trends and the changing patterns of social “needs.” These include 
flows between pahari places (such as when a girl marries and moves to a different and sometimes far 
away home, when a family shifts from a pahari village to a pahari town/city for their children’s 
education or when a barrel of mandua is transported to the local market), flows from pahar to places 
bahar (such as when a Kumaoni soldier is stationed in the plains, when a Garhwali man spends two 
years working in Abu Dhabi as cook or when a river is dammed to produce electricity that can flow to 
Delhi) and flows from bahar to pahar (such as when a German entrepreneur moves to the hills, when 
wheat and rice from the public distribution system arrives from Punjab, when NGOs distribute 
literacy materials that have been produced elsewhere or when a shipment of flat screen TVs arrives at 
a village store during wedding season).  
These shared (and contradictory) understandings of pahar shift perpetually and relationally.34 
For example, as pahari men join the military or leave the hills in search of wages, the rural pahari 
population becomes comprised of women and children; conversely, the association of pahari agrarian 
life – such as forest harvesting, sowing seeds, harvesting, threshing, seed selecting, taking grains to 
the mill, cooking, cleaning, milking cows and buffalos and caring for animals – with femininity 
propels men bahar because “there is nothing here.” 35 These patterns themselves intersect with 
emerging conflicts about femininity (as meaning hard work, strength, and time in the sun; as meaning 
leisure, thinness, and whiteness) and emerging conflicts about masculinity (as performed through 
migration out of pahar for work; as performed through migration into pahar for leisure or capital 
investment).  
  Pahar – here signifying the particular regions of Kumaon and Garhwal – has long been a 
place for religious pilgrimage, honeymoons, tourism, and elite boarding school education. Upon 
Indian Independence, British hill stations and British army bases transformed into Indian hill stations 
                                                          
34The “r” of “pahar” is not the same as the “r” of “bahar.” In Hindi they are written with different 
letters.  




and Indian army bases. However, over the past twenty or so years as segments of India’s middle and 
upper classes have become significantly wealthier, and especially after Uttarakhand became a state, 
pahar has also transformed into a place where people from north Indian cities and abroad are 
constructing houses, mansions and hotels for holiday excursions. I witnessed a great deal of such 
construction throughout Kumaon. While the desired ends are idyllic, the means discernibly are not. I 
need only mention that the manager of an eco-tourist lodge located about an hour's walk from the 
village in this chapter’s opening event has been physically threatened numerous times by “land mafia” 
to sell property. Understandings of and material changes within pahar, in other words, are tethered to 
metaphorical “bahars” – imagined spaces beyond comprised of idealized places symbolizing hope, 
survival, status or class mobility.  
 These contradictions, movements, understandings and idealizations entangled in 
“pahar/bahar” come to bear on the aspects of agricultural biodiversity, food production/consumption 
and taste broached later in this work. They manifest in performances of modern consumption that 
include elite customers selecting Himalayan Finger Millet off the shelf and pahari youth disliking 
mandua's taste. They manifest in the belief, as articulated by M.S. Swaminathan in this chapter’s 
second event, that “millets broaden the food basket” of modern India and in the ghost towns 
throughout the hills of modern India where millets no longer grow. They manifest in the tourist places 
with a Himalayan view where you can find “value added” finger or barnyard millet for sale in “organic” 




  “Mandua” and “Millets” are two ways people in the opening events refer to 
finger millet. This section examines the relationship between symbolic 
forms of producing, classifying and understanding marginalized 
seeds/crops/foods/grains and political economic projects. Through the less 
acknowledged human “interventions” of language and political struggle, the 
identity of grains themselves become open to forms of social 
transformation.36 
 
                                                          
36 My lexical analysis of these local food crops has some synergy with Harold Conklin’s (1968) analysis 




The first crops/grains/seeds one encounters in this work is mandua. In “PAHAR,” Kashtee looks over 
the village fields where mandua has been sown with nitrogen-fixing dhals (pulses and lentils) and 
madhira, another food grain, after the wheat was harvested in April. This mixed crop system that the 
fields display is called “barah anaaj” (twelve grains). The term, like “pahar,” claims a loose definition; 
neither of its components is “accurate,” and these inaccuracies are essential to its meaning. In fact, I 
never encountered “twelve” different kinds of crops in a pahari field (most often it was little as two 
and as many as eight). In fact, the crops that comprise the system are not all “grains” (in addition to 
lentils and pulses, one might also find oilseeds and vegetables). As Vijay Jhardhari has explained in 
conversation (and as he also writes), “barah (twelve)” is not an ideal for which to strive, but a 
possibility, an inclusive gesture, a metaphor for a crop not grown in isolation (a form, one might say, 
of nonhuman sociality). A few weeks after my conversation with Kashtee and Neema, these crops 
would be harvested, along with madhira planted on the other side of the village, and dhan (rice), sown 
at the bottom of the hill near the river.  
 Mandua can grow as tall as wheat and, like wheat, can vary greatly in height. Its stalks 
generally sell for more money than its grains because they provide nourishment deemed vital to the 
cows, buffalo, and goats that abound in the hills. Rarely, however, have I met farmers with much, or 
any, “extra” to sell. The baal of the mandua plant looks less like a “head” than like a small human 
hand. Pahari seed activists/farmers I interviewed have recently identified as many as twenty-six local 
varieties, though one could argue that there are more (which they have not yet come across) or less (if 
species perceived as different are genetically “same”). However, in the villages I visited both in 
Kumaon and Garhwal, farmers generally distinguished between only two: “open” – those whose 
“fingers” stretched long as if grasping for something just beyond their reach; and “closed” – those 
whose “fists” were tightly clenched as if trying to hold onto something that would be taken away. 
Mixed together, the seeds/grains of these two kinds are indistinguishable to the human eye: small; 
brown, beige, or maroon; and perfectly round; farmers I met stored them together, whether as seeds 
to be planted the following year or as grains to be consumed. Whether there are two, twenty-six, a 




This means it has evolved in the way it has, with its variation from village to village and plot to plot, 
because humans have planted, harvested, and shared seeds year after year in these hills for many 
centuries. Mandua is considered “traditional” because it is produced and consumed through practices 
that have been passed on from generation to generation; however, these traditions necessitate change 
(in meaning and materiality) to live and they require the interplay of human and nonhuman labor in 
place and time. Like the most paharis, mandua cannot claim “indigeneity;” at some point it was a 
migrant, likely from the Ethiopian highlands where finger millet was grown as far back as 4000 
years.37  
 At the conference in “BAHAR,” two paharis use the word “mandua.” However, others use 
different names: “ragi,” as this food grain is called in much of India; and “millets,” which 
encompasses a variety of crops/seeds/grains (in which madhira also falls). Mandua is also called 
other things: “finger millet” (and madhira: “barnyard millet”), “Himalayan Finger Millet” (and 
madhira: “Himalayan Barnyard Millet”), “eleusine coracana” (its binomial name; madhira's is 
“echinochloa frumentacea”), “underutilized crop,” “traditional seed,” “coarse grain,” “miracle grain,” 
“black,” “poor person's,” “illiterate person's,” “nutritious,” “tasty,” “disliked,” “abandoned,” “old,” 
“warm,” “strength giving,” “resilient,” “disappearing,” “drought-resistant,” “vital plant genetic 
material,” and “orphan crop.” This almost inconceivably broad range of identities and affiliations 
serves as a reminder that humans are not the only species that can claim a complex social life. 
 I did not come to pahar in 2011 with a special interest in “millets.” I had heard about the seed 
activism here and I was drawn to hill agriculture, having previously spent a year in Peru. I met a 
farmer in the Nagni region of Garhwal and an activist based in Dehradun who, twenty years ago, had 
helped form a network called Beej Bachao Andolaan (Save the Seeds Movement). Now they were 
concerned about millets – not just mandua, but also madhira/janghora, koni (foxtail millet) and a 
broader scope of “traditional” locally produced pahari foods – because in some areas “free” packets of 
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hybrid and “improved” millet seeds, produced in Indian agricultural universities, were being 
distributed to farmers with pesticides. When I started inquiring about “millets” or “mandua” in 
pahar, the varied reactions intrigued me. For example, a Hindi tutor in Mussoorie filled the hour with 
talk on this subject and then scoured his library to find an ethnography written by U.S. anthropologist 
Charlotte Wiser in 1937 because “millets” appeared in her charts. He was not a farmer or an activist, 
but expressed so much pride in pahari grains (including local pahari rice and wheat varieties) that he 
refused to eat food made from wheat and rice grown in cash crop regions; in his opinion, they had “no 
nutritional value.” But the following July and August, at the height of the monsoon, when I visited 
various organizations that were in fact connected to Beej Bachao Andolaan, I found that the fate of 
pahari grains was less a topic of conversation; it took a backseat to issues like fighting the 
construction of nearby dams or having a motor roads built or repaired to connect villages to each 
other. When I returned to New York between visits to India, I noticed some organic stores had started 
selling “millet,” usually mixed in “organic” cereals, or baked into biscuits or breads. 
 Like many activists and older farmers I have met, a Kumaoni farmer who is affiliated with Beej 
Bachao Andolaan and active in a National Seed Network, dates the beginning of a slow 
marginalization of mandua, madhira, koni and other “traditional” pahari foods to the 1960s, followed 
by a sharp decline from the mid-1990s.38 Over the past twenty years, he attended three events in 
which pahari farmers displayed samples of different seeds; each time, he said, the diversity had 
plummeted drastically and some varieties had disappeared. He attributed this to the inundation of 
limited varieties of industrially produced wheat and rice – both as seeds through Green and post-
Green Revolution government “extension” efforts and as food through the Public Distribution System, 
(what Nirmila called “control” in the first event). Uttarakhand presents particular case, the Director of 
an Indian NGO that does work on plant genetic diversity in Kumaon told me. It is distinct from the 
plains of Andhra Pradesh, where the Millet Network of India and the Deccan Development Society 
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have done a lot to revive these crops over the past fifteen years, launching a successful campaign to 
include local millet varieties in school lunches.39 It is distinct from Karnataka, and to a lesser extent 
Tamil Nadu, where, despite decline, you never stopped finding ragi dishes proudly listed on some 
restaurant menus. It is distinct from Uttar Pradesh, to which it once “belonged,” where millets have 
almost disappeared from the land and social memory.  
 “Orphan crop” is the last in that long list of names people give for mandua. It was relayed to 
me on more than one occasion in a way that suggested a study of millets in the hills would be naïve 
and anachronistic – like rooting for a team that was not losing but had already lost the game. As 
Daniel Janzen wrote in E.O. Wilson’s 1988 volume on Biodiversity: 
Agroscapes, seemingly still supporting long lists of widespread species, are primed for 
massive extinction as individuals of these species senesce or are killed through 
intensification of contemporary agriculture. If all these species were to be physically 
removed as soon as they have no future, the catastrophe would be much more 
noticeable and would therefore arouse the sentiments normally associated with 
massive extinction.40 
 
However, It is too simplistic (and arguably untrue) to define mandua as an “orphan.” This term 
connotes an identity (a state of being), not a process (a condition of becoming). It implies something 
irretrievable, a transformation of state that requires new agency and new agents. However, mandua 
has not been abandoned or irretrievably cast out. The fields below Kashtee's home appear as they do 
in late August because mandua had actively been saved, stored, sown, and weeded. A week after that 
opening conversation, she and others would once again forgo sleep to perform nightly patrols to 
safeguard these “orphans.”  
Rather, mandua survives despite and because of a trifecta or “hat trick” of marginalization – 
that of pahar (place), women and small farmers (people), and “millets” (grains). This intersection 
contributes to producing the terrain on which mandua still grows and has stopped growing. The 
marginalization of pahar, for example, contributes to and detracts from the marginalization of 
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mandua. The government has not invested in agricultural infrastructure here because pahar has “low 
productivity” (crops take more work to grow at a slower place with less yield; agricultural land 
comprises only 13 percent of Uttarakhand's ecology; and family plots are unirrigated, small, and 
scattered). To some extent, pahar is marginalized in recent national efforts to revive millets and 
traditional seeds because of the difficulty and expense of getting in and out of the hills, the challenge 
of internet connections, long power cuts, and the obligations on pahari women that make it 
challenging to leave home.41 Conversely, remoteness and lack of infrastructure is also why a large 
majority in this region depend to some extent on food grown locally, and why agricultural extension 
agents have not been successful in promoting industrial seeds (the more remote, the less successful).42  
The vast forest cover, which leaves little room for agriculture, also contributes to methods of 
food production that sustain mandua. Most paharis feel mandua only tastes good only if cooked with 
wood-fire; and because mandua is considered more sustaining than wheat, women and girls might 
consume it before going to harvest in the forest. In the opening event, people used mandua to make 
wheat “stretch longer,” counted on it to grow regardless of rain patterns, and relied on it when the 
market was volatile.43 It provided a form of security (a word I will later discuss) through its versatility 
(quality) rather than its yield (quantity). Mandua's concomitant turn towards life and towards death, 
its coinciding survival and precarity – its condition of marginality – makes no sound in the global 
market; yet its production sustains and cushions capitalist relations in a variety of ways. 
  “Mandua,” not “Millets,” comes first in the title of this section because the vast majority of 
rural paharis I met – except for the most mobile, cosmopolitan or environmentally politicized (who 
were generally male, relatively wealthier and from historically privileged castes) – did not use, or even 
recognize, the latter term. Certainly, there were times “mandua” and “madhira” were understood 
together as part of a group of foods that people “used to eat” or as “monsoon crops” that needed 
weeding. However, paharis generally referred to them as distinct, as distinctions are widely made 
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43 The primary kinds of wood used in Gow were oak (banj) and pine (chir), the latter of which I discuss 




between “wheat” and “rice.” Mandua and madhira require different threshing.44 They have divergent 
consumption patterns, are cooked differently, associated with particular dishes; madhira might be 
mixed with curd or eaten as rice, while mandua ground into rotees (flat breads) or ladoos (sweets). In 
many places I visited, mandua was still eaten by some, if not many, people, while madhira had largely 
been given up as a human food but was still grown and fed to milk-producing animals.  
 So how, then, did mandua, madhira, and other food grains come to be “millets?” The primary 
words in eleusine coracana and echinochloa frumentacea do not indicate a shared family or genus. 
We could look etymologically to the French “milet,” the Latin “milium,” or the proto Indo-European 
“melh,” which meant “to grind or to crush” (the root of the English “mill” and “to mill”). It defined any 
grain or grass that could be consumed as food, in other words, all edible cereals. In Europe, the 
“common millet” was panicum miliaceum, otherwise known as broomcorn or proso millet, which also 
grows in Uttarakhand and other regions of India and now is predominantly commercialized for 
birdseed; though its origins are still uncertain, there is evidence this “millet” appeared as a 
domesticated crop 7000 years back in China.  
Similarly, the “Corn Laws” enacted in the United Kingdom between 1815 and 1846 to restrict 
and impose tariffs on imported grains reflected a comparably loose classification for “corn” in Europe. 
These laws included any grain that required grinding.45 As Arturo Warman writes in Corn and 
Capitalism, the “debate over corn’s origin” since the sixteenth century was ideologically rooted in 
colonialism, racism and capitalism and “revolved around what was believed to be an inherent 
inferiority of American nature and American civilization compared to the Old World.”46 In the 
Americas, now recognized to have been the home for initial (now extinct) varieties of ancestral wild 
corn, “corn had a name all its own, and in many languages even the individual parts had names that 
were not shared by other plants.” On the other hand, historically in most European languages the 
word for “corn” “was not unique to the plant… 
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45 The “Corn Laws,” which were designed to favor domestic producers, raised food prices for the urban 
wage laborers at a time of heavy industrialization and met with urban resistance. 




as in the case with the adoption of the tern maíz – originally from Taino — in the 
Spanish language. In others the name of another plant or plant product familiar to the 
Old World was used to refer to corn. Christopher Columbus called corn mijo in Spanish 
or “millet” in English, after the Old World cereal. This was the case for the Portuguese 
as well, who also referred to corn as milho, or “millet.” In British English, the world 
“corn” became a generic term used to refer to grain in general but especially to wheat.47  
 
From this era, competition in the global market of exchange and the commodification of food grains 
launched certain crops into a “place” all their own.  
Perhaps this explains why, during the course of research, I found that many people included a 
variety of crops and grains in their conception of “millets” and that there was no clear answer to “How 
many millets exist?” If certain cereals – take wheat – are no longer “millets,” it is because they have 
been “promoted” to distinction, whether in the later European colonial era, through capital expansion, 
through U.S. “Food Aid” policies of the 1950s, and/or through the Green Revolution. Meanwhile, 
“millets” have remained the category of default for the broad swath of “other food grains,” not 
distinguished (or deemed important enough to distinguish) from each other but very much 
distinguished (and racialized, or marked with “essential” difference through which other grains claim 
social value) from those that had specific names and entered the realm of measurable (and global) 
“value.”  
 Arturo Warman’s exegesis on the political economy of corn, like Antonio Gramsci’s or 
Raymond Williams’ analyses of the political economy of language, reveals the changing categories for 
food crops to be far more than superficial description. A small slippage or shift of words can perform a 
great deal of work and can condition the mind to practice certain ways of thinking. Categories function 
to suture as well as to delineate, enabling people to take cognitive leaps and make sense out of what 
might seem otherwise illogical. For example, the heading “Contingencies: one two four” would sound 
“right” but read “wrong.” In this work, using “millets” self-evidently would presuppose an onto-
epistemology of particular grains/crops/seeds that does not resonate with their conditions of 
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corn and corn’s forerunners remains crucial in order to reclaim a rich legacy of botanical knowledge 
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peasants and indigenous peoples who still practice the tradition and transform it in the course of 




production. It would be to assume their “commodity nature” – something against which Marilyn 
Strathern cautioned in The Gender and the Gift. Strathern observed that even in analyses of “gift 
economies” perceived in opposition to capitalism, anthropologists still apprehended an exchange of 
things, rather than circuits of relations. 
I found that “millets” moves in company with other words and categories that are not 
commonly evoked among pahari farmers, such as “agroecology” and “woman farmers.” Concerning 
the former: corresponding with Akhil Gupta's research among male cash crop farmers after the Green 
Revolution, pahari (mostly women) farmers I met did not identify separate modes of agriculture 
(beyond “plains” and “pahar”) though they certainly distinguished between agricultural methods. For 
example, farmers noted the difference between applying cow's manure and chemical fertilizers, but 
generally called both “kaam (work).” Concerning the latter: I was corrected numerous times by 
married “women” as young as eighteen when I called myself a “woman” because I was unmarried and 
therefore was a “girl.” Again – heeding Strathern – “woman” connoted a relation and not an 
experience- or age-related identity. Furthermore, in the opening event, perceived caste distinctions 
often permeate everyday life and mark the patterns of people's movements, even among the young 
(though to a lesser extent). Thus, many pahari women I met did not recognize a generalized category 
of “women,” and even if that category was used it was, inevitably, conflicted. For example, it might be 
understood to apply to certain circumstances (when one is having lunch with fellow NGO fieldworkers 
at the canteen) but not in others (when one is back home under the eyes of one's neighbors).48 As for 
“farmers,” Nirmila in the first event undeniably claimed this identity, yet she (like all the women in 
her village) does not possess a land title in her name and is not recognized as having “farmer status” in 
India.49 
 I encountered “millets” in circuits of NGOs, funding agencies, government, industry, 
entrepreneurs, transnational institutions, and environmental activists (some of whom were also 
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pahari farmers). While it clearly did not hold the same meaning or import for everyone who used it, it 
reflected the embodied work of mediation, reinforced through usage. However, if “millets” has been 
produced through political economic currents, it has also cut against them. If the broadness of this 
category has resulted from racialization and neglect, it has also emerged as one through which groups 
in various parts India and the world are forging solidarities born of a shared situatedness. The soft 
boundaries of its definition, the haziness of its lines of delineation, summon a kind of inclusivity – for 
grains and therefore people who produce them. “Millets” therein becomes a site of political, 
ideological, economic, environmental and lexical struggle.  
 Like pahar and bahar, “mandua” and “millets” are not oppositional. Each bears traces of the 
other. By “trace” here, I do not mean a fragment, a broken bit, a small piece of a thing – as in a pebble 
chipped from a boulder, as in something derivative. It is more like the imprints made by/on a boulder 
and a river as both move, collide, and interface in a process that transforms their matter and relation. 
I mean the violence and subtleties of impact and proximity. I am thinking of Jacques Derrida's 
theorization of writing under erasure (sous rature) and his work Of Grammatology, as well as Gayatri 
Spivak's introduction to and English translation of this work.50 Derrida's “being” is an unsettling, 
contingent ontological proposition. At once naming a state of thingness or existence and undoing it (it 
is sliced through, not whole, questionable). “Being” here is tentative, humbled, undone the moment it 
is formed or apprehended. I see this line as a line of relation that drags in the possibility of other ways 
of “being” and perceiving, disrupting what is taken for granted and calling attention to the relational 
and the unseen. “Millets” throughout this work could be read as “millets.” It/they exist in real material 
and ideological ways, but do not constitute an a priori category. This metaphorical line drags in 




  “Economy” and “Ecology” are two major underlying concerns and 
motivations for the protagonists of both opening events. Through an 
examination of how processes of seed commodification, national 
development and globalized agriculture have affected paharis and pahari 
                                                          




crops, this section demonstrates that economic and ecological concerns are 
ultimately indistinguishable. 
 
Earlier, I mentioned a Kumaoni farmer who dated the slow marginalization of mandua back roughly 
fifty or sixty years. This dovetails with the era following India's 1962 war with China at its Kumaoni 
border and widespread road construction for military use.51 In other words, it was a time when, to use 
Swaminathan’s metaphor, “guns” were directly affecting the future of grains in India’s northern hills. 
In addition, during that decade, the national government expanded efforts to develop India’s 
industrialization through extracting resources from this region, and it invested in plans for the 
construction of massive hydroelectric dams. As Gadgil and Guha argue, “the demands of the 
commercial-industrial sector [replaced] strategic imperial needs as the cornerstone of forest policy 
and management.”52 The national government began to wrest control over forests from states and 
forests policies restricted local use while commercializing forest wood.53 This Kumaoni farmer felt 
these development plans – and the heightened uncertainty and hardship they brought to people’s lives 
– led to the decline of pahari grains more than the then newly introduced high-yield varieties of wheat 
and rice of the Green Revolution.  
Before long, however, industrialized agriculture would also make its mark on the landscape of 
the region. In the mid-1980s, certain parts of Garhwal and Kumaon had turned to contract farming 
and industrial varieties of seeds and food made their way up into the hills, particularly the parts that 
were now accessible through motor roads. By then, India was beginning to steer towards a path of 
economic liberalization and militarization, and grains were forging a path for guns. The Green 
Revolution enabled India to become nationally “self-sufficient” in grain production. High yield 
                                                          
51and the beginning of sealing the once porous Indo-Tibet border, which closed the “Silk Road” and 
centuries old unregulated trade. For forty-four years because of geopolitical conflicts with China, this 
route was officially closed and much of it became unused; meanwhile for military reasons, various 
footpaths were turned into motor roads. In 2006, the Indian government opened up one of these 
paths again for trade but with restrictions. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/crossing-
the-himalayas-china-reopens-a-passage-to-india-5329459.html 
52 Gadgil and Guha (1992). 
53 In 2006 the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest-Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) 
Act, also called the Forest Rights Act, was passed. Despite seeing this as a victory, some forest activists 




varieties provided additional revenue sources: meant more land could be used for nonagricultural 
exports like cotton and more people could be shifted into wage labor. Thus, more resources could be 
invested in India’s geopolitical might. By 1974 India had already conducted its first nuclear bomb test 
and in 1998 launched a series of five others.54  
On the global stage from the mid-1980s, the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, 
also played a pivotal role in the decline of mandua in the hills. Broadly speaking, the process of 
forming GATT began at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, though it was officially negotiated 
through the then newly formed United Nations.55 Countering notions of historical inevitability, its 
contentious beginnings never smoothed out: at every stage, opposing visions of the present, future and 
past were at play. While the forty-four countries that met at Bretton Woods agreed to institute the 
International Monetary Fund and what is now the World Bank, they were not able to agree on the 
issue of tariffs in global trade.56 GATT, launched three years later in 1947, signified a “new” era in the 
global political economy. 57 However, it bore historical markers of a rigged game. GATT, in 
combination with the World Bank and IMF, facilitated the transfer of power and wealth from what 
were formerly “European Empires” to the United States and its allied European or settler colonial 
nation-states. Through a multilateral nexus of diplomacy and economic regulation, the national 
governments of newly (or soon to be) liberated nation-states entered into relationships of debt and 
obligation to banks and countries that had accrued wealth and geopolitical power through centuries of 
colonial or settler colonial relations.  
                                                          
54 The first test was ironically called “Smiling Buddha.” Rupal Oza (2006) writes about the second, 
Pokhran-II, as related to globalization, nationalism and gender. 
55 The Bretton Woods Conference, formally known as the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference, was the gathering of 730 delegates from all 44 Allied nations in Bretton Woods, New 
Hampshire, United States, to regulate the international monetary and financial order after the 
conclusion of World War II. The conference was held in July 1944, and agreements later established 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
56 The countries instrumental at Bretton Woods were the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The World Bank was then called the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). 
57 GATT was negotiated during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and was the 





Each of GATT's completed eight rounds has taken increasingly longer to settle, reflecting new 
transnational contentions, new accumulation strategies and emerging forms of civil society protest as 
problems of “global trade” become compacted in certain regions, populations and realms of life. The 
“Uruguay Round,” which began in 1987, took eighty-seven months and was profoundly contentious 
precisely because it significantly reduced tariffs and introduced agriculture into global trade. The 
arduousness of the process reflects multiple points of resistance and the percolating efforts by 
thickening transnational rural networks to collectively forge and carve imaginative space out for 
alternative global futures. 
However, the period marking the end of the Uruguay Round of GATT in 1995 was a 
consolidating moment for corporate power. By this time, national seed certification laws, invented in 
the early 1900s in the US to protect farmers by guaranteeing them quality seed, had been reinvented 
as transnational “plant protection” mandates, patents and breeders’ rights that protected the 
“intellectual property” of industrial breeders. The International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants (UPOV) required member nations to pass seed certification legislation restricting 
what farmers could plant and sell. Between the launch and conclusion of the Uruguay Round, these 
became far more repressive. In 1991, the UPOV redrafted its 1978 rules in order to “encourage the 
development of new varieties of plants, for the benefit of society.”  
Farmers throughout the world have protested the implementation of UPOV ’91 because 
national governments have used it to fine, jail and criminalize farmers for the customary practice of 
saving seeds, which has been a fundamental aspect of farming since agriculture was first 
domesticated.58 Moreover, customary practices of seed saving are crucial to agricultural biodiversity; 
thus to endanger them would mean threatening the existence of biological diversity as well. In India, 
civil society organizations collectively filed a public interest lawsuit against the national government’s 
efforts to adopt the more restrictive agreement and have, thus far, managed to stay the process.59 
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Importantly, the same laws cannot protect the seeds farmers breed through their methods of 
harvesting, selecting, storing, and replanting local varieties because these forms of intellectual 
property do not – indeed, cannot due to their conditions of production – fit the criterion of “stability” 
and consistent reproducibility. In other words, intellectual property is only recognized as such if it can 
be “scaled up;” if it is an innovation whose “distinctness” can be bleached of markers of place, labor, 
and heterogeneity; if it represents a predictable life trajectory whose purpose is to be legible in and 
amenable to the realm of global exchange. 
Easing the trade “barriers” between nation-states set industry, labor and commodities “in 
motion” and paved the way for corporate domination of the global food system. Not coincidentally, in 
the mid-1990s, India continued on a more deliberate path of economic liberalization, which it initiated 
a few years earlier after the collapse of the USSR (and the dissolution of the various kinds of aid it had 
provided). For, the World Trade Organization (WTO) formed then out of GATT with a goal of reducing 
market “distortions” and impediments to trade. The WTO reinforced the UPOV by requiring member 
countries to comply with plant patents or develop sui generis laws in order to participate in global 
trade.60 Also around that time, transgenic (GM) crops were first successfully commercialized and, 
along with new institutional mechanisms, industry was able to break through a major technological 
barrier. The speed and breadth of industrial seed production leapt forward so as to make all “raw” 
“plant genetic material” newly relevant.61 Isolated genes from one plant could now be identified, 
catalogued, digitized, extracted and injected into the genetic material of another species; industry 
could now pick and choose specific traits (like finger millet's drought resistance), develop plants that 
grow only with particular chemical “inputs” and produce seeds whose progeny will not reproduce (and 
                                                          
60 Since the mid-1980s there have been new tensions among transnational governance bodies, nation-
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governments; increased investment by corporations, nation-states, and wealthy individuals in 
militarization, agriculture and pharmaceuticals (in contradiction to Swaminathan's final statement); 
convergence of humanitarian aid and war; and, new forms of privatization of natural resources. 




therefore cannot be farmer-saved). In other words, industry could now create plant and seed varieties 
whose futures could be both designed and foreclosed. 
Wealth accrued by corporations, governments, foundations and individuals through public-
private partnerships during the Green Revolution is now being directed into agricultural research and 
development because this is “the future” of food, bio-fuels, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
Agricultural corporations are now “life science” conglomerates; allied with foundations like Bill and 
Melinda Gates and Rockefeller and with intergovernmental research institutes like ICRISAT, they 
have invested in innovations that can literally alter life – social and biological. Corporations that were 
already powerful have consolidated into an oligarchy of six that now produce the vast majority of the 
world's industrial seeds and wield considerable power over transnational food and agricultural 
negotiations.62 It is hard to believe that Monsanto, now the world's biggest seed company, hardly 
produced seeds in the mid-1980s. Its domain was chemicals. It has recreated itself largely through 
acquisitions and, more recently, by licensing its patented seed traits to other companies.63 Seeds 
matter to Monsanto for some similar reasons they might matter to a farmer of La Via Campesina or a 
farmer in the opening event of this chapter – they suture the end and beginning in the cycle of plant 
life.  
To control this critical moment of the cycle gives one control over the methods by which that 
life comes into being (production) and the human/nonhuman relation (“means of production”) that 
underscore it. As Jack Kloppenburg puts it: whoever controls the seed controls the food system.64 
                                                          
62 Gradually since the mid-1980s and far more rapidly since the mid-1990s, a small percentage of 
corporations, foundations, and individuals have been able to accumulate a massive amount of wealth 
and power while making the lives of the majority of the world’s human population more precarious (to 
varying degrees). See Howard (2009) for an illuminating visual on the consolidation of the seed 
industry over the past twenty years. 
63The expansion of agribusiness over the past twenty-five years has moved in fits and starts, reflecting 
economic relations and crises as well as technological or institutional hurdles to accumulation.  
64 Kloppenburg (2004). La Via Campesina (2013) similarly states, “Whoever controls seeds controls 
the right to food, food sovereignty, and the political sovereignty of the people. Seeds hold a special 
place in the struggle for food sovereignty. These small grains are the basis for the future. They shape, 
at each life cycle, the type of food people eat, how it is grown, and who grows it. Seeds are also a vessel 
that carries the past, the accumulated vision, and knowledge and practices of peasant and farming 




Farmers who harvest seeds and then sow them, like those in “PAHAR,” do so “freely” outside the “free 
market.”  This is not only because they do not have to purchase seeds, but also because their encounter 
with “nature” is not mediated through an equivalent or abstraction. While the seed industry has 
boomed, local varieties – produced by small-scale farmers, like those who grow mandua – still 
account for the majority of food grown in the world. La Via Campesina and many civil society groups 
throughout the world (and strongly in India) have come out staunchly against transgenic seeds, 
claiming that they drift and “pollute” the fields of farmers who do not use them, thereby stripping 
farmers completely of “choice” and further endangering farmer-saved varieties and making it harder 
for them to sell in organic niche markets.65 This argument, like that of the La Via Campesina farmer in 
“BAHAR,” makes a critique of power more than technology, and this is something that the widespread 
preoccupation with “genetic modification” often hides.  
Paradoxically, during this same period the Indian government has passed important legislation 
asserting the rights of citizens; for example, the 2002 Freedom of Information Act (now the Right to 
Information Act) and the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act 2001. The latter is 
India's WTO sui generis legislation; it acknowledges and protects farmers' rights more than almost 
any other in the world.66 However, in the early 1990s as a response to economic crisis, the Indian 
government (led by Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party) simultaneously set on a course of 
opening India to cheap imports (including in agriculture), privatizing natural resources and reducing 
social supports for small-scale rural producers. One could argue this was akin to breaking someone's 
legs while offering them a state of the art cane.67 In 2000, various states, including the newly formed 
                                                          
65 Ronald Herring (2009) argues that farmers have also advocated for GM (transgenic) cotton. 
However, there have been many reports of rising farmer suicides in the Indian cotton belt due to the 
high cost of chemicals and the reality of debt (CHRGJ 2011). There are also numerous consumer-
based arguments against transgenic foods, such as the lack of comprehensive biosafety testing. In 
India, civil society groups were successful in achieving a moratorium on transgenic food crops largely 
for this reason (Roy 2014). However, in 2014 with some administrative finagling, which I describe in 
Chapter Three, the Indian government launched “GM field trials” for twenty food crops. 
66Just three years later, the Indian Parliament passed a 2004 Seeds Bill that virtually undid the farmer 
benefits of the previous legislation. Karine Peschard (2014) argues that Indian government plays an 
intentionally ambivalent role as it mediates between civil society, business, and transnational 
institutions. I analyze this more in Chapter Three. 




Uttarakhand (then “Uttaranchal”), established “hassle free” and duty-free “Special Economic Zones” 
to “enhance” foreign investment. India's capital New Delhi proudly bears new markers of modernity 
and wealth, like Terminal 3 of the Indira Gandhi International Airport, its Airport Express and a 
newly designed Jawaharlal Nehru Stadium (for the 2010 Commonwealth Games). In just thirty years, 
the once dusty village of Gurgaon, Haryana, southwest of Delhi, has become home to offices of half the 
world’s Fortune 500 companies; in its sprawl of massive malls, commercial buildings, and high rises, 
many new buildings sit empty as sites for laundering money. Much of the wood, water and electricity 
for these ventures come from pahar, expediting the 500 dam projects that have long been in planning 
stages.68 
 There have undeniably been new economic opportunities for those who already possessed a 
certain level of financial and/or cultural capital – as well as for those industrious individuals and 
groups who found themselves at the right place at the right time. Uttarakhand's new and rapidly 
expanding state government, urban centers, and tourist routes have opened up jobs and possibilities 
for investment and entrepreneurship for those (predominantly men) with political alliances and/or 
wealth, particularly if they are eager to make below the radar deals. Also undeniably, there has been 
profound stagnation for the majority of India’s polity and in pahar. A laborer who works every day in 
someone else's store in a pahari city or town (one that sees tourists and has money flowing in) might 
make 3000 rupees ($50) a month, and for much of the year cannot afford to eat vegetables besides 
potatoes.69 In rural Kumaon or Garhwal – as one man succinctly put it – there are only two jobs (for 
men): drive a car or own a store. In fact, these too require a base level of wealth.  
 I observed a few other options: work as an NGO fieldworker (for a small percentage, more 
women than men, generally for 4000 to 6000 rupees, or under $100 US, a month for 6 days/week), 
do construction or stone breaking for government (less money) or private constructors (a bit more 
                                                          
68The Indian government began planning dams in Uttarakhand in 1961; the design for the massive 
hydro-electric Tehri Dam was completed in 1974. 
69 This is often true even when pooling money with other relatives, and by no means represents the 
state's poorest people. Often NGO wages do not match what they are formally documented to be for 




money) for a daily rate that sometimes would not be paid, engage in the illicit felling of trees at night, 
or – for a few – work for a Business Process Outsourcing company doing web research, data mining, 
or data scrubbing for “good” pay (roughly 16,000 rupees, or $260 US a month for 6 days/week) but 
under unreliable and often untenable working conditions.70 Pahar has been called a “mail order 
economy” since the British colonial era when Garhwali and Kumaoni sepoys were stationed away and 
sent money home; between 2011 and 2015, almost every family I encountered relied upon wages of a 
male family member who worked elsewhere – whether as a cook, a cleaner, a factory laborer, a soldier, 
in government (if lucky) or doing something unspecified (often described with the English word 
“duty”) – and returns home once or twice a year. When Uttarakhand became a state in 2000, its first 
(BJP) government opened the doors to transnational corporations in order to “create jobs” by 
guaranteeing ten years of tax-free status, among other perks. Both of Nirmila's (from the opening 
event) sons work in Rudrapur – a village turned industrial zone about a seven-hour hour bus journey 
from where she lives; their wives and young children usually reside with Nirmila, sustained in part by 
food that does not “exist” in the market. 
In the opening ethnographic events, one can plainly observe “environmental” concerns 
descending onto realms of “agriculture.” Less obvious, but very much present, is the way these worries 
are intensified and bound by the specter of environmental disaster. In June of 2013, a “cloud burst” in 
parts of Garhwal and Kumaon during the height of the Hindu “Char Dam” pilgrimage season.71 5700 
people (of whom 934 were paharis) were officially “presumed dead” and over 100,000 people were 
stranded. In October of that year, I visited disaster sites with functionaries of transnational NGOs who 
                                                          
70A few people confirmed that at least five men in Nirmila's village felled trees at night in surrounding 
forests but I was told not inquire. A forest watchman here a decade ago was found murdered in the 
woods. Ajay Rawat (1999) has conducted incredibly brave and thorough research on Kumaon's “forest 
mafia.” By 2014, the market for Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) moved to Philippines. These 
companies in India grew too quickly and then imploded. During my time in Kumaon I found various 
people had been suddenly transferred or let go (for young women being transferred often means 
having to quit because it was not deemed safe to live alone or far from family; furthermore the “good” 
wage became mediocre once rent and transport was factored in). Also a school principal discussed 
issues her teachers were having because of “cultural changes” due to the sudden influx of money 
among some twenty-somethings who were working for Delhi-based BPO. 




were making funding recommendations; among the prevailing concerns expressed by them and 
paharis was not only how to “revive” agriculture, but if it was worth it. The disaster made 
“Uttarakhand” visible in a new way. Anxiety about accelerated biodiversity loss propels the national 
government, NGOs and industry to collect plant genetic material before it disappears. In addition, the 
mission to save pahari grains recalls widely circulating photos of uniformed members of the Indian 
army saving human lives; and the space made for “hill agriculture” and Uttarakhand in the family 
farming conference in “BAHAR” subtly evokes state-centered nationalism. 
Concurrently, “agricultural” concerns are descending onto transnational environmental 
debates.72 In September 2014, agriculture was identified as one of twelve “focus areas” in the United 
Nations Climate Summit. At this point, groups ranging from industry leaders to staunch anti-industry 
activists recognize agriculture as a “major driver and victim” of “global warming” (the rising of the 
earth's overall surface temperature widely attributed to human impact) and “climate change.”73 
However, if this awareness has become “common sense,” the way forward is still highly contested. 
Even “agroecology” and “family farming,” which appear to be points of consensus, pose conflicts; 
wealthier more heavily industrialized countries like the U.S. envision it as a means of “carbon 
trading,” thereby (as opponents accuse) transferring the burden of reducing carbon offsets onto small 
farmers of the Global South so they can continue with their current course.74 Industry is currently 
                                                          
72Local organizations dropped everything to address the environmental emergency. “Online disaster 
volunteers” did mapping and outreach from their living rooms. Hindu fundamentalist groups sent 
cadres of volunteers. Contractors vied for construction jobs. Humanitarian organizations sent large 
sums, a bulk of which – people tell me – fattened pockets of politicians and middlemen. Tourists 
cancelled tickets, and many people lost their livelihoods. Three owners of collapsed stores whom we 
met in Garhwal said the banks had deducted a significant portion of their promised government 
compensation for previous loans. In villages outside the “disaster” zones, many irrigation canals and 
fields were ruined. 
73 Industrial agriculture has “driven” climate change through methane emissions flooded rice paddies, 
chemical inputs, deforestation for agricultural lands, production of animal feed and bio-fuels, 
irrigation demands, reduced plant diversity through widespread production through monocropping 
and consumption of processed foods, its reliance on petrol for transport (UNCTAD 2014). Meanwhile, 
farmers encounter greater need for irrigation, land is drier and more drought and erosion prone, 
many yields of cash crops have plateaued, the abandonment of small seed systems.  
74 At both the 2014 Climate Summit and the Conference on Food Security 41, debates raged over the 
“Global Alliance on Climate Smart Agriculture” (GACSA), as many countries are being pressured to 




promoting the “solution” of transgenic crops that are designed to need less pesticides and water; 
various civil society groups claim this will only produce new social and environmental problems down 
the line.  
 Every economic trend, project or contention previously mentioned is fundamentally ecological. 
This is no wonder: if “Pahar” and “bahar” share their “brea(d)th” – both in terms of the letters that 
span their “distance” and the sounds they elicit – “economy” and “ecology” share their beginning. 
They both have etymological roots in the ancient Greek word “oikos,” which indicated a household 
unit including land and production. “Oikos” incorporated gendered divisions of work as well as 
relations of slavery; like the social life that preceded British colonial rule in pahar, it was not a 
harmonious pre-capitalist ideal. As Gadgil and Guha proposed, what is construed as “nature,” 
“environment” or “ecology” comprises the basis of all human sustenance and human work/labor and 
is therefore economic (and “materialist”).75 Responding to Gadgil and Guha, Agrawal and 
Sivaramakrishnan demonstrated how looking closely at the ethnographic and historical particularities 
that inhabit the intersection of “agrarian environments” – where I locate mandua and “the subaltern 
production of biodiversity” – exposes the dialectic between “the labor of nature and the nature of 
labor.”76 Positioned “from the margins,” this study recognizes capital relations as a crucial 




 Collocated, the words “Food” and “Security(Sovereignty)” evoke legislation 
mentioned in both of this chapter’s opening events. This section gives a 
brief overview of the national and colonial history leading to India’s 2013 
National Food Security Act to illuminate aspects of the relationship 
between pahari food production/consumption and national development. 
This law crystallized conflicting visions and needs, and is riven with 
victories and losses. Particularly important here is India’s Green Revolution 
and its aftermath, as well as way in which narratives of inevitability work to 
produce new narratives of inevitability. 
 
 
                                                          
“average” of the earth's temperature could also be used to exacerbate sacrifices by poorer people, 
countries, and regions for the benefit of wealthier corporations, individuals, and countries. 
75 Gadgil and Guha (1995) and Smith (1990 [1984]).  




In September 2013, India's passed the National Food Security Act after intense debates in parliament, 
media and among civil society constituents that revealed conflicting visions for India's future and 
conflicting beliefs about the role and responsibilities of the state.77 The law outlines civil society 
“entitlements” for the country's populace. These include five kilograms of food grains – comprised of 
heavily subsidized wheat, rice and, for the first time, “coarse millets” – every month for up to 75 
percent of India's rural population and 50 percent of India's urban population, while (as before) those 
identified as “Below Poverty Line” will receive thirty-five kilograms per month per “household.” A few 
months after the Congress Party pushed this legislation through, the Hindu Nationalist BJP won the 
national elections by what was called “a landslide.” Within its first trimester, this new government, in 
what some considered antithetical to its pro-industry alliances, refused to ratify the 2014 World Trade 
Organization trade facilitation agreement in Bali.78 Specifically, it was challenging a mandate aimed at 
preventing “market distortions” of agricultural subsidies by limiting the extent to which a country can 
stockpile grains and provide minimum support prices to farmers. Complying with the new Food 
Security Act would eventually push India’s agricultural subsidies beyond the WTO limits.  
 These two, intricately bound, legal moves reveal the changing terms of transnational and 
national negotiations. The National Food Security Act emerged out of a campaign across India 
launched in 2001 for the “Right to Food.” The campaign is part of a transnational movement, whose 
claims are grounded in Article 25 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The passage of 
India's new National Food Security Act reveals the strengthening ability of civil society organizations 
within India to draw on transnational discourses and alliances to assert sustained demands on the 
nation-state.79 Concurrently, India's noncompliance at the WTO emerged out of India's its new 
position in the global market as a member of the G20. It reveals the strengthening ability of “emerging 
                                                          
77 The 2013 National Food Security Act was retroactive to July of that year. 
78 At the WTO meeting in Bali, India was backed by South Africa, another “emerging economy” and 
fellow member of BRICS. 
79“…in April 2001, the People's Union for Civil Liberties, Rajasthan submitted a petition to the Indian 
Supreme Court. According to India’s Right to Food Campaign, The petition demands that the 
country's gigantic food stocks should be used without delay to protect people from hunger and 




economies” to assert demands in the transnational sphere. As a twist to the pressure on national 
governments to create legislation that complies with WTO patent or sui generis requirements on 
intellectual property and UPOV seed certification mandates, in this instance civil society pressure on 
domestic law is propelling change in multilateral agreements that have previously benefited wealthy 
countries.  
 One of India's main arguments at the WTO meeting in Bali was that the existing limits no 
longer make sense because they are based on calculations set almost two decades back, and domestic 
populations have obviously grown tremendously since then, India's by over 300 million people. 
However, there is another population statistic that the Indian government has touted less: the 
plummeting number of farmers. By 2011, there were 9 million fewer farmers in India than a decade 
before, and it is continuing to fall.80 Many of those I interviewed throughout Uttarakhand live on the 
precipice of this trend, in the realm of what Marx called “primitive accumulation.” They have sold or 
migrated from their land, and therefore lost their means of livelihood; and they have turned to selling 
more of their labor on the market, often as precarious contact workers.81  
 In “PAHAR,” many families from that village have not sold their land, and land titles remain 
predominantly in the names of male family members though it is women who largely perform the 
work upon it. Women like Nirmila, Kashtee and Heera still farm while their husbands or sons work in 
cities and send money home in what has been the “mail order economy” of the hills since the British 
colonial era. However, problems like wild boar and monkeys, changing rain patterns and new social 
desires for the younger generations, combined with the region's rise in tourism, strongly suggest that 
this might soon change. Their families now rely on the market for more of their daily sustenance than 
even a few years back. Furthermore, since agriculture has been included in multilateral trade 
                                                          
80 Shrinivasan (2013). Here, India is not alone. Throughout the world, farming has become a less 
viable or desirable profession in the face of global market competition, seed commodification, the 
need for more cash to live and neoliberal trends that have propelled new desires and social needs. But 
at the same time, precisely because of financial precarity, “new peasantries” are forming and being 
rejuvenated (Da Via 2012, Van der Ploeg 2008).  
81The unemployed keep the price of labor down, help to discipline laborers who know they can be 
replaced and add to an underlying anxiety that feeds the system. Contrary to popular belief, everyone 




agreements through GATT (and later the WTO), the food items they buy might come from anywhere 
in the world. The prices of these items fluctuate immensely and unpredictably based on a vast 
spectrum of factors out of their control including the cost of fuel, wars in other parts of the world, 
grain hoarding and market speculation, volatile futures markets, sudden gluts and scarcities in 
production and the interests of all the entrepreneurs, businesses and organizations whose income and 
revenue come from some intermediary process. In 2007-2008, erratic spikes in food prices led to 
crises and “food riots” throughout the world.  
That speakers in “BAHAR” make so many references to the dire situation of hunger and 
malnutrition only three years after the UN launched its “Zero Hunger” campaign calls into question 
the idealized and future oriented vision of this important campaign. Using Prema Devi’s theory 
depicted in the Opening, one might could argue that – in addition to the sheer power corporations 
have accrued to shape multilateral agreements – the disjuncture between humanitarian goals and on 
the ground realities emerges out of the kinds of “common sense knowledge” or shared understandings 
that circulate within segregated spheres.82  
 Food security and food sovereignty projects – whether by large-scale farmers, agribusiness, 
transnational corporations and national governments (as in the former) or by seed activists, farmers 
and civil society organizations (as with the latter) – in some way seek to mediate, contain, control or 
contend with social contingencies around food production and consumption. These are measures to 
protect “fictitious commodities,” whose market value must be produced through by a combination of 
myth, coercion and socially produced need as the “free” market expands.83 Food itself is not a 
“fictitious” commodity. However, a majority of food is still produced through the direct relationship of 
work/labor on land, in other words, at the interface of two of the market's most uncontainable, most 
“insecure,” elements. Furthermore, like seeds, food inhabits a dual place in the circuit of production 
and consumption. It is not only the product of focused human energy but also the source of human 
                                                          
82 These ideological disjunctures mirror those related to forms of seed production I analyze in Chapter 
Three. 




energy (and that of other species that sustain humankind).84 There is a level beneath which the human 
demand for food cannot drop. As such, food has played a historically critical role in governance and 
rule. If money is “social power” as David Harvey contends, food very much is too.  
 As a bureaucratic mechanism, food security legislation makes “visible” previously invisible 
bodies, labor and sources of sustenance that support market relations in India. Food produced for 
sustenance that appeared not to exist and now really does not exist reveals itself as need, as a claim on 
the state. For example, Nirmila's two daughters-in-law and two grandchildren live with her for much 
of the year and eat food grown on her family's land, thereby reducing the family's dependence on her 
sons' wages. It is not just that her sons' incomes supplement their families' livelihoods, but that her 
sustenance, or small-scale, agriculture supplements her sons' incomes and helps to keep the price of 
labor down. In effect, it subsidizes industry. As Nirmila and others in her village plant and grow less 
food, the demand for food on the market rises, as does the demand for wages to pay for it. State 
subsidized food grains buffer industry from having to contend with the brunt of these demands.  
 At the same time, as evidenced in the confrontation that ends the first event, as farming in the 
hills requires more effort and has fewer hands, many families have already come to rely on the public 
distribution system's supply of cheap grains and, over the past generation, have reduced their 
production accordingly. However, this is a dependent form of security. When that system is volatile or 
unreliable as is often the case (currently, there is a 40 percent reported “leakage” in the public 
distribution system), it creates panic and political upheaval.85 Nirmila's support for Modi expressed 
frustration that she could not access wheat or rice from “the control” (government ration shop) in the 
lean season before the harvest because of implied failures in governance and administration. 
 Defining “national food security” as an uncomplicated social good belies the conflicting 
priorities of the nation-state that situates its own geopolitical security and advancement at odds with 
                                                          
84One could argue that it takes labor to consume food; hunger strikes, which Gandhi used to great 
political effect, are the refusal to perform that labor. 
85UN agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, link food insecurity reciprocally to 
political instability; in other words, each causes and derives from the other; and recently India was 





that of the security and welfare of the majority of the populace. Lived food insecurities are born out of 
these tensions, and therefore, paradoxically, mark the success as much as the failure of such projects. 
India's move to change the terms of WTO mandates, largely construed as an act of defiance against the 
US and WTO, is not an indictment of neoliberal trends that have enabled corporations to consolidate 
at a rapid pace over the past twenty years and wield considerable power over the global food system. It 
is a strategic move to advance geopolitically by assuring a base level of domestic appeasement. It 
reflects a political moment in which “emerging economies,” whose rising GDPs are the outcome of 
private-public partnerships and the wealthiest strata of their populace consolidating wealth and power 
to invest in research and development (thereby exacerbating wealth disparities), face critical decisions 
about how to exert their new power while mitigating the “collateral damage” of trade liberalization. It 
signifies a necessary promise of entitlements as well as a relinquishment of responsibility.  
 During the weeks surrounding its passage, the 2013 Food Security Act was debated in the 
media as if it were an unprecedented landmark. While it reflects new regimes of food production and 
corresponding national, transnational and civil society tensions,86 these tensions – and the manner in 
which they have crystallized into law – draw lines of historical continuity. The national Public 
Distribution System goes back to 1960, though its stipulations have changed at various historical 
junctures; and some aspects of the new law, such as the amount of food grains allotted families 
identified as “below poverty line,” reiterate already existing legislation. “Food security” in India 
emerged out of and still reflects and struggles against elements of colonial enterprise.87 Indeed, since 
1947 (as well as in the final decades of British colonial rule), the shifts in instituting, changing, 
rescinding and re-instituting bureaucratic means of food rationing or food security have marked 
moments of heightening or lessening precarity for India’s populace – each due to the way a particular 
geopolitical, economic, national and ecological constellation of events articulated with unreconciled 
issues of power, wealth and national belonging. This has been woven into the fabric of Indian 
democracy since its Independence.  
                                                          





  Contrary to M.S. Swaminathan's claim that “the future belongs to countries with grains not 
guns,” “food security” reflects a remarkable convergence of grains, guns, colonial relations, capital 
expansion and humanitarian intervention that has positioned the security of nation or empire (and 
elite interests therein) at odds with that of the majority populous. Indeed, in the high mountains of 
Uttarakhand today, you find encampments of the Indo-Tibetan police amidst rainfed crops, “state” 
forests and fallow plots of abandoned land. You find roads, stores and local economies that support 
the military and, in turn, draw people, natural resources and infrastructural investment away from 
rural farmers. Moreover, India's different phases of “food security” underscore the fact that grains are 
only part of the story. In the post-Independence decade, for example, India heavily imported food aid, 
half of which were wheat products, through the US's Public Law 480 or “Food for Peace” program. 
The flood of imported grains enabled the Indian government to set on path of rapid industrialization 
while superficially ameliorating the way British colonial rule has decimated the agricultural 
infrastructure to the detriment of the rural poor.88 Such programs reproduced dependence in many 
developing countries even as the US was investing in rebuilding the infrastructure of European 
agriculture through the Marshall Plan.  
 During the same decade when the Indian government – with Prime Minister Nehru at the 
helm until his death in 1964 – launched its “Green Revolution” as a new phase of food security, its 
military fought three wars at India's northern borders (one with China, two with Pakistan) to define its 
territory or protect its national security. It was this moment that India turned from importing US 
grains to importing “hybrid” technologies that were developed largely through investments by the US-
based Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in order to develop and disseminate high-yield plant 
varieties. The goal was “self-reliance.” Moreover, the nation-state, riven as it was with social 
disparities and conflicting class interests was the “unit” or the “self.” To resolve a “national” problem, 
                                                          
88 See Mike Davis’s (2002) Late Victorian Holocausts for an in depth and powerful look at the 
production of famines in the colonial era, and how those in India related to those in other regions of 
the world. A great deal of evidence now suggests that the British underestimated the number of 
famine deaths in India by tens of millions of people. This reveals how quantitative assessments can 




the Green Revolution displaced aspects of India's debt and dependence onto its farming populace who 
now had to buy seed and corresponding “inputs” like fertilizers.  
 In other words, the story of how India became a country that stockpiled grains, enjoyed 
decades of rising yields, avoided widespread famines and transformed into the biggest rice exporter in 
the world – attributes for which it was lauded in “BAHAR” – underwrites the hardships in “PAHAR.” 
The perceived marginality of rainfed grains grown in diversified seed systems compounds 
Uttarakhand's perceived marginality to “national food security.” At the same time, the acknowledged 
centrality of water from this Himalayan region for far away cities, industrial centers and cash crop 
states has transformed village, town and forest life – a contributory factor, many farmers have told 
me, to the exacerbating problem of wild boar coming into the fields.  
 India's phases of “food security” since Independence parallel larger political economic and 
ideological shifts in the transnational sphere, from an emphasis on rights of nations (to import 
sufficient staple grains, at a time when US was inundating the global market with cheap exports in the 
form of food aid) to the responsibility of nations (to feed their populations by producing their own 
cash crop staple grains, at a time when the US government and investors had developed the ability to 
produce and commercialize high-yield seeds on a mass scale) to universal human rights (for people to 
have access to nutritious food over and above a nation's sovereignty, at a time when agri-business “life 
science” conglomerates dominate global food production and a growing network of civil society 
groups, activists and farmers are resisting it).89 
 In this final phase, struggles for the “right to food” – as a legal claim on the state – and “food 
sovereignty” – as an assertion of farmers' customary rights to seeds, land and water – converge and 
                                                          
89 Though “food security” was incorporated as an official term in the policies of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations’ World Food Conference of 1974 in Rome, it 
was widely used much earlier (Edelman, 2014: pp. 965-966). In 1996, after the formation of the WTO, 
the commercialization of transgenic seeds and the significant expansion of transnational social 
movements, the FAO defined it as “when all people, at all times, have physical, [social] and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life.” In 2002, the organization added the word “social.” The World Food 





diverge.90 This contradiction inheres in Nirmila's words to the school watchman. Her belief that the 
government “control” should be open exhibits the first (a claim on the state, a legal right). Her 
declaration that “this is our land” because of the work performed on it rather than what is written on 
land titles exhibits the second (a claim that surpasses the state, a customary right). Many farmers in 
Uttarakhand are caught in this place of ambiguity and precarity, which, in combination with other 
factors like time-line driven and task-oriented funding projects, spatial segregation, daily stresses on 
women and women and small farmers' disconnect from the decision-making processes that shape 
their lives, makes solidarities across caste and class lines difficult.  
 Tensions inherent the “right to food” as a claim on the state and food “sovereignty” as a 
customary right are also seared into the 2013 National Food Security Act. The eventual outcome of the 
law reveals the manner in which new “food sovereignty” discourses articulate with a dominant legal- 
and rights-based approach in a country where government bureaucracy, regional identities, NGO 
presence and electoral politics converge. The initial demands of activists included locally sourcing 
each region's grain procurement, among other decentralized, small farmer and production (as 
opposed to merely consumer) oriented changes, which is why “coarse millets” were included in the 
legislation. Nevertheless, the final win, as Harsh Mender lays out in Ash in the Belly, was in some ways 
pyrrhic; a series of necessary compromises resulted in omitting most of these stipulations, and those 
that were included are dependent on individual states for interpretation and implementation.91 
Furthermore, this legal instrument diverges from a more holistic “food sovereignty” vision in that it 
delineates a set of programs to be administered separately – such as for schoolchildren, “below 
poverty line” households, pensions for elderly, and nutritional supplements for pregnant women.92 On 
                                                          
90 Farmers are also claiming the right to local autonomy, strong local markets, local production-
consumption cycles, skill-building, gender equity and horizontal farmer-to-farmer networks (La Via 
Campesina 2013). In 2001, the transnational platform for “food sovereignty” was formed and the 
meaning of the term was better defined at the Nyéléni conference of 2007. The former UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier De Schutter (2009, 2014) also asserts the interdependence of 
the right to food, farmer access to seeds and “agroecological” production. Also see Beuchelt and 
Virchow (2012) and Edelman et al. (2014). 
91 Mender (2013).  
92While in Latin America, one can observe the influence of Paolo Freire on farmer-to-farmer networks, 




the one hand, these social supports are essential; on the other hand, their compartmentalization, 
separate administration and requirements of proof (like the legislative and administrative segregation 
of forest and field) means that food insecurities at the boundaries of identity and classification (like 
wild animals coming into fields) are not really addressed. 
 What transpired at the WTO meeting is also a conflicted “win;” powerful member nations 
agreed to a “peace clause” on India's and other “developing countries’” food security demands for a 
period of four years. During this time, they cannot take India to the WTO for breach, which might 
have resulted in heavy penalties. Furthermore, a few months later, President Obama and Prime 
Minister Modi agreed that India's food security programs would not be challenged under WTO rules 
"until a permanent solution regarding this issue has been agreed and adopted.”93 However, at the 
same time, the WTO is considering changing the terms of negotiation to control India's, and other 
“emerging economies” like South Africa’s, power to shape the field.  
 As a developing country whose economic debt and food dependence after Independence 
strongly influenced its domestic policy, India's ability to assert demands and articulate power as a 
nation-state in the transnational sphere is important to the wellbeing of its populace.94 In addition, 
India's new Food Security Act ameliorates some of the immediate, life and death, needs and food 
insecurities that have derived from India opening its doors to neoliberal global trade over the past 
twenty-five years. However, within its first year of governance, Prime Minister Modi's government has 
already been criticized for using eminent domain to dispossess farmers of land to turn over to 
business. This suggests “food security” for the new administration might serve a different purpose. 
Modi won, after all, by articulating a populist platform. Supporting – or at least not challenging – the 
new legislation guarantees that a large population of Indians who do not benefit from pro-industry 
policies will be dependent on the state for basic survival and therefore less likely to protest. The law 
also guarantees a market for industrial seeds and inputs just when India has approved field trials on 
                                                          
hierarchically-structured NGOs or research centers like Swaminathan’s. As Holt-Gimenez (2001) 
notes, the line between the two is not firm. 
93 HT Correspondent (2014). 




transgenic food crops and when the Rockefeller Foundation, Gates Foundation, Monsanto 
Corporation and US government are setting the course for a “Second Green Revolution in Africa.” It 
also guarantees government subsidies to rural elite in cash crop farming regions, and it keeps the cost 
of labor down for corporations that the national or state governments want to attract to India's shores. 
 “Food security” envisioned this way is unsustainable in the long-term. It reproduces the 
conditions that create its need. As a temporary safeguard, while infrastructures that prioritize local 
production and safeguard the commons are being strengthened, it makes a great deal of sense. At 
present “food sovereignty” has not really taken off in Uttarakhand or many other parts of north India; 
the movement is strongest in south India and among groups of rural elites who claim caste privilege.95 
In Uttarakhand the concept is expressed most by NGO leaders and workers, upper caste and landed 
farmers, (often male) activists living towns or cities or wealthy outsiders who have moved to the hills. 
However, it arguably holds more promise to give India's majority “food security” in the long term. To 
create conditions for food sovereignty in Uttarakhand would mean addressing social inequalities 
pertaining to patterns of rapid urbanization, national development, land rights, caste and gendered 
exploitation, forest policy and migration among other things. In other words, it would understand 
“food security” to be not the aim, but a secondary outcome of a more representative democracy. The 
former, the aim of preventing starvation, suggests a future of extreme precarity and dependence. 
Furthermore, it cannot guarantee an endurable present for many. The latter, in contrast, is about 
creating social infrastructures now that would acknowledge an undetermined future and allow for 
life's unavoidable contingencies. 
 
 
                                                          
95 This includes the aforementioned La Via Campesina affiliate KRRS in Karnataka, India. Similar 
disconnections between elites or NGOS and poor peasants on the ground exist in other regions as well. 




8. Farmers in the Kumaoni village of Gow deter monkeys and wild boar (“suar”) 
























10. As described in Chapter One, many roads are being built to sites of new hydroelectric dams, 







11. Erratic monsoons – a “cloud burst” in June 2013, killing thousands of people 















subaltern PRACTICE of biodiversity 
This chapter examines the social terrain in which farmers in Uttarakhand, India sow seeds of 
mandua, madhira and koni (pahari “millets”) at a time of year that brings weddings and the 
shift from heat to rain.1 I aim to show how deeply the practice of biodiversity in Uttarakhand is 
intertwined with patrilineal and patriarchal relations, broader social life, religious beliefs and 
cultural rituals – such that pahari grains embody what is material, ideological, practical and 
spiritual. In this chapter, I depict how the practice of biodiversity is changing in the face of 
national and capitalist development and globalized agriculture. 
 
“Jan Gyan”  
 “People Knowledge” calls attention to the living labor, knowledge and social life that produces 
pahari grains. It calls attention to the human life that grows with plant and animal life in the 
hills. It calls attention to the educational aspects of that life – in the kitchen, field, forest and 
courtyard – and their historical, gendered, classed and caste dimensions. In this title, no 
hyphen, comma or slash exists between “people” (human life) and “knowledge” (human ways of 
understanding the world and one’s place in it). 
 
In the Frame 
In this chapter, the threshold of marriage surfaces as a moment of transformation in which 
“girls” become “women” and shift households and locales. Rather than focus on the “social 
drama” of weddings, the narrative explores relational trajectories around these events, 
                                                          
1 The pahari (hill) millets examined here are: mandua/koda – finger millet (ragi in other parts 
of India); madhira/janghora – barnyard millet; and koni – foxtail millet. Their scientific names 




understanding them to be both iterative and transgressive.2 I analyze how learning to produce 
and consume particular foods in particular fields, forests and homes comes with learning what it 
means to be a person of a certain place and status. It also means learning the social value and 
social cost of sustenance work and small-scale agriculture in a country whose project of 
modernity depends upon and denies its worth. “Traditions” portrayed in this text are not lost, 
pre-colonial or timeless; rather, differently situated people value, devalue, reject, dismiss, hail, 
appropriate and re-invent practices associated with the past in ways that contribute to the 
survival and decline of foods, customs, and ways of life. They reflect the manner in which India’s 
path to modernity and its more recent turn to a free market economy have relied upon and 
compounded, rather than resolved, existing social inequities.  
Specifically, the following four sections demonstrate how:  
(a) (agri)cultural trends paradoxically and simultaneously endanger and necessitate 
small-scale agriculture and rainfed crops; 
(b) pahari practices and ways of knowing are both devalued and reinforced in a context 
of “feminized” rural distress; 3  
(c) competing pressures on women to perform class through whiteness, leisure, and 
consumerism, on the one hand, and physical strength and hard work, on the other, 
have material effects; and, 
(d) NGO fieldworkers detach from “tradition” in their work to revive “traditional” crops. 
 
 
                                                          
2 This project is very much influenced by social anthropologists of the Manchester School and 
their mid-twentieth century work in British Central Africa – particularly by their close attention 
to the relationship between symbolism, political economy and social change and the ways in 
which they revealed ritual enactments to be saturated with meanings that mediate social 
tensions produced by capital expansion, colonial rule and local politics. I draw from Victor 
Turner's analysis of how conflicting social pressures manifest through rituals at a particular 
moment and place, among people who understand themselves to comprise an obligation-bound 
collectivity; for Turner, the social enactment of conflicts through rituals diffused tensions in 
ways that enabled groups to remain (tentatively) coherent or caused them to rupture and 
structurally transform. Though they did not quite succeed in their attempts to disrupt prevailing 
functionalist theories of the social, the Manchester School certainly took on social change and 
conflict. Here I am also drawing from Judith Butler’s prolific work on subject formation. See 
Butler (1990, 2000, 2004, 2015). 







This chapter moves ethnographically through moments in different, yet connected, lives. The 
narrative is “thickly” descriptive so as to bring out the dense relations and everyday life that 
comprises the practice of biodiversity; I understand this practice as far beyond what happens in 
the field and as not easily amenable to linear or compartmentalized frames. The “messiness” and 
dense weave of socio-ecological life depicted here underpins the survival of people, animals and 
plants in a region that is experiencing a great deal of migration, environmental change and 
socio-economic upheaval. The text also evokes subaltern (marginalized) sensibilities, notions of 
self and ways of knowing. One afternoon in May 2015, I was sitting in the canteen of a local NGO 
with a critical human geographer from the U.S. who has been living and working in Kumaon for 
years. “You're interested in the exception,” he said. “By exception I mean what's left out of the 
story.” Here, the dramas of everyday life, which are generally “left out of the story” of 
biodiversity – comprise the narrative. The text’s refusal to cling narrowly to its “subject matter” 
gestures towards the fullness of the lives and socio-ecological relations embedded in pahari 




Most people introduced in the following pages do not spend the majority of their time in fields, 
and why they do or do not perform agricultural work is an important part of the story. 
                                                          
4 See Crapanzano (1991): “We certainly have to acknowledge that the structure of our discipline, 
its push toward consistency, toward what Bakhtin might call a dominating monological voice- 
one, in the case of anthropology, at least, that struggles to subdue (by declaring them subject 
matter) the many voices that insist on dialoguing with it – is very much a product of our social 
and cultural arrangements and cannot without foolish arrogance be universalized.” In 
conversation he said, “Without messiness, you would not have social life.” I am also drawing 




Livelihoods in the hills, as with many of the world’s small farmers, are diversified.5 Even before 
the British annexation of Kumaon in 1815, pahari men joined regiments of the British East India 
Company.6 After Indian Independence, this trend continued as paharis joined the Indian army 
or left to work in cities. Since India embarked on a path of economic liberalization in the late 
1980s, and increasingly after 2000 when Uttarakhand became a state and new economic and 
governmental opportunities developed, this migratory flow intensified (particularly for women). 




                                                          
5 See Van der Ploeg (2008). Diversification had been woven into the fabric of “new peasantries” 
and plays a role in sustaining communities. 
6 The Nepali Gurkhas ruled Kumaon without external opposition from 1803 to 1814. After this 
period, they encroached into territory claimed by the British East India Company. This led to the 
Anglo-Nepalese War in 1814. In 1815, the British established their rule over the eastern half of 
Garhwal (east of Alaknanda and Mandakini river) and Kumaon (the latter as a result of the 








a. Sowing Season, Wedding Season, Changing Seasons: Reproducing Social 
Contradictions  
 
In her Kumaoni village, “millets” still blanket fields during the kharif; both Indian and foreign 
entrepreneurs have recently begun to buy mandua through a local NGO.7 Yet, Rukmini Devi 
expressed little hope for the seeds she was sowing. Last year, in October 2013, her production of 
mandua, like her rabi harvest of wheat, had been low, feeding her family for roughly two 
months. Now in April everything they ate came from the store, which made money all the more 
critical.  
Under a blazing midmorning sky, her face bore no sign of the week’s festivity. Yesterday 
had been a religious festival that marked the beginning of the wedding season that would 
subside when the rains stopped and start again after the Hindu holiday of Dewali.8 Like others, 
she had stayed away from the fields and spent the day exchanging fried pooris and aloo pakode 
and washing laundry that dried quickly in the sun. Early in the morning, she had visited a small 
temple beside her home in the Scheduled Caste section of the village Gow; some caste Hindus, 
who lived on the other side, had made the pilgrimage to the base of the hill on which the village 
was perched, past the homes whose stone roofs were now soft and draped in amber wheat and 
across the river to an ancient Shiv temple where, after praying inside the cool sanctorum, 
women waited on line to crawl inside a tiny room, make offerings of incense, rice and vermillion 
and ask something of God. 9 This year, the holiday had particular resonance for Rukmini and her 
husband; their younger son was getting married in a week. And their daily lives would change. 
                                                          
7 The kharif is the rainy/summer season in which mandua and madhira are sown in April and 
harvested in September/October. The rabi is the winter season in which gehu (wheat) is sown in 
November and harvested in April. 
8 Dewali is the Hindu New Year (various regional stories explain its meaning). It is also the turn 
of India’s fiscal year.  
9 “Scheduled Castes” is a legislative term for historically oppressed castes in India. It came out of 
“Depressed Classes” in the British 1935 Government of India Act. In 1936, The Government of 
India Order listed a schedule of these groups and the term was changed to “Scheduled Castes.” 
These were adopted into the Indian Constitution in 1950, and various related laws were 
subsequently passed including: 1955 Untouchability Practices Act, 1989 Scheduled Caste and 




“Hat hat!” Her husband Bhawan directed their two bulls on the other side of the small 
oblong field.  
 “Who knows if the seeds will come up?” Rukmini said. “Some people’s do and some 
people’s don’t. It’s like that.” While she appeared resigned to circumstance, in fact Rukmini had, 
over almost three decades of working in these fields, developed a theory of why things unfolded 
in such a way. She was reluctant to voice it for shame about what she had not done, even as she 
understood this lack was largely a product of circumstance. 
She believed that human actions and their effects were profoundly shaped by social and 
environmental factors, and that conditions of favorability or hardship accrued through 
repetition. For instance, the “same” labor could grow excellent crops in one spot and reap hardly 
anything in another. Especially now, the soil quality and the location of a field were important 
because of environmental changes, like volatile rain. A good harvest fed humans, goats, 
chickens, cows and buffalo; good food made for stronger and more resilient workers; good 
fodder meant better dung; dung fertilized the soil for the next round of crops. Each good cycle 
strengthened the next.  
For Rukmini, the cycles had moved in the opposite direction. The work for someone of 
her age and social position had become almost untenable. She was not in good health, fatigued 
from responsibilities that fell fully on her shoulders since her daughter married. She could no 
longer walk distances carrying heavy loads, which meant that she could not fertilize their 
                                                          
Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, as well as affirmative action or “reservations” 
mandates. In 1990, 1992 and 2003 laws were amended to create and change the governance of 
National Commissions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes – creating a great deal of 
social unrest in what is now Uttarakhand and throughout India. For the 2011 Census, Scheduled 
Castes comprised roughly 16.6 percent of the national population, and Scheduled Tribes roughly 
8.6 percent. According to the 2008 Planning Commission’s Uttarakhand Development Report, 
Scheduled Castes comprise 17.76 and Scheduled Tribes 3.02 percent of the total population in 
Uttarakhand. This is higher in cities and towns and lower in rural areas. 
“Gow” means “village” in Hindi. While all events and quotations are true, I have changed the 
names of people and places. I use “Gow” here like pahar – it is not meant to represent all 
villages in the hills, just as “pahar” in my text does not speak for all India’s hill regions. Rather, 




fields.10 Anyway, her harvest was minimal, so the cows had less dung to give. She observed the 
way other life forms bound to her in production still experienced beneficial rest between periods 
of intense labor: land rested fallow for six months in each two-year rotation; seeds rested 
between the harvest and sowing; bulls rested between the plowing seasons; harvested wheat 
“rested” for at least a month before being eaten so its energy would not to upset the stomach.  
When she first married, physical respite was incorporated into field labor. And, rest was 
something women anticipated as they aged and spent more of the day at home. Now the 
financialization of everyday life and the need for more money was transforming the pace and 
organization of sustenance agriculture.11 Because sustenance agriculture accommodates to 
nonhuman life cycles while the demands of daily life increasingly do not, human bodies like hers 
bear the stress of mediating competing temporalities and social demands. Rukmini contended 
with this conflict practically but did not articulate as a broader economic critique. “In the 
summer we plow and sow mandua, in the rainy season we weed. Then we cut the plants, we save 
seeds, we clean the grain, we store fodder for the animals, we carry the grain to the mill. Then 
we put more dung in the fields. [Regardless of season or circumstance,] the work must get 
done.” 
She climbed the hill to another field and began broadcasting madhira with lobiya, a 
popular dhal in this village. She was planting a version of the pahari mixed crop system known 
as barah anaaj. Unlike mandua, which her family still ate, the madhira would go entirely to 
their animals in the form of fodder and porridge. Scientists now promoted these foods as high in 
proteins, iron and nutrients. Rukmini, like other farmers I met, explained it in terms of lived 
                                                          
10 Researchers and farmer groups are advocating against the pahari practice of putting manure 
directly in the fields and trying to expand other organic methods like composting. However, 
according to Rukmini’s experience, straight application of manure is far preferable to nothing at 
all. 
11 See Haiven (2014), Martin (2002) and Frederici (2014). Furthermore, while microcredit has 
not yet taken off in this region of India a bank branch was being built in this and other villages 




effects: mandua made people strong; madhira helped cows and buffalo to produce milk of 
better quality, quantity and taste. One reason that methods like “zero tillage” does not work in 
this region is because farmers in Uttarakhand raise animals and need fodder for animal feed and 
therefore cannot use the straw for mulch. Similarly, high yield industrial varieties of “dwarf rice” 
popularized during India’s Green Revolution do not supply enough fodder for animals.12 She 
removed a handful of seeds from a plastic bag and, with a bent arm over her head, gently tossed 
them so they fell like rain. She moved with a rhythm she had acquired from a young age. 
According to a farmer-activist I interviewed a few months earlier, some pahari farmers are 
resistant to new methods of organic crop intensification that have found success elsewhere not 
because these are more work, as some claim, but because these require exacting measurements 
and timing that do not conform well to the manner of work. 13  
On this morning, I asked for and offered Rukmini seeds. Small farmers, throughout 
India and globally, have long practiced seed reciprocity. It is a tradition that “lives” through 
partial deaths – or transformations of meaning, manner and purpose – that produce the 
semblance and effect of coherence. 14 In pahar as in various parts of India, certain acts of giving, 
such as feeding others, signify social power and were historically denied those marked as “lower” 
                                                          
12 Here, “yield” refers to grain only, and does not address other food security and agricultural 
concerns – such as a cow or buffalo’s milk production. Masanobu Fukuoka’s (2009) writes in 
depth about his success with “no till” farming in Japan. 
13 For example, in 2011, the Nalanda District of Bihar, India reported record high yields in the 
kharif season using intensive organic methods. This made world news (Diwakar et al, 2011).  
14 Asad (2015): “In any living tradition there are arguments about whether exegetical texts, or 
texts belonging to other traditions, have any value for one’s own tradition, and if so why. 
Disagreements therefore arise not only about the substance of interpretation but also over where 
exactly the limits of a tradition lie. These arguments and exchanges suggest that founding 
narratives are moments in ongoing conversations: so in principle tradition can accommodate 
rupture, recuperation, reorientation, and splitting—as well as continuity. Tradition is singular as 
well as plural. For subjects there are not only continuities but also exits and entries. Tradition 
accommodates mistakes as well as betrayal; it is not by accident that ‘tradition’ and ‘treason’ 
have a common etymology.” This coherence might be thought of as maya in the Hindu religion 




caste. Seeds, however, traverse these boundaries; in so doing, they momentarily animate a 
collective identity and transcend lines of social distinction.15  
The seeds I requested were for Prema, the farmer from whom I was renting a room in a 
neighboring village. Wild suar (boar) had torn up the fields in which she planted mandua and 
madhira the year before. Her neighbors had also lost much of their harvest. Without the need 
for explanation, Rukmini scooped generous handfuls of mandua and madhira into two plastic 
bags. Prema anticipated such a response because “they’re not worth any money.” In other 
words, their market exclusion – rather than their recent accrual of value as climate resilient 
crops and specialty grains in the national and global spheres – would return them this year to 
Prema’s fields. Similarly, an NGO fieldworker told me that farmers in Gow continue to grow 
mandua and madhira because the land here is still “cheap” and rainfed. He felt that if it were 
ten kilometers to the south where families can sell plots to buyers who desire glacial views and 
better roads or ten kilometers to the west where they can irrigate cash crop vegetables that grow 
in warming temperatures the story would be different.16 
The seeds I gave Rukmini were from a farmer-activist from Garhwal, the other ethno-
lingual side of the state, where he lives at roughly the same altitude of 2000 meters. He has 
dedicated the past two decades of his life to saving hundreds of pahari varieties of grains, beans, 
lentils and vegetables and exchanging seeds with farmers in the hills and throughout India. An 
advocate of strengthening existing modes of farmer exchange rather than centralized seed 
banks, he performs his activism in correspondingly informal ways. Respected as he is, however, 
he is having trouble scaling up; even his own children are pursuing other careers. “Distribute 
these,” he told me. “This millet has disappeared in places, but it is such a good one.” Whether or 
                                                          
15 A great deal of anthropological work concerns the meaning of giving or the “gift” – such as the 
potlatch traditions of the Pacific Northwest. For foundational texts refer to Malinowski (1922) 
and Mauss (1925). 
16 The village architecture of Gow likely also has to do with its lack of appeal to urban or foreign 
buyers. Homes are close together, as are fields. Thus, the built environment offers scant 




not the seeds continued to be reproduced, their sowing might germinate ideas and a sense of 
pahari identity. The packet of seeds that passed from his hands to mine to Rukmini’s to 
Bhawan’s met with blank stare that eventually dawned into recognition. “It's koni,” Bhawan 
said. “We grew it...pehele.”  
The refrain of “before” was voiced most often by those over forty who had lived through 
what was collectively considered a divide between “now” and “before.” While “pehele” signified a 
deep chasm in experience, it often harkened back to an epoch as recent as ten to twenty years 
ago. As a temporal construct, it combined materiality and myth; it resonated with climatic and 
social impressions; it embodied an ethos. Pehele, adults ate well and did not need sweaters in 
winter; men defended themselves against wild animals with their hands; men trained in the 
religious role of jaagars played instrument in the fields as women sang and worked; mothers 
made sweet kheer (a pudding made of milk) with madhira instead of store purchased semya 
(thin rice noodles); the fields produced more than enough to feed “everyone.” 17 At the same 
time, young people were married without consent; brides did not know the age of their 
husbands until their wedding day; daughters-in-law put up with family abuses or eating leftover 
scraps; a married daughter did not have a way to tell her parents she was visiting a nearby 
temple. These aspects of life were so entrenched, people could not say simply whether changes 
had been “good” or “bad.” 
 According to Rukmini's niece, pehele life was “simple” compared to today’s “fashion,” an 
English word that found a home in her Hindi vernacular. “Fashion,” she explained, meant dying 
hair, wanting more clothes and mimicking styles on TV. Now, people owned “more things” but 
were less satisfied with what they had and more stressed (tanov). Older people described the 
current “fashion” as a feeling of dissatisfaction and a simultaneous dearth in crops.18  
                                                          
17 This practice still happens in some rice growing regions, but has largely stopped here. For 
more on rituals related to jaagars, see work of anthropologist John Leavitt. 





The previous October nineteen-year old Manju gave me insight into pehele. Her love of 
farming and mandua was no doubt informed by the unexpected trajectory of her young life; 
after she was orphaned, a well-off family that moved back to Garhwal from Delhi adopted her 
because they only had sons. The husband launched an NGO that focused on livelihoods and the 
wife took care of their animals and largely worked in the fields. Now Manju spent evenings 
studying towards a university degree and days helping her mother. I joined her during mandua 
harvest. Her family had kept the rain-moistened heads of the plants under a cloth on the roof. 
When they were pacca (ripe), Manju showed me how to knead them with the soles of my feet. 
“Should I wash my feet first?” I asked. “No!” she laughed, “This washes your feet!” Indeed, when 
we finished our feet were soft and clean, and the red and brown beads were dislodged from their 
stalks. 
While we worked, Manju recited jokes that made her laugh aloud. Almost all ridiculed 
attempts to impose the knowledge and customs of pehele to contemporary life: an old man 
thought the characters on TV were real and ended up punching the screen; a villager took off his 
shoes before he boarded a bus because “that is what we do in Garhwal,” and when he arrived at 
his destination he searched for his shoes outside. Tellingly, men – generally older men – were 
consistently the naïve protagonists. The stress women bore, however exploitative, gave them 
importance in rapidly changing times whereas a man who did not relinquish ways of being that 
previously served him, a man who did not have broader mobility, no longer had a place in the 
world. She acknowledged that things had changed so much and so rapidly even the jokes felt 
dated. Hardly anyone “didn’t watch TV.”  
Manju’s quips corroborated my observation that references to tradition tended to fall 
into two camps: that which, like the production of koni, fell over the precipice of desire or 
relevance into the purview of pehele; and that which, like eating rice midday in the summer, 
remained or became “what we do” because it lent coherence to present life. The two were not 




of practicality, faith, social differentiation and social cohesiveness. Traditions reproduced by 
those who curried social power in the form of land, wealth and status in ways evident in daily 
life were less likely to “disappear.” Thus the farmer-activist who had given me koni seeds, and 
Manju’s father, whose NGO collaborated with him, had a difficult task: to activate an allegiance 
to sustenance foods and rainfed crops that for generations have not been highly esteemed.19 For 
them, pehele was a terrain of struggle: it marked a crucial cultural moment in which a practice 
had fallen or was falling away from living tradition but still lived vibrantly in social memory – 
susceptible to being reclaimed.  
But Rukmini and Bhawan saw little point in such struggle. For those with neither caste 
nor class privilege the connective social tissue had become threadbare. How does one 
understand their sense of alienation against the claim, “Here, we all work together. We don't 
say, ‘You will work there, I will work here,’” made by a farmer in a Garhwali village as she 
pointed to a line of relatives collectively harvesting rice? Some NGOs made similar claims that 
the region had an egalitarian and communal history. One could interpret the discrepancy 
through a paradigm of loss – a loss that correlates with India’s post-Independence 
infrastructural and economic development and post-1990 move towards a free market economy, 
as well as with increasing environmental disasters. The country’s economic and service sector 
growth has paralleled an undeniable brain drain out of rural areas: by 2014, the number of 
farmers had fallen in absolute numbers despite India’s exponential population growth.20 Some 
pahari villages are virtually boarded up. In other words, there are not people left to farm.21 
                                                          
19 Mandua in pahar has held a different status from “ragi” in other parts of India like 
Karnataka, where it has emblematized a stronger part of the regional identity. It also differs 
from corn in Mexico, where strong indigenous identity and history gives that grain social power 
and from Peruvian quinoa, which was integral to the pre-Spanish colonizing Incan empire.  
20 At the same time job growth has stagnated and child malnutrition has remained remarkably 
high (Chatterjee 2007). 
21 This phenomenon aligns with what Marx (1977: Part VIII) called “primitive accumulation” 
because it sets peasants “free” to sell their labor on the market (at the same time, the land can 
become a commodity). There has been a widespread exodus of small farmers from rural areas 




 But the issue is not as simple as the loss of populations or traditions. It is as much about 
the resilience of ways life and forms of knowledge as about their abandonment. As 
circumstances change, the very practices that maintain cycles of production also undermine 
them. Along these lines, three aspects of social organization here are most relevant because of 
how they both unify and demarcate groups, or represent traditions of joint labor that 
simultaneously foreclose kinds of collaboration. Foundationally interlinked, their schematic 
distinction serves only as analytical scaffold. Each of the three is, on the one hand, grounded in 
supernatural and ethical belief that undercuts causal determinacy (“We don't know why.”); and 
each is, on the other hand, fundamentally implicates private property relations and social labor. 
In practice, they mediate India’s unresolved “peasant question” in this region as it relates to 
household relations (in particular, patrilineality) and the lack of meaningful land reform. They 
are products of rather than precursors to modernity and capitalism, understanding the latter 
pair to be dialectic and historical processes that were propelled by European colonialism as a 
relation not a starting point. They reveal the site of “tradition” to be one of resistance and 
assimilation to emerging forms of social power. 
First: caste.  
When I asked the farmer who pointed to her relatives if “we all work together” included 
“Scheduled Caste” families, she said no. This means that as people migrate, existing forms of 
social exclusion foreclose the possibility for collective field labor among those who remain. 
The tala or lower side of Gow where Rukmini Devi lives is home to historically 
subjugated groups whose labor sustained village life yet whose personhood was excluded from 
the categorical purview of the Hindu caste system. Unlike many nearby villages, Gow had a 
substantial number of “Scheduled Caste” families. They comprised one-third of roughly 175 
families. While bodies move fluidly between the two parts of the village – whether to fill vessels 
with spring water (located on the tala side) or to attend the high school (on the mala side) – and 




organization of daily life draws bold lines of segregation. People continue to reproduce deeply 
set prejudices and social shaming that through practices such as refusing to take food from the 
hands of someone deemed “lower.”22 Many adults from tala Gow agree that things are “much 
better than before.” For example, residents of tala Gow gave examples of being able to drink in 
chai stalls and hotels, move more freely, enter homes in mala Gow and, occasionally, serve food 
to someone perceived as “upper caste.” In other words, they had broken through forms of rural 
“untouchability.” 
However, in line with now widely circulating values of consumerism and individuality, 
these gains largely reflect consumption-based rights and matters of individual dignity and social 
standing rather than shifts in production or property relations. For example, of the over twenty 
stores that line the road above Gow, only one was owned by someone of a Scheduled Caste. A 
detailed survey performed by a local NGO in 2014 revealed families in mala Gow own 
significantly more land than those in tala Gow.23 Rukmini’s family, for instance, claim only a few 
unirrigated plots; this meant she has little to gain from giving her labor to others because she 
needed less help in return.24 It is telling that those still residing in tala Gow publicly use the 
governmentally framed “Scheduled Caste” or “SC,” rather than “Dalit,” a political identity 
associated with a national movement launched by B.R. Ambedkhar. 25 As Dinesh, a Dalit scholar 
                                                          
22 Uttarakhand is a state with fewer reported instances of caste violence than many others (Shah 
et al. 2006). However, Dinesh, a pahari Dalit journalist and scholar living in Delhi (with whom I 
spoke a few times) challenged this. “People still treat you like shit,” he said. He described 
indignities he continues to experience when he returns home to Kumaon, such as a child with 
caste privilege refusing to take water from his hand. People are standing up to these kinds of 
indignities in many ways. For example, an employee at a locally based NGO in Kumoan 
informed me that her organization held a meeting in which a group of Scheduled Caste women 
refused to take food prepared by women who had refused to eat their food the previous time. 
Furthermore, many acts of violence, in particular sexual violence go unreported.  
23 A recent survey by a locally based NGO found that most families that live in mala Gow own 
roughly 1 bigha or 12 nalis of land (roughly 800 meters squared) compared to the 2-4 nalis 
owned by families in tala Gow.  
24 This accounts for one reason why women from tala Gow did not join in efforts to deter the 
suar in Chapter One. 
25 “Dalit” is the politicized identity (Kumar 2014). In this work, I used “Scheduled Caste” or “SC” 




and journalist who left Uttarakhand for Delhi, explained, those paharis denied caste status had 
been on the losing side of history: whether in centuries old wars in which conquered groups 
were stripped of social privileges; projects to subdue revolution, for example Hindu campaigns 
that uplifted oppressed groups just enough to prevent them from converting; or forms of 
political and land patronage, like those forged during British colonial era.26 
Moreover, India’s approach to the free market eliminated forms of rural security even as 
it provided opportunities to consume, study and work elsewhere. Carpentry, Bhawan’s expertise, 
was previously associated with Scheduled Castes. Yet he does not benefit from the massive 
construction of second homes and government buildings because those jobs are filled by labor 
that came from other places, such as Bihar, and caste Hindus who have diversified into “skilled” 
labor that made money. Though he could earn roughly 300 rupees ($5 US) a half day during this 
time of year by plowing other’s fields as marginal landowners often did, he said it was difficult 
for an “old man” to do such physical labor in fields dispersed “here and there.” 27 Besides, people 
chose to leave land fallow rather than “pay so much for so little [money and production]” 
because government subsidized rice and wheat are cheaply available and they need money to 
                                                          
employ the politicized term. Many of the identified “positive” changes in caste relations emerged 
out of Dalit political movements throughout the country, for which Ambedkhar is a profoundly 
important figure. Again, refer to Kumar (2014), as well as Rao (2009). 
26 After studying historical works, including those of Badari Datta Pande, Dinesh concluded that 
in his pilgrimage from south India to what is now Uttarakhand at the beginning of the 9th 
Century AD, the guru Adi Shankara (Adi Shankaracharya), who consolidated and spread what 
became the Hindu doctrine of Advaita Vedanta, “Hinduized” the region. Dinesh argues that in 
this period many subjugated groups were brought into the auspice of Hindu social life, though 
still highly subjugated. This might have prevented revolution and mass conversion. Dinish felt 
this could explain why there were twenty-two jatis (named subcastes) in mala Gow and only one 
(of the “highest” possible subjugated position) in tala Gow.  
27 The going rate for plowing varies greatly depending on the village and region. I have been to 
places in Garhwal where it is as high as 600 rupees (about $10), twice the amount as in Gow. In 
Garhwal I have met farmers attempting to get people to swap plots, so family plots would be 
close together and nearer to homes. This could reduce drudgery. When I mentioned this to 





buy vegetables whose prices, as agricultural commodities on the global market, have been 
volatile.28 
Second: household.  
While the relatives at whom the farmer pointed were working together, they were 
rotating labor on land on that belonged to one household. Thus, as people migrate, the quantity 
of land a family needs to work or can work shifts significantly, as does its labor force.29 The 
unevenness of this process, and the demands that fall on those who remain, propels households 
to function separately. 
At present, Rukmini Devi had no other women in her household. Their daughter had 
married and left, and their younger son was not yet married.30 Their elder son, born with “a 
problem with his dimag (mind)," was a bachelor, who relied on his parents’ care.31 This was her 
husband’s birthplace and many of their neighbors are relatives; but families are as distinct as 
they were joined. For example, many families still share pahari-style homes called bakhalays.32 
They work side by side in the courtyard or keep their cows together in the lower section of their 
homes that was built for animals. Nonetheless, they cook and eat separately and are very clear 
                                                          
28 Food prices have experienced numerous peaks since 2007-2008 and have at moments been 
higher than they have ever been (Mckeon 2009a, 2009b, 2011).  
29 Farmer groups in other regions are challenging this by collectivizing land across lines of caste 
and family and directly taking on women’s land rights. Bina Agarwal (2003) writes of Deccan 
Development Society farmers doing so to grow millets in Andhra Pradesh. Arguably, the 
geography of the mountains (and related social life) and disconnections between pahar and the 
market or what have been construed as “real” agricultural zones (like Andhra Pradesh) poses 
particular challenges to such projects.  
30 A daughter’s, then a daughter-in-law’s, contribution of labor to her family is instrumental. I 
found most families in rural areas desired both female and male children. Nonetheless, 
according to the 2008 Uttarakhand Development Report by the Planning Commission of India, 
the male-female ratio in Uttarakhand was 1000 males: 1001 females in rural areas and 1000 
males:845 females in rural areas. 
31 During the course of research I met quite a few families that were contending with loved ones 
who had problems with their “dimag” (mind), which I understand to be social, not merely 
individual, issues. This phrase was used to describe cognitive issues and mental illness that 
ranged from depression (that in some cases were related to experiences of sexual violence) to, 
like Rukmini’s son, forms of communication and intelligence that manifested at birth.  
32 Pahari homes made of wood, stone and mud that are painted white with intricately carved 




about whose animals, grains, seeds, milk and fodder belong to whom. Sons divided land over 
generations. Many times I had been in the field with a farmer who stopped weeding, sowing or 
plowing at a seemingly arbitrary place in the middle of a small plot because “this belongs to 
someone else.” Rukmini’s sister-in-law, a member of the village panchayat, proudly showed me 
pictures of her daughter’s wedding that was held at considerable expense in a hotel in the city. 
She would lend Rukmini and her husband money without interest but with expectations of 
return. Similarly, farmers from different households help each other in numerous ways, for 
example by putting dung in the fields of an ill woman; but out of pride and practicality one does 
not ask for favors that cannot be reciprocated. More and more rested on each woman’s 
shoulders, and her labor belongs to a family.  
Third: gender.  
All the relatives the farmer pointed to were women. Unlike cash crop regions where men 
performed much of the agricultural labor bestowed with economic value, sustenance in these 
hills is primarily women’s work.33 As families migrate, men who remain, even those who cannot 
find work due to the region’s “underdevelopment,” are reluctant to lend a hand in many 
activities. And many fields remain unsown because most women, reciprocally, do not take over 
men’s responsibilities or claim property as theirs. 
Rukmini’s husband, for instance, adhered closely to his prescribed role of plowing the 
fields, so weeding, reaping, saving seeds, cooking and collecting firewood were her 
responsibilities. “A woman can plow,” a Garhwali man told me, “But to this day I have never 
seen it.” A pahari director of a small NGO near the Nepal border is trying to change this. She 
feels this is an effect of patriarchy, a way men retain symbolic ownership over land whose titles 
                                                          
33 Regardless, even in India’s crop regions, women tend to perform certain kinds of agricultural 
work/labor – such as seed saving and harvesting. This is also true in other regions of the world. 
An ecofeminist argument might be that these moments of production are those most obviously 
entangled with fertility (seeds) and social reproduction (harvest). While somewhat essentialist, 
one could also argue that these have been the role women in various places have historically, but 




also belong to them. Thus women who experience domestic violence had little recourse and 
often no place to go. When crops have economic value, she explained, men play a role at the 
beginning (plowing) and end (market transactions) of the cycle – those points where property 
and money most materialized, those points of connectivity to the larger economy. Such 
inequities dovetail with the way women who filled the mandated positions in the Gram 
panchayat (local self-government) were still referred to by their husbands’ names and expected 
to defer to their husbands’ decisions.34 I also heard other theories: A Kumaoni man said that 
men plow because women shoulder enough work. A Kumaoni woman told me that bulls, like 
men, are male and thus work together; if women plowed, it would not rain. 
Woven together, these perspectives speak to two phenomena. First, how agricultural 
labor for family consumption in which pahari women were already instrumental now falls 
almost entirely under their domain; the value it produces is both necessary to and rendered 
invisible in a market economy. So while before women performed this labor, now the labor itself 
possesses a gender identity from which the national economy and allied corporate interests 
benefit. The “feminization” of rural poverty here results not only from migration of men into 
urban spheres but also from how devalued labor gets infused with certain notions of 
“femininity.” Second, a great deal of social, mystical, practical and ideological work goes into 
reproducing men’s social power and concurrently into establishing their basic relevance as 
trends in national development, culture and economy make it difficult to be “men” in this 
sustenance-based rural sphere.  
Likewise, men continue to play an instrumental role during the twenty-two days of the 
monsoon when paharis honor their village deity. During this period in Gow, some men with 
                                                          
34 A Gram panchayat, headed by a Sarpanch, is the local self-government in villages as well as 
small towns. Each elected member, like Rukmini’s relative, holds the position for five years. The 
panchayat system weakened a great deal upon Independence, but then was reinvigorated in 
1992, with spots reserved for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Shubra Gururani 




caste privilege follow strict rules of conduct and reside in the duni (a temple site). In the 
evenings when families gather around the fire and the jaagar (a man trained in percussion for 
religious rituals) plays, these men become possessed by Devki’s (the local goddess’s) spirit and 
dance, convulse and spray water and sweat onto the collective – emerging as protagonists in a 
context that does not distinguish stage from audience, actor from environment, performer from 
spectator or divine from human. Some of those who are seated also become possessed. Finally, 
when the men press the fire’s holy ash, the embodiment of Devki, into the skin of others uttering 
prayers, some recipients cry as a release from social tension and stress. During such festivals 
and at key times in the agricultural season, relatives still return from far away; the threads of 
disintegrating rural sociality thicken and tighten and, in so doing, materialize the sutured social 
net that lays beneath national economic growth – a net of support, survival and necessity. 
Why did Rukmini still grow mandua when her fields produced so little? “Because it is 
here,” she said, gesturing vaguely around her. “It” was land, seeds, people, animals, social 
expectations. It was a way of life. She added, “We have to eat.” Beyond any material contribution 
to sustenance, her intimate connection to the labor of production signified the potential of 
provision and security. It kept certain kinds of power in her grasp.35  
If the horizon of possibility for Rukmini and Bhawan did not appear vast, it held a future 
daughter-in-law. Rukmini expressed this with excitement and restraint. For, there was still the 
sangeeth (when women gather for religious and social rituals the day before a wedding) and 
bhaarat (the groom’s wedding party) to plan and money to borrow from relatives.36 In addition, 
                                                          
35 This is what Van der Ploeg (2008) calls “the struggle to retain autonomy.” 
36 Though a bride’s (dulhan) family generally pays for the wedding in this region, the groom’s 
(dulha) family still has considerable expenses for the sangeeth (a gathering of women on each 
side the day before the wedding) and the bharaat (the groom’s party that sends him off or 
accompanies him to the bride’s home and then welcomes the pair home with festivities). 
Rukmini had to pay for gifts, food, priest’s fees (Scheduled Caste groups in Gow have their own 
priests), a band and a DJ. In Gow, people borrowed from relatives (often interest free) rather 
than banks or third parties. However, a State Bank of India branch was being constructed on the 
main road here and in other places throughout the hills in 2015; this might significantly alter 




similar to small producers elsewhere, people here rarely make declarations about the future.37 If 
uncertainty is a generalizable fact of life, its deflection or denial in certain realms has intensified 
it in others. Like farmers in mountain environments throughout the world, paharis experience 
intense socio-ecological instability exacerbated by globalization and global warming. In Gow, 
“Do you think it will rain?” meets often with a response like: “Who knows what the weather will 
do? I only know the monkeys will give trouble.”  
Just two days before their son’s wedding, the body of a thirty-five-year old man came 
home from Bangalore in a box. If the cause of his death was vague, so was the work he had been 
doing; many men did not share details that might damper the pride with which they could assert 
they worked in a big city. The wages he sent home covered expenses that had become social 
necessities; reciprocally and less evidently, his parents’ and wife’s efforts to raise two young 
children, run a household, grow food and maintain a network of rural ties offset the financial 
and social costs of production for some distant company. His body was flown to Delhi and 
driven to the village. It arrived after dark and was kept on ice overnight. At dawn, his male 
relatives carried him down the hill for his last rights (anthim sanskar) and cremation at the 
same Shiv temple where women prayed at the beginning of the wedding season. One man said, 
“Here in pahar, ‘kal’ [tomorrow] means ‘sometime’ and ‘parson’ [the day after tomorrow] 
means ‘maybe or never.’” 
 
 
b. “Anything You Can Learn”: (De)Valuing Forms of Knowledge 
 
A week later, Bollywood and Kumaoni tunes pounded throughout the hills of Tala Gow from 
Rukmini Devi and her husband’s brightly decorated home. Wedding festivities had begun; it was 
the evening of the sangeeth. Tomorrow their son and the bharaat would go to the bride’s village 
for the wedding and return with a new member of the household. Rukmini Devi wore a gold 
                                                          





brocade sari and an expression of relief. She offered visitors sweets and a place to sit on a woven 
mat inside. Outside, people gathered; unmarried teenage girls in pressed salwars (long tunics), 
married women in sarees and accessorized with gold, and younger girls, like most of the men 
and boys, in tops and jeans. A small crowd clapped as a man joined a boy in the center of the 
circle; he tucked a ten-rupee note into the young dancer’s belt, a ritual that folded exchange 
value into a different social meaning. Nearby, a woman laughed as she wrested her arm out of a 
man’s inebriated grip.38  
Beyond the circle, one of Rukmini’s relatives stood facing the other way. She was looking 
out past the schoolyard towards a hilly expanse of fields whose apparent fallowness would mask 
to strangers that mandua, madhira, and dhals (lentils) had just been sown. Everyone called her 
Chauma because she had been born at the height of the monsoon.39 She was eighteen.  
Like the kharif crops in the fields she overlooked, Chauma’s future did not hold 
certainties. But certain things were likely to happen, and a great deal of work had gone into 
creating those conditions. She was looking at an impending transformation. If she scored high 
enough on her school exams “maybe [she] would go to study” and get her BA. If not, the next 
phase of life would entail being the protagonist in an event imbued with profound social and 
economic significance in the rural hills: a wedding. Although the latter option was virtually 
predictable, Chauma said, "Let's see what happens.” Her statement apprehended the 
considerable power others wielded over the course of her life as well as the limitations of the 
social to determine exactly how things would go.40 
This kind of outlook circulates widely in the hills, a place of bodies and identities in 
motion. Mixed crops rotate among fields from year to year. Men leave for cities and return 
                                                          
38 Alcoholism among men is a major social issue in the hills, and one I discuss briefly in the 
concluding chapter.  
39 “Chaumasa” (here “Chauma” for short) means “four months” and signifies the monsoon 
period. While I have changed all names, including this one, I met many paharis women whose 
calling names signified ecological phenomena. 




seasonally. Girls marry and relocate. Plant names vary according to attributes – subverting 
efforts at genetic identification and classification. People call each other by nickname or relation 
– so the subject of the hail consistently changes. These foothills are not the high Himalayas 
where nomadic shepherds still live. But as recently as thirty years ago, before Haldwani 
sprawled and the land was built up, most villagers packed up their things and took to the plains 
for months every year; they set up tents on free plots and worked as agricultural laborers. 
Chauma’s great aunt Coshilia, whose relatives would “not let [her] rest [die]” when he fell into 
her protracted bedridden spells, told me, “you saw everyone out on the road.”  
 The vast majority of girls here study humanities. Chauma was no different. Science and 
math are dominated by boys who "could read all day" or live in town. Disciplinary divisions of 
formal education follow a different epistemic than that which inhabits sustenance practices of 
farming, cooking and forestry. Daily life here counters in fundamental ways the assumption that 
human interactions and aesthetics can be distinct from environmental concerns. Pahari girls 
and women become experts on recognizing plants and animals and understanding their 
relations to other life forms. This expertise is practical because it looks to effects. It is receptive, 
emerging out of a sensory and intellectual attunement to the temporalities of multiple species 
and stages – from the six-month growth span of a mandua plant to the two-year shelf life of its 
seed. 41 It is alert, attending to diverse effects and time frames that exist in biological variation. 
This diverges from how formal education has developed in India’s government schools and 
colleges, which adhere to the British colonial model. Yet, the pahari method of observation 
bears similarities to that employed by predominantly male scientists in laboratories of US-
backed agricultural universities where “innovations” in plant breeding happen.42 
                                                          
41 I thank Rachel Daniell for this insight. 
42 US-backed agricultural universities have expanded throughout India from 1960 (as the Indian 
government under Nehru began implementing the Green Revolution), beginning with G.B. Pant 




Informal education in the sustenance and “domestic” sphere and that of formal 
schooling also pose temporal conflicts. They make competing demands on the lives of girls who, 
in Chauma’s words, “only read for an hour at night after the work is done." Administrators of all 
levels of public schooling here understand this; Chauma was not expected to attend class, only 
to appear at the right time and place for the exam. Crises flare when the few degree 
requirements, like examinations, coincide with, for example, a monsoon rain that washes out 
the village’s only motor road. Then, groups leave at dawn to make a dangerous twelve-kilometer 
trek, or a student might pay a chartered taxi driver 250 rupees (roughly $4 US) – a sum that 
barely covers a mug of coffee at a “modern” café in Delhi but is more than what someone here 
earns for a day of breaking stones in the national employment scheme. In such ways, temporal 
and spatial disjunctures in a rupee’s worth bind distant places and lives, contributing social 
reproduction to urban and industrial zones even as it makes necessary the migratory trends that 
sustain them. 
Actually, no one from the intercollege in Chauma’s village had ever earned a Division 1 
score, which might mean a scholarship. As in the US, the Indian educational system is riven with 
class disparities. I heard “The schools here are not good” repeated like a pahari mantra. In Gow, 
as throughout much of the rural hills, families with resources – for example, those that own 
stores – send their sons (and increasingly their daughters) to schools bahar (outside), whether 
to the nearest town or to Dehradun, Haldwani, Rishikesh or Delhi. “The wealthier you are the 
farther you go.”43 To go “farther” is not only an indication of physical distance but also one of 
proximity to central nodes of the government or the market. As if to underscore this unequal 
reciprocity, elite Indians and foreigners send their children to acclaimed boarding schools in 
                                                          
43 A storeowner on the main road between Gow and the neighboring village said this to me 




pahar, in former hill stations where British officials once retreated during the summer months. 
44 
Chauma might also have wanted to defer thinking about the fact that soon she would be 
leaving what she knew as home. Marriages here are still largely arranged and understood to be 
between families, not individuals.45 In many ways, the relationship between women who share a 
household or live as neighbors matters more in daily life than that between a wife and husband 
who might spend most of the year apart. Like the regional dialects and birdcalls, agricultural 
and social practices of patrilineality in the hills vary considerably. In this part of Kumaon 
women carry loads on their heads, while near Rudraprayag in Garhwal women bear the weight 
on their backs. In Gow, most farmers use a paddle to beat grains of wheat off the stalks, while in 
the neighboring village most farmers hold the stalks like a bat that they slap against a vertical 
wood slab.46 Similarly, in Gow married women wear sarees all the time, whereas in places 
nearby they work in salwars (long tunics).  
Regardless, however, couples from the same village generally do not marry. In addition 
to other effects, this keeps a woman’s families separate and prevents competing loyalties and 
conflicts. It also works to monopolize her labor. Thus, the agricultural biodiversity of the hills is, 
and has long been, a shifting enterprise with labor perpetually changing hands. There is little to 
mark the history of this motion or, conversely, to note this motion as part of “history.” Despite 
the Hindu Succession Act of 2005, which mandates gender equality in land inheritance, no 
woman in Gow has a land title in her name.47 Someone like Chauma who spends her formative 
years intimately learning a place understands that someday she will live elsewhere. More 
                                                          
44 I met a Panjabi “farmer” (actually a land owner who employed others to do almost all the farm 
labor) who had attended an elite boarding school in the hills in the 19980s and who was now 
sending his son to the same school. His family fared very well with India’s agricultural policies of 
the past fifty years. 
45 Love marriages” are not at all as common here as in India’s metropolises or even 
Uttarakhand’s expanding cities. 
46 In some families, bulls performed this work with their hooves. 




important than any skill, the practical education she receives teaches her to accommodate to 
new places, people, plants, animals, and practices. It also teaches her that a strong attachment 
to something does not assure its persistence in one’s life.  
This might partially account for why sometimes outsiders appear to care more about the 
future of pahari crops than the people who grow them. I frequently heard farmers utter: “You 
can learn.” One woman said, “If you practice enough, anything you can learn.” Knowledge, in 
other words, is not exclusive. It is shared and transferable as long as one’s mind and body 
practice it with receptivity. The predominant pedagogy employed when paharis taught me 
farming and forestry did not emphasize precision of technique; tasks were not broken down into 
discreet components to be mastered as Foucault described of a shift in French education during 
the seventeenth century.48 Rather, it required submitting to the rhythm of labor alongside others 
until that movement became intuitive and refined. In other words, senses have intelligence and 
people learn through absorption in a place – to develop forms of ecological attention and socio-
ecological “habitus.”49 
Chauma’s leap in formal education from her mother Chandra Devi, who was married at 
thirteen, was common – primarily the product of government and NGO female literacy 
campaigns that came out of India’s post-Independence feminist movements.50 These have many 
social benefits: helping women access a world where titles, contracts and social media 
predominate; reducing domestic violence; alleviating food insecurities; and expanding rights-
based advocacy, to name a few. They have also opened up avenues for social connection as 
networks of extended family splinter. Nonetheless, the preoccupation with reading and writing 
                                                          
48 Foucault (1991). Refer to the section on “Discipline.” 
49 Bourdieu’s (1992) “habitus” includes a person’s sensibilities, tastes, values, and behavior 
cultivated in particular social “field” in which power is always at play. Furthermore, Bourdieu 
also saw “habitus” as the absorption of these preferences, tastes and behaviors into the body 
itself and its physical movements. 
50 According to the 2001 census as cited by the Indian National Literacy Mission, female literacy 




also serves to devalue the forms of practical education that shaped Chandra's life, and it 
contributes to the swiftly moving current of class aspirations that is propelling farmers out of the 
rural sphere.51 
It was not difficult to discern the social nature of Chandra’s conspicuous shame when she 
remarked, "I can’t read or write [Hindi]." Or when she told me that Chauma’s father “couldn’t 
do skilled labor” such as laying stones.52 A secondary definition of the rainfed “koda” (mandua) 
crop in a copy of an old Oxford Dictionary I found in Mussoorie read, “an illiterate person, a 
poor person who trades grain for education.” While such transactions now hardly transpire, the 
stigma linking poor farmers to “coarse grains,” and both to tropes of “backwardness” and 
primitiveness, continue to be re-inscribed. Farmers who were not destitute once enjoyed the 
status of annadata, or givers of food; the “anna” came from the Hindu Deity of Food 
Annapurna, also a massif comprised of some of the world’s highest peaks.53 “Annadata” merged 
femininity, domestic labor, mountain landscapes, divinity and food production. The idea 
                                                          
51 In fact, many women’s “self-help groups” proliferate throughout pahar and rural India more 
broadly draw from the same horizontally structured pedagogies advocated by Paulo Freire 
(1970) that have inspired farmer-to-farmer networks in Latin America (Rosset et al. 2011). 
However, in north India these groups are largely confined within more hierarchal NGO or 
government networks. Some researchers argue that they can contribute to neoliberal trends by 
focusing on individual “upliftment” rather than social or economic injustices (Sharma 2008). 
52 The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) 2005 was 
advocated for and introduced to address intensifying problems of rural distress and migration 
by guaranteeing the “right to work” in rural areas. It provides at least 100 days of wage 
employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members volunteer to do 
“unskilled manual” work. In pahar, most people could earn twice as much working for private 
contractors and felt shame about the low value and low esteem of government work. The 
MGNREGA is also administrated through states, which employ contractors. Hence, possibilities 
for corruption are high, and I heard of various instances in which contractors withheld or denied 
payment. Like other men, Chauma’s father “sometimes drank” with his day’s earnings, so the 
money did not always contribute to family income. While many see drinking as a vice, it also 
serves a social function. Alcohol sold at the government shops comprises a major source of 
revenue for Uttarakhand’s state government. In other words, money paid to workers through 
the government employment scheme often returns – sometimes that same day – to the 
government. An elderly pahari man with whom I spoke at length while traveling by shared jeep 
told me this is why he told his sons to leave for work. “There is nothing for them here,” he said, 
“besides drink.”  




elevated the field labor of pahari farmers to a social height. As one seed activist explained, “It 
was a divine status because not everyone can farm but everyone must eat.”54 In the country’s 
once significantly (and still) majority rural population, this broader social function was obvious 
and embedded in family life.  
However, during the British colonial era, the perception of farming labor in general 
began to fall to a debased rank relegated previously to the rural poor. 55 The speed of the fall 
accelerated upon Indian Independence, through India’s Green Revolution, and again from the 
mid-1990s when – after contentious debate between those from formerly colonized nations and 
those from former colonial empires and their settler colonies – agricultural subsidies were 
significantly reduced to facilitate global trade. Many factors contributed to the debasement of 
farm labor: colonial cash crop farming accumulated wealth for Britain and the Indian elite; 
national projects of modernization during the 1950s invested heavily in industrialization and 
minimally in agricultural infrastructure; the Indian government turned to industrial agriculture 
in the 1960s to wrangle free from the geopolitical food dependency that beset many of the 
“darker nations;” contract farming in India accelerated from the 1980s as policies encouraged 
links between agribusiness and government; India disinvested from rural social supports and 
opened its doors to foreign corporations in the 1990s to resolve its financial crisis. 56 The latter 
                                                          
54 This was said to me by Heera’s husband, who appears in section (d) of this chapter. I stayed 
with their family occasionally throughout my time in Gow; their village is located roughly two 
and a half hours away (one to two hours by bus, depending on weather, and one hour walking in 
from the main road). 
55British rule was also not homogenous and took on a different character in various places and 
through different periods in Uttarakhand (Rangan 2000). Broadly “British Rule” in India began 
in the early 1600s with the expansion of the East India Company, through a period in the mid-
1700s to mid-1800s when parliamentary control expanded and then from 1857 to 1947 when the 
British Crown (Raj) administered rule. Though much of this earlier period the British and 
French Empires were at war in the subcontinent and elsewhere, as well as vying for economic 
supremacy (Marshall 2009[2005]). 
56 In the hills of Uttarakhand, the British set up tea estates, many of which failed and a few of 
which still operate. As farmers with less or no access to capital became landless laborers, in 
essence, diversifying for survival; wealthier land-owning families decreased their work in the 
fields, in essence, diversifying for accumulation. The wealthy, professional and rising classes –- 




few dovetailed with rapid urbanization and profound cultural shifts; for example, media 
syndicates began promoting a brand of “Hindu nationalism” that re-drafted the androgyny and 
femininity inherent in Hindu myths into militaristic and masculinist tropes.57 Thus, the 
performances of reverence for deities like Annapurna fell; meanwhile farm mechanization and 
the expansion of non-food crops like cotton altered the meaning of farming and farm labor.58  
All this comprised the social surround when, a few days after Rukmini's son's wedding, a 
seasonal hailstorm broke a stone terrace that had been previously weakened by rain.59 
Overnight, potatoes Chauma and her mother had planted near their house were buried under a 
half-meter of rock and dirt. Chauma took it hard. Potato was the most common – and for some 
the only – vegetable purchased in Gow. It was relatively cheap. Hardly anyone grew it, even in 
their kitchen gardens. On an impulse, Chandra Devi had brought the seeds back from her mika 
(her parent's village) where warming temperatures, good irrigation, and links to the market had 
completely transformed agriculture into cash crop vegetable farming. Chauma had watched 
them sprout and grow. They were specimens of healthiness. They were market items brought 
into the integrative fold of sustenance, irrigated crops that had managed to survive on just rain. 
They embodied an element of her mother’s whimsy. At the same time, they emblematized the 
possibility that Chauma's family had a chance at belonging in the broader world.  
                                                          
have also pursued university education and work abroad in countries (like the United States) 
that have advantages and status in the global economy. 
57 Connections between Islamaphobic and “Hindu fundamentalist” groups of the Sangh Parivar, 
including the RSS and VHP, and India’s current Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP party are 
well documented; Christophe Jaffrelot writes about this. Modi won the national election in 2014 
during my fieldwork, and also won Uttarakhand. I put “Hindu nationalism” and “Hindu 
fundamentalism” in quotations to call attention to the fact that many Hindus feel religious 
nationalism or fundamentalism is antithetical to the tenets of their faith.  
58 Cast as “primitive”, small farmers’ place-based work, loss of autonomy and subjection to debt 
in the “treadmill” of industrial production hold particular shame and anxiety as choice, mobility 
and money gain social value. Furthermore, the growing middle classes and upper class perform 
social power by distancing themselves from physical labor. The widening spatial and social gap 
between producers and consumers devalues field work/labor and serves to dehumanize the 
bodies that perform it.  




I spent an afternoon trying, unsuccessfully, to help her excavate them. Her efforts belied 
the claims of many elders that Chauma’s generation “doesn’t want to do mehenet kaam.” More 
precisely, the definition of “hard work” has changed. Whereas before “mehenet” had been a 
mode of comparing oneself to others engaged in similar work (which came with its own forms of 
exploitation), now it signifies a kind of work set against those that appear to be worth more. It 
also indicates a shift from that which was demanding yet shared to that which is almost 
impossible and increasingly individualized. As agriculture gets more thickly interwoven with the 
market, mountain lives are caught in a double bind: Many of the benefits of cash crop farming 
continue to be consolidated in a few key regions or among corporations or landowners who 
already had capital to invest or the geographic compatibility with modes of industrial 
agriculture; and mountains are cut off from the market due to challenges of transport and scale. 
60 Also, early adopters in cash crop systems frequently accrue the advantages and squeeze others 
out of competition. At the same time, the environmental and economic consequences of this 
entanglement have become generalized and, in fact, are felt more profoundly in the mountains, 
which are highly susceptible to changing wind patterns and experience floods and soil erosion, 
among other hardships.  
 “What’s the point?” Chauma lamented days later. “So good they were. So good.”  
 We were walking through the forest back to her home.61 Naming the edible trees and 
bushes around us eventually did the trick of distracting her. These provided pleasure and 
nourishment without making demands; they affirmed intimate knowledge she shared with 
                                                          
60 Certainly the prevention of famine in Independent India is an important generalized benefit. I 
discuss the complications of this in Chapter One. Many mountain and forested environments 
(Uttarakhand is both) do not lend themselves easily to “space-time compression” (Harvey 1990). 
 61 Forests, which comprised a majority of the region, are realms of intense labor and struggle 
over property and the commons, as well as refuges where women go to rest, talk, sing and dance 
while they collect pine needles for cow bedding or wood for cooking and harvest its edible 




others. When we emerged out of the forest she pointed to a kafal tree, a species that has inspired 
some of the more widely known Kumaoni folksongs.62  
“The berries aren’t ripe,” she announced. Nonetheless, she cautiously scaled the tree and 
dropped berries into a fold in her salwar (tunic). 63 She offered me one, pinched between fingers 
whose nails were pockmarked with crimson polish. As its twin landed in her mouth, her face 
registered none of the sourness I tasted. We sat silently, eating berries.  
Suddenly she said, “Maybe I'll get married.”  
A family friend knew someone.  
Three weeks later, he arrived with his friend and older brother. On a Saturday that 
brought a welcome pre-monsoon shower to end a week that was “hot like the plains.”64 Chauma 
had just finished pressing one of her salwars. Her father led them to the downstairs room of 
their new house, which was still unfinished because the money had run out.  
The family friend came upstairs and tasted the dhal for spices, prodding Chauma, “Don’t 
be shy. Go down.” She did – to offer water – then quickly came back. He returned and said more 
forcefully, “Come now.” She looked out the window and burst into tears. When her younger 
brother tried to photograph her crying, she slapped the phone out of his hand and went, pulling 
me along. 
The “boy,” who was sitting on the cot, gestured to the space beside him. She shook her 
head and sat across the room in a plastic chair.  
He wore dark slacks and a white button-down shirt that clung to his thick torso. He told 
her he lived in a village at lower altitude and closer to Bhowali, one of the Kumaoni hubs, in a 
                                                          
62 Historian Shekhar Pathak has written widely on folk songs in Uttarakhand.  
63 During my fieldwork in Uttarakhand, I encountered many women who had broken limbs, 
broken ribs, sprained shoulders or gotten large bruises from falling out of trees (often to lob 
wood). I also encountered women, as in other places, who had the same injuries from their 
husbands. 
64 These are phenomenological observations of global warming/climate change by those who 




house that was “convenient” and visible from the main road. Hers required a steep twenty-
minute walk. He proudly stated that he was a manager for “a multinational” factory. His elder 
brother, married, had a job in a government hospital and his younger brother attended a “good 
school.” They had found a good match for his younger sister, but she could not marry yet 
because there would be “no one at home to do the cooking.” Their mother was deceased. He 
said, "Only if I get married she can get married." His questions for Chauma focused on her 
ability and willingness to do housework. His friend added that food had to be ready before the 
bus passed at seven.  
She said, “I have no problem with work.”  
He said, “We have fields but they are empty now.”  
She said, “I can’t do much in the fields alone.”  
He identified, like her, as Scheduled Caste. However, his family had been better 
positioned socially, geographically and economically to make the most of the processes of 
urbanization, development, border militarization, tourism and government expansion that had 
shaped the course of pahari lives and places for post-Independence generations, especially in 
recent years. They had been able to benefit from government quotas that came out of national 
Dalit struggles. His philosophy of life emerged from this situatedness.65 He staunchly stated the 
credo that “if you work hard you succeed.” He elaborated that he believed in the need to 
“advance, develop, [and] educate children.” While advocating a capitalist vision of modernity 
and progress, he also displayed a conservative view of a wife’s role and a woman’s labor. He felt 
this is what enabled men to advance and, therefore, families to succeed. It is what made his life 
possible in a competitive world. Similarly, he took his own duties to family seriously. 
                                                          
65 I am drawing here from Gramsci’s (1978 [1926]) dialectical understanding of “philosophy” as 
the experiential (practical) truth of history that emerges out of a person’s position (and in turns 




His friend said to Chauma, “Speak your mind. Don't be embarrassed. Don't compromise, 
it’s your happiness.” However, he interrupted a few times when she began to speak.  
She eventually asked a few questions. They revealed the limits and extent of what she 
understood to be her agency. They intimated her vulnerabilities in the marriage contract, as well 
as, perhaps, her vision of how a man with a “good job” should be. 
 “Do you drink or smoke?”  
“No. None of that.”  
What about others in the household?  
He hesitated before answering, “No.” 
She asked about his height. The friend suggested they both stand up. He was only slightly 
taller than her.  
“Okay?” he said.  
“I don't know,” she said.  
She asked his age.  
“Twenty-eight.” 
He asked hers.  
 “Not twenty.”  
 “So we are eight years apart, that’s no problem for me.”  
Noting her obvious disappointment, he said, “I can show you a birth certificate.”66 
She responded, “I don't need to see a certificate.”  
 “After all, I could be lying,” he said. “Many people lie to get married. I could say I have a 
good private (company) job but really just be breaking stones."  
Chauma turned silent. This was the work her father did for money.  
                                                          
66 One effect of the government expansion in the hills was that courts and bureaucratic offices 
proliferated. Families often solved disputes in court even though it was widely believed that 




After she served them lunch, he suggested they exchange numbers in case either “had 
questions.” She said, “If I have questions I will ask others.” 
At the end of May, women throughout the village could be seen and heard in the 
mornings and late afternoons in the fields weeding mandua. I bumped into Chauma on the path 
that cut through Gow’s two sides. She seemed preoccupied. She had not made a decision. Her 
family was inquiring about him and his family.  
Within the week, they agreed. She informed me as she watched her brother play jacks in 
the courtyard using stones. She, her sister and mother were enjoying restful days now that the 
weeding was done. Their seasonal kitchen garden had sprouted chili, pumpkin and cucumber 
plants; their apricot tree was ripening. Chauma’s beloved kafal fruit was dark and sweet, and 
they were enjoying a bowl of it mixed with the pahari namak (seasoned salt, pahari spices and 
oil) while sipping black chai. She seemed relieved.  
Did his height bother her? “No.”  
Did she like him? "Yes, he is okay." 
In mid-July, the engagement ceremony came, accompanied again with a welcome rain. 
The tepid start to the monsoon revealed the resilience of mandua and madhira, which remained 
green and continued to grow, albeit slowly, even as people’s kitchen gardens were becoming 
limp and brown. Male relatives served food in the courtyard as they do in weddings. Female 
relatives rolled and fried poories (flat breads made of wheat) in the kitchen, while the eldest of 
them looked on, smoking beadies. Chandra Devi came in to show off the gold earrings and silver 
toe rings his family had given.  
Chauma looked striking in a red tikka (a red mark of vermillion) on the forehead that 
people wear in Hindu religious functions) and bright orange sari. At the sight of her, her best 
friend and neighbor with whom she often collected wood in the forest began to cry. The two 
embraced. Her friend adjusted the safety pins that were barely holding Chauma’s sari in place 




Now the engagement was pacca (fixed/ready/ripe). Chauma’s fiancé bought her a cell 
phone. They talked every day. Chandra let her spend the afternoons sleeping or, on the rare 
occasion when the electricity worked, watching TV. 
 
 
c. "The sadder I am, the more I laugh….”: Conflicting Values of Strength and 
Beauty 
 
The day Chauma met her future fiancé, I returned to Prema Devi’s house in the next village to 
find her daughter Deepa preparing rotees. Deepa knew that I had been at someone’s home in 
another village for a “boy-girl” meeting. As I ducked in through the kitchen entrance, she looked 
up and quipped, "Can you do kethi kaam (field work)? Can you make food? Can you wash 
clothes? Can you collect firewood? … He didn't ask, ‘What do you like?’"  
Nearing twenty-five and yet unmarried made Deepa a bit of a rebel.  
She held up the dough to show me that she had mixed the tiny amount of remaining 
mandua flour in with the wheat, though people generally did not eat mandua during warm 
months. Eating, like farming, followed seasonal cycles. And not without reason: bichugaas 
subzee (wild stinging nettle curry), for example, made your stomach ache in summer heat. But a 
superseding value in Prema’s home, as in the homes of many small-scale farmers, is that 
nothing, especially food, should fall to waste. The direct link between consumers and producers, 
the reality that those who grow food are often still the same people who cook it, has developed 
into a societal attunement to the fact that wasted food is wasted labor and potential scarcity – a 
stark contrast to India’s Public Distribution System or US food wastage, both of which in 2014 
were as high as 40 percent.67  
Through her social position, mother’s influence and life experiences, Deepa had become 
a social researcher with feminist sensibilities. She worked for a local NGO. Six days a week, she 
                                                          
67This wastage has been much publicized in headlines like that in the Indian Express on 
September 3, 2013: “40 percent of foodgrains wasted every year due to lack of storage.” Also, see 




left her home around nine and returned around five, walking five kilometers each way through 
forest. Her employer receives money from national and foreign donors to fund a highly 
respected school. The organization also sells value-added products like homemade soaps, facial 
scrubs and organic oils and tea bags to stores, distributers and individuals in Indian 
metropolises and abroad. Some of the “raw materials” are sourced in pahar but most come from 
elsewhere, were assembled here and then sent elsewhere as a way to create “rural livelihoods” 
that otherwise do not exist. Deepa had spent the day making gift sets. She earned 5000 rupees 
(less than $100 US) a month. This enabled her to buy pre-paid cards for her cell phone and 
clothes for her sister’s birthday and, most importantly, pay for college. After she finished her BA 
degree, she planned to go on for her Masters in Social Science.  
Deepa’s proclivity for joking was like her mother’s, who once told me, "The sadder I am, 
the more I laugh. What would I do, cry?” The only time I witnessed Prema Devi somber was 
when something reminded her of her younger brother who died in a gas explosion, leaving a 
widow and two young children in the city of Haldwani. She rarely got to see them; that was the 
problem with having a cow that would not allow anyone else to take its milk. “Such a good man 
he was. So good,” Prema would say, her tone similar to Chauma’s lamentation of the lost 
potatoes. However, Deepa’s wit was more than an inherited family trait. This attribute abounds 
in the hills as widely as sweet shops and terraced fields, as it does in places where small farmer 
or other tightly bound social networks proliferate; jokes momentarily resolve social tensions and 
relieve the drudgery of labor and precariousness of life.68  
Pahari girls and women banter on most occasions save the moment a new bride leaves 
her maternal home, when generally she and others cry as a social release. Jokes and laughter 
display a social trait and a form of emotional labor highly valued in pahari girls and women and 
                                                          
68 “Joking relationships” were written about a great deal by social anthropologists between the 
1920s-1950s such as Meyer Fortes and A.R. Radcliffe Brown. Radcliffe Brown (1965[1927]) 
theorized the joking relationship as “permitted disrespect.” These contributed to a functionalist 




instructively cultivated over generations: emotional toughness. Historically, it went along with 
physical toughness. A Garhwali woman explained, “Women do a lot of work. Jyada bahoot.” 
The final “too much” was both a critique of exploitation and a badge of honor. Here women and 
girls, and more recently immigrant Nepali men, were said to be the strongest pahari laborers. 
Prabha, a farmer from Garhwali with whom I had spent time the previous October, exemplified 
this toughness. For a week she harvested rice and carried heavy loads of stalks through steep 
terrain while limping from a large abscess on her foot. 69 She had stepped on something in the 
forest. When she finally had it removed she remarked casually to the town medical attendant, 
“This is the first time this has happened to me.” He replied equally casually, “There’s a first time 
for everything.” He injected her abscess, cut open her foot, removed a great deal of pus and a 
pus sac, packed the wound and then stuck a needle in her arm to prevent tetanus; at this point, 
she fainted into my lap. When she came to, she sat up and said, “Can you check my daughter, 
she has some fever.” 
Increasingly since 2000, when Uttarakhand became a state and experienced rapid 
urbanization, an aesthetic favoring a woman's physical strength has conflicted with an aesthetic 
favoring her apparent leisure. Or put differently, the kind of labor a woman’s body can perform 
and endure has conflicted with her ability to be shielded from physical labor and the sun. It is a 
clash of economic hierarchies and constitutive ways of exhibiting wealth, both of which rely on 
women to conduct the cultural labor of performing social distinction. On different occasions, 
three people told me that a pahari woman – particularly a daughter-in-law – of a wealthy family 
that still farms continues to work in fields and forests.70 It is not just her stock of gold but the 
family's harvest, number of animals, stacks of wood – in other words, the fruits of her labor – 
that exhibit her family’s status and becomes a source of pride. 
                                                          
69 In Prabha’s region women carry loads on their backs. In other regions, such as Gow, they 
carry loads on their heads. Techniques and technologies vary from place to place. 




However, as families migrate, as land divides over generations, as physical labor socially 
degrades, as daughters-in-law become “more aware of their rights,” as the consumer culture that 
dominates urban India also proliferates in “remote” enclaves, people display wealth and social 
power, and aspire to it, through purchasing items of daily life: flat screen televisions, smart 
phones, blenders, cement additions to homes, arrays of clothing. 71 A pahari woman is still 
expected to work hard, but her work does not hold the same meaning; it reverberates with subtle 
refrains of shame. Movies, television serials and advertisements depict wealth through 
“modern” women who exude everything her life does not make possible: physical “weakness” 
(thinness), softness, perennial youth and whiteness that exemplify an exotic version of 
hegemonic, heteronormative and perceived liberatory European and North American ideals. But 
such ideals are restrictive and devalue existing forms of autonomy: girls and women are 
expected to be less physically strong, less active, less bound to other women in daily life, more 
concerned with how they appear to people they will never meet and more dependent on external 
forms of governance that did not adequately address their needs.72  
These ideals have been able to root because they found sympathetic soil – i.e., a 
preference for skin lightness linked to the debasement of men’s physical labor established over 
centuries of colonial conquests. Paharis have a reputation for being “naturally” light-skinned 
because of their ancestral ties to Nepal, Tibet, Eurasia and parts of north India, which itself 
experienced Eurasian settlement. The diverse population of the hills reflects a series of wars and 
migrations, in which the “losers” often became exploited laborers. If the Nepali Gurkhas, who 
controlled Kumaon in the early 1800s, heavily taxed and exploited farmers, the British 
                                                          
71 A group of fifteen women of varying ages agreed upon this during a focus group I facilitated in 
mala Gow in April 2014.  
72Take, for example, the issue of domestic violence. In Garhwal, as well regions of Peru’s Sacred 
Valley where I stayed in 2006, I visited villages where women had banded together and greatly 
reduced domestic violence by using their own systems of punishment (including controlled 
beatings, fines, and shaming). These were effective because they approaches causes and effects 
as social, not individual, issues and because people were accountable to those with whom they 




magistrate subsequently offered land as gifts to absentee landlords (often to privileged caste 
Hindus) who taxed farmer labor. The British elite established hill stations for leisure and 
unsuccessfully attempted to populate the hills with Europeans; and those paharis who allied 
with the British officers, for example men who joined the military, enjoyed higher social 
standing. More recently in the 1980s, contract farming extended into the plains and to some 
degree the hills of Kumaon and Garhwal. 73 In Gow and surrounding villages, those men 
identified as Brahmin who “could not plow” (compared to those Brahmin men who still did) 
came to enjoy high social distinction, and there were families that had strategically, over 
generations, moved into this stratum by adhering to forms of dress and behavior. This elite 
group could make money as priests and spent little time in the sun.  
Many paharis whom I met expressed the collective insight that this colorism was 
connected to the aesthetics of food in a broader social, environmental, and political economic 
field. “People say if you eat mandua roti, it makes you black,” people told me in various villages, 
most prevalently in irrigated rice-growing or cash crop regions where mandua production had 
significantly dropped. “She does not eat black rotee,” said one Kumaoni woman of her teenage 
daughter.74 A twenty-year old university student from a village near Kausani declared in English, 
“I hate mandua. I love rice.” A few scientists, researchers and NGO employees with whom I 
spoke in towns and cities believed farmers needed to be educated out of this view; it was akin to 
pahari superstition and construed as irrational. Yet such statements are in fact true and 
analytical: they illuminate the obscured, affective and material reality that tensions related to 
social power in marginalized rural spheres are constitutive of India's colonial history and its 
trajectory of capitalist development – as well as its food and agricultural policies.  
Local varieties of wheat, finger millet, barnyard millet, foxtail millet, amaranth, and 
                                                          
73 By the 1980s, industrial technologies had revolutionized Indian agriculture. 
74 In his work Sweetness and Power, Sidney Mintz (1986) analyzes the symbolic power of 
whiteness in refined sugar set in a colonial political economy that ties indentured labor in the 




other grains had been cultivated in the hills (and other parts of India) for centuries before the 
arrival of the British East India Company.75 However, after the British Raj consolidated rule and 
took over governance on the heels of the Indian Rebellion of 1857, British colonial policies 
propelled wheat – due to its familiarity, affiliation with temperate (read “civilized”) climates, 
whiteness when refined and ease of use in leavened European breads – into the global market as 
a cash crop. 76 Around the same time, Great Britain was evolving into the dominant player in 
what sociologists Harriet Friedmann and Phillip McMichael have identified as the first 
international “food regime.”77 Concurrently, colonial policies diminished the economic and 
social value of what came to be known disparagingly as “coarse grains (mota anaaj).”78 This 
divergence continued after India Independence through a period of US “Food Aid,” which aimed 
to export the “taste” of wheat in order to further its potential commodification.79 As Green 
                                                          
75 See Pande (1993) and Pant (1935). 
76 This roughly yearlong rebellion against the East India Company began in May 1857. It 
accelerated the demise of the East India Company and led the British Crown to take over the 
administration to India and govern directly. This widespread and diverse rebellion began in 
Meerut (present-day Uttar Pradesh), which is close to the southwestern border of what is now 
Uttarakhand, and was most intensely fought in the central and northern plains of India (Pati 
2007, Stokes 1986). Other cash crops expanded during British rule in India included opium, tea, 
coffee, sugar, jute and indigo. At the time grains were largely imported to Europe from settler 
colonies, not the tropics. Indeed many of the British cash crops in India were nonfood items, 
which in part accounts for why India became dependent upon US “food aid” after its 
independence (McMichael 2009). Mike Davis (2002) details how the British decimated aspects 
of the infrastructure of India’s food and agriculture systems. 
77Harriet Friedmann (1987) introduced the concept of “food regime” to describe emerging 
formulations of power within the capitalist world system. Broadly, she and Philip McMichael 
have identified the first international food regime (from 1870 to the 1930s) to be geographically 
centered in Great Britain – combining colonial (including settler colonial) exploitation to 
“[provision] emerging European industrial classes, and underwrit[e] the British ‘workshop of 
the world.’” The second food regime (from the 1950s to the 1970s) was geographically centered 
in the United States, which provided “food aid” to strengthen “its informal empire of 
postcolonial states on strategic perimeters of the Cold War.” A third current food regime (from 
the late 1980s onwards) is that of corporate “consolidating differentiated supply chains,” which 
provide for “privileged consumers” and “generate[e] populations of displaced slum-dwellers as 
small farmers leave the land” (McMichael 2009: 141-142). 
78 Jhardhari et al (2012) describe the negative effects of depictions like “mota anaaj” in 
Uttarakhand. 
79 Harriet Friedmann (1982) analyzes the rise and fall of the US Food for Peace program after 




Revolution technologies subsequently positioned corporations to coopt the US government’s 
international food regime and also enabled India to become self-sufficient in national grain 
production, a few breeds of industrial wheat and white rice – grown primarily in cash crop areas 
– emerged as dominant Indian foods.80 In the hills, the divergence between wheat and mandua 
was helped along by the fact that the former, not the latter, has long been incorporated into 
important religious and social rituals, such as weddings. 
Paharis connected the perceived blackness or primitiveness of people with the perceived 
blackness or primitiveness of foods. This subaltern perspective recognizes by necessity the 
practical effects of power and the entanglement of desire, shame, and belief with material and 
historical phenomena; however, the condition of subalternity – a tentative state of vulnerability, 
repression, socio-spatial containment or epistemological subjugation – also produces knowledge 
that is often not literal or coherently expressed; it might not have, in a Gramscian sense, 
detached from practice to make a larger political claim or, considering Butler, consciously 
sought to disrupt patterns of social reproduction. In other words, subaltern knowledge, in close 
proximity with subjugated practices, articulates how power works but might not make that 
claim. This knowledge itself is often overlooked, suppressed or dismissed by those with social 
power. For example, a government scientist I interviewed who was conducting research in 
Kumaon to produce high yield mandua and madhira varieties disavowed the racial and 
ideological aspects of India’s present day food production. Such issues, he felt, were “small” 
                                                          
secondary aims was to promote the taste of wheat as a means of reproducing cultural and 
economic ties between the US and other regions.  
80 In Chapter One, I discuss in more detail these industrial technologies developed on the heels 
of World War II in Mexico by US government, Rockefeller Foundation and Ford Foundation. 
Such as the semi-dwarf variety of “IR8” originally developed in the Philippines at the 
International Rice Research Institute funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and Ford 
Foundation. These also replaced local varieties of rice and wheat. South Indian ecologist and 
rice conservationist Debal Deb claims, “India had nearly 110,000 varieties of rice until 1970 and 
this diversity has been lost to posterity as a result of the green revolution with its emphasis on 
mono culture and hybrid crops. Now, only 6,000 species or varieties of rice survive” (as quoted 




compared to the real problems of yield and market price, about which farmers needed to be 
educated.81  
 I found girls and women held in tension contradictory pressures concerning their 
appearance and their labor, and the corresponding social and economic necessity of both 
sustenance agriculture and money. They expressed this in various ways – through their words, 
bodies, labor, relationships and desires. There was Chauma’s nail polish, perennially chipped 
and needing a fresh coat. There was the time Prabha, while limping with the abscess, called me 
“patlee” (thin) rather than the disparaging “kamzoor” (weak) that I heard more frequently, and 
then joked that she was fat. In addition, because of migration, women who remain in the hills 
shoulder a greater share of work than they might have fifteen years earlier, intensifying this 
contradiction.  
 “Girls get so excited for their weddings,” said Deepa. “They think about the new clothes, 
dressing up. They don't think about married life when they have to work…. If you marry the 
wrong guy it will ruin your life. Better not to marry at all.” She noted that though their 
neighbor’s elder sister and husband were separated, he still beat her when he came to visit their 
son because “he [thinks he] has a right to do it, she is his wife.” In her view, so much rested on 
that moment families reproduced the marriage contract, an event that most affected the person 
who was often least empowered to direct its course. It bothered her that “people meet the guy 
once and just give their daughters away, as if they were nothing.”  
Remarkably, Deepa had turned down eleven potential matches. In each case, her 
decision was based on the life that marriage would make possible and what it would foreclose. 
                                                          
81 In line with Akhil Gupta’s (1998) findings among primarily male farmers in the plains of 
Alipur in north India, almost all the women farmers I had met in the rural hills, even in areas 
where warming temperatures and irrigation had enabled cash crops to replace plants like 
mandua, felt crops grown with chemicals were “weaker.” They did not adopt these practices 
because they felt them better as judged by the same criteria but for reasons of practicality 
according to changing social criteria. Their explanations did not resolve these contradictions but 




She turned down one man because his family owned a buffalo, which was “too much work” and 
tied a woman to the house. She turned down others because the family either “had too many 
cows,” “owned too many fields” or was “too big;” it was hard to make rotees for ten hungry 
mouths every night. She refused a family that demanded dowry. One prospect wanted his wife to 
live with him in Delhi; Deepa said no because “We cannot live in the plains. Pahari women 
cannot sit around. It’s not in our nature. We’re used to moving here and there.” Commenting as 
much on perceived safety constraints on women’s mobility in the urban centers as on their 
perceived lifestyles, she implied that desire for “free time” is not a natural sign of progress, but 
produced in and through the organization and meaning of labor itself. Leisure appealed to 
pahari women now because, compared to even two decades earlier, women did not experience 
the same camaraderie. 
Deepa’s mother Prema Devi was the woman for whom I collected mandua seeds from 
Rukmini Devi. By this time, she had already planted them. Though she asked her sixteen-year 
old son to make a two-hour journey home to plow the fields, she did not ask her daughters who 
lived at home for any help. Prema's life exemplified the complexity of “tradition.” Poor by global 
or national standards, she nonetheless enjoyed social advantages relative to others with whom 
she directly interacted. Her parents, from a village thirty kilometers away, had good land that 
they now used for growing potatoes and other cash crop vegetables. Their caste privilege as 
Rajputs led her to marry someone whose family had the same. Having attended school until 
ninth standard and grown up before girls and women were also abandoning farming life, Prema 
had functional literacy in both reading/writing and agricultural biodiversity practices. On the 
one hand, she was on the vanguard of social changes. On the other hand, she was deeply tied the 
refrain “that’s what our ancestors did.” This dualistic belief system produced opportunities for 
social advancement. Indeed, her family's class mobility and manner of daily survival relied upon 




diversifying her own labor while limiting her children's farming experience; and exhibiting thrift 
and consumerism.  
For example, Prema judged herself by standards she had learned from her mother 
including physical and emotional strength, endurance and the quality of her household labor. 
She consumed food made in hotels or canteens regardless of the server’s or cook’s purported 
caste, reciting the NGO refrain that “if you cut our skin, we all bleed the same blood.” Yet, she 
refused food made in the home of anyone who was identified as Scheduled Caste; nor would she 
drink their chai or accept tikka that had been dipped in water instead of oil. She explained this 
in terms of social distinction (“they are dirty”) and practical terms (“because then no one [in my 
social circle] would eat from my hands”).82 She was planning to finish her high school degree, a 
big deal for a forty-five year old pahari woman. Meanwhile, she withstood the inconveniences of 
self-segregation during her period, including not entering the kitchen and not bathing inside. 
She practiced this even when alone and it meant not eating. She explained that Devki, the local 
deity, was watching.  
When Prema was not doing something productive in the field she was doing something 
productive in the forest. Or the kitchen. Or the courtyard. Or the cowshed. Or she was schooling 
her daughters on how to accommodate the occasional paying guest, usually a researcher 
arranged by a local NGO.83 Or she was using her networks to arrange her son’s housing in the 
pahari city where he attended school. Or she was on the phone with her husband who worked in 
Delhi. Or she was accompanying a pregnant woman to the city hospital in her role as a part-time 
health care worker. Officially, the latter earned her 500 rupees (about $8 US) a delivery; 
unofficially, she received an extra 100 rupees (roughly $1.50) and a new saree from a family 
                                                          
82 One day Prema returned home from a health care training in a nearby town and recounted for 
me how her friend mistakenly gave a Scheduled Caste woman with whom they were traveling 
Prema’s bag, which contained her lunch and water, to hold. When Prema discovered that her 
food had been “touched,” she gave the rotees away and therefore did not eat until the evening. 
83Myself included. In 2015, the rate was 200 rupees (about $3.5 US) a night for room and board 




each time she attended the namkaran of a baby whose mother she had helped.84 She showed me 
the trunk full of new sarees she had amassed to re-gift at her daughters’ weddings per 
traditional obligation. Her institutional savvy and ability to read helped her make sure her 
family would qualify for Below Poverty Line subsidies, even as poorer families like Chauma’s 
“didn't have a card.” While she collected her monthly quota of sugar, wheat, rice and kerosene 
she reviewed the transaction painstakingly while joking with the man behind the counter. If she 
had a migraine on the day the new gas canister arrived she tied a cloth tightly around her 
forehead and still carried it up the hill. Her cracked four-year old cell phone was “so good, so 
good;” she liked to read aloud the daily texts she received about vegetable prices, adding 
flourishes like “and the monkeys will come back at three.” 
At the same time, she had lost hundreds of rupees on fees for exams her teenage son 
unapologetically slept through. She bought her younger daughter a12,000 rupee ($200 US) 
smart phone for passing her high school exams; it broke within a year. They built a new addition 
to their home out of heavily marketed cement rather than stone and mud even though Prema 
never used it because it was “too cold in the winter and too hot in the summer.” She cultivated 
her daughters' tastes and habits by shielding them from the brunt of farm and forest labor. 
Despite belief that they “could learn” if needed, the younger got “bad headaches” and Deepa got 
“skin infections” the few times they still tried.  
Prema expressed both pride in her identity as a farmer and disdain for Rukmini and 
Chauma's village where “there are flies and people have to work too hard [in the forests and 
fields].” Having “too much” physical labor marked people and places with the stigma of poverty, 
particularly because farm work bound people to land while mobility indicated social power. 
                                                          
84 Many pahari babies of Hindu associated faith (as in other parts of India) are not named at 
birth but on the eleventh day of life – the namkaran (name giving day) – marked with social 
and religious rituals. The money and gifts Prema collected at these festivities is not unique. The 
two Brahmin priests who performed at caste Hindu marriages in Gow earned around 7000-
8000 rupees ($100-120) for each two-day wedding (with a sliding scale for poor families). One 




While almost every family in Prema's village farmed, field labor consumed less of their daily 
lives. In general, families here owned fewer plots and had relied upon forms of wage labor more 
heavily and for more generations. The water catchment was such that there was no way to 
irrigate fields, while there was some irrigation in Gow. In Gow the fields were clustered and the 
homes were clustered separately (in each of the village's two parts); here, homes and fields were 
interspersed; thus one did not see everyone out “together,” diminishing the collective farmer 
identity and obscuring how much people worked. Unlike Gow, which had a significant 
Scheduled Caste, Prema's village was comprised almost of solely of caste Hindus. It was also 
located at a slightly higher elevation and was cooler – a feature British officers of the past and 
tourists of the present idealized about the hills.  
Her two daughters stayed close to how she had raised them. Nonetheless, they were quite 
different from each other. Her family exemplified both the patterns and unpredictability in the 
reproduction of life. Deepa’s job had given her a taste for hotel food with no qualms about who 
had prepared it, though she would not marry someone of a “lower” caste or take food prepared 
in their home. Like many of those with caste privilege, her willingness to cross lines of social 
demarcation did not extend to the most central aspects of sociality and therefore still served to 
reinforce these divisions.85 Averse as she was to the labor of producing mandua, she had 
developed a taste for it and a strong belief in its “healthiness.” Neetu, in contrast, hardly left the 
house except for her college exams. She ate mandua without relish. She preferred rice and dhal 
and loved Nestle’s Maggi Ramen, now widely popular in the hills.86 Like her father, she refused 
                                                          
85 The use of “SC” or “Scheduled Caste,” a government term, for Dalit groups in villages struck 
me as particularly curious given the “remoteness” of the region. It might reflect the intellectual 
acknowledgement that “everyone bleeds the same” (as I was often told), as well as an 
attunement (and often resentment of by Caste Hindus) to government reservations for 
Scheduled Caste groups. At the same time, this terminology does not reveal a transformation of 
deeply held caste beliefs (as would the politicized term “Dalit”). 
86 In an interview in April 2014, one of numerous store owners on the main road told me he sells 
10 boxes worth of individual Maggi packages every week to people of all ages; whereas ten years 
ago he hardly sold any. I have seen people eat Maggi as a snack or as a curry with rotees for 




food cooked at hotels or, for that matter, in most people’s homes regardless of caste. While 
Deepa had close friends who identified as Scheduled Caste, Neetu had “no friends at college who 
are SC” and felt they "easily get admission.” She had been a child in the latter 1990s, when 
protests over nationally mandated caste reservations swept this caste Hindu dominated region 
on the heels of a recession that was used to justify India’s explicit neoliberal turn.87 
The two sisters often sat on the roof at sunset before the ritual of the day's final chai, a 
vestige of colonial taste. I found them there one evening. Deepa was stitching chamomile tea 
bags for work. A lemon tree had bloomed. And the only cucumber vine in Prema's kitchen 
garden not eaten by monkeys had trailed up the wall to where they were sitting, as if headed for 
the sky.  
Deepa narrated to Neetu details of the wedding she and I had attended earlier that day – 
of their twenty-one-year-old neighbor whose family had moved to Haldwani but still returned 
annually for the sowing and harvest and religious occasions. Against the abode Prema and her 
daughters maintained with care and filled with life, the teal doors and windows of their 
neighbor’s home plainly wore its empty years of sun and rain. The DJ's set blasted as Deepa 
evaluated the wedding food. Today the bride's side had sung songs poking fun at married life. 
“The monkeys [known to be thieves, i.e. the groom's side] are coming today”.... “After the 
wedding there are children and after children there are expenses”…. “Look at who came today 
with empty pockets”....  
Deepa fixated on the bride who “had gotten three facials to lighten her face” and 
developed "dark splotches." She said, “For some people you can do it and for some you can't." 
With judgment uncharacteristically focused on someone’s “mistakes” rather than her social 
                                                          
Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) imposed a ban on these instant noodles citing high levels 
of MSG and lead. One of five Nestle factories in India producing Maggi is located in Rudrapur, 
Uttarakhand, where it was established in 2006 after companies were given a period of tax free 
status to draw industry and create jobs in the new state.  




realities, Deepa’s comment illustrated just how much pressure rested upon girls and women as 
refrains of social value, performances of wealth and struggles for survival shifted. Skin 
lightening creams now also has seasons; a store clerk told me that sales spike with weddings and 
the start of school. But people often “look worse” because they work outside without sunscreen 
and then apply these products according to what they can afford or weave into daily life. On her 
wedding day, a bride is expected to look unaffected by the strain of these competing pressures. 
She is supposed to model excellence according to both sets of standards. This itself is social, 
ideological and “domestic” labor demanded by evolving capitalist relations. Not to perform well 
– i.e., to make visible this labor – subjected a woman to the scrutiny of the unforgiving gaze or 
camera lens.  
We heard the bharaat’s band leaving to return to the groom’s home. We saw them 
descend the path towards the main road. In the sea of terraced plots between us and them, 
saplings of mandua, various dhals and madhira had just broken through the dry earth.  
Deepa said, “Now she will go to her in-laws’ house forever.” 
Neetu said, “Now she will go to her in-laws and cut fodder and work in the fields.”  
They both laughed.  
 Deepa said, "Pooja will too, for five or so months."  
She was referring to her close friend's younger sister whose wedding was planned. Over 
the next few weeks, Deepa would take days off work to accompany Pooja to beauty parlors and 
shops because Pooja's older sister, now married and a mother, lived far away. As Deepa 
observed, as girls she once looked after crossed the threshold of married life, it only made her 
more conflicted.  
 
 
d. Cultivating (New) Traditions: A Fieldworker’s Conflicted Role 
 
In Delhi in April 2014, I interviewed a Program Director of a multinational NGO that funds 




that articulate a critique of the global political economy and India’s national policies. He asked 
me to switch off my recorder before stating, “We’re not making radical change. It’s not possible 
within this model.” I had expected more of a bombshell – the observation has become fairly 
commonplace. However, that he needed to obscure it because it might jeopardize his job or 
reputation exemplifies how layers of subjugated knowledge exist all the way up (in power) and 
away (spatially) in global networks of humanitarianism. In particular, it reflects how practical 
knowledge is suppressed to uphold idealized tropes – with the consequences bearing down on 
those who contend with the contradictions in practice, and the benefits filtering up to those who 
can be shielded from such truths and their direct effects. I found that the ability of pahari 
fieldworkers to act on the knowledge of experience to be similarly curtailed within a state 
dominated by reformist politics, a country with a strong bureaucratic government, and 
organizations linked to national and transnational funders and funding cycles.  
Organizations connected to millet revival efforts in the hills range greatly from those that 
are publicly pro-organic and anti-GMO to those whose leaders who dislike “ideological 
opinions” and want to defer their opinions to “scientific research.” There are farmer and 
environmental activists who spearhead small NGOs that train farmers to make value-added 
products like pickle from forest fruits, sweets like cholie laddu and juices. Some organizations 
link farmers to markets in Dehradun, Rishikesh, Haridwar, Haldwani or Delhi, where they can 
sell extra mandua to consumers and distributers interested in its newly advertised medicinal 
properties, such as high iron or protein content. But rarely does a pahari farmer have much 
extra to sell. I met a few fairly elite paharis, such as Manju’s father, who lived and worked in 
cities but then “missed the sound of the stream” or disliked the temporality or “hawa” (air) of 
urban life.88 They came back to start organizations that address problems of rural infrastructure 
that have gone hand in hand with India’s economic and urban development – out-migration, 
                                                          




poverty, formal education, water rights, forest rights, domestic violence, livelihoods, women’s 
land rights or village-level democratic governance. NGO employment also provides a needed 
source of income off the tourist trail. For fieldworkers, it is not a lucrative career; most are paid 
between 4000-6000 a month (up to $100 US).89  
 Some NGOs have constructed small campuses where field workers live to avoid 
strenuous, sometimes impossible, rural commutes. Manju’s parents built a campus that runs on 
solar and renewable energy made from dung. These become centers in the margins, places 
where funders, researchers, government officials and volunteers from bahar (outside) 
sometimes come. Because the nexuses of development and commerce are located elsewhere and 
often far, leaders travel between rural and urban zones so often they do not blink an eye when 
facing a full day of road sickness. These organizations form strong networks; many are at least 
tangentially connected to efforts to revive millets. Environmentally focused groups end up 
taking on social issues like caste discrimination; socially focused groups end up taking on 
environmental issues like seeds or dams. Those who have worked in the field long enough 
understand that these cannot be disentangled. As one director explained in an interview early on 
in my research, “It’s not ‘about mandua,’ it’s about how mandua connects to everything else.  
In six organizations directly involved with mandua and pahari seed varieties, I found a 
fieldworker’s role produces a complicated relationship with tradition – more so in organizations 
whose central management is not locally based. Most fieldworkers come from pahari families 
still bound to rural networks. More are male; of the females, more are not yet married so they 
have fewer household responsibilities.90 In a fieldworker's life, institutional goals and practical 
                                                          
89 By talking to pahari fieldworkers in different regions, I found they are sometimes asked to lie 
to visitors and funders when asked about how much money they earn – this was especially true 
for organizations with centers elsewhere, like Delhi. Some fieldworkers expressed deep 
suspicions about where the money went, and some even felt leaders were investing in property 
in the hills for personal use or investment.  
90 I am basing this on anecdotal data gathered from speaking with roughly twenty-five 




life often clash. For example, I met many fieldworkers implementing programs to address caste 
discrimination who would not take chai in someone's house, particularly in the same village 
where they lived. As is also typical in other places, fieldworkers who work on agricultural issues 
often no longer or never did field labor themselves. 
Consider the examples of two female fieldworkers, both around age forty. They work for 
different NGOs that focus on agricultural biodiversity and pahari crops.91 Their organizations 
have important similarities: both are hierarchically structured national nongovernmental 
organizations with global reach; both are based in Delhi, with Uttarakhand being one of many 
regions of focus; each has started a seed bank in the hills, one in Kumaon and the other in 
Garhwal; both have experimental farms; both are run by well-known and controversial figures 
who have been characterized by many as opportunistic and out of touch with on the ground 
issues as well as influential over national policy and engaged in important work.92 Within this 
frame, these organizations see and present themselves in opposition: one as a scientific and 
research-based promoter of food security and farmer livelihoods with an eye towards issues of 
power; the other as an ideologically-based group grounded in Gandhian self-reliance that is 
resisting seed corporations, chemical inputs and colonial/neocolonial violence.  
Each of these fieldworkers mediates the complicated position of supporting small farmer 
practices to revive the region’s plant biodiversity while inhabiting a mode of living that 
reinforces the desires that are pulling people away from such practices. The structure and social 
patterns of their organizations conflict with their aims. Heera worked for wages full time and 
was also a wife, mother, daughter-in-law and farmer. Hard working in all capacities, she was 
dubious about the effectiveness of her NGO or how beneficial it was for her life. Employees who 
had quit her organization informed me that because decision making power rested in Delhi and 
in the hands of someone who did not engage in farming or field work or live the reality of 
                                                          
91 with whom I spent roughly a week each, although not necessarily on consecutive days. 




financial precariousness, projects kept changing according to the concerns of funders and “big 
[powerful] people,” including the Director. This was done without apparent concern for what the 
labor to implement plans actually entailed, such as walking twenty kilometers a day if the bus 
was not running.  
Heera’s job was to maintain the seed bank, visit villages to run self-help groups, 
distribute and collect seeds, give information, help researchers gather data and keep logs. When 
her husband, a passionate collector of local seed varieties who worked for a different CSO, 
expounded on the benefits of organic farming or the negative effects of the Green Revolution, 
she tuned out. In reality, she was far less concerned about India’s future food security and pool 
of plant genetic material than she was with earning money for her three children to attend 
college. Her dream was to maintain her sustenance fields and to open her own store – it was a 
vision of sovereignty that corresponded to the times. Balancing two temporal regimens, she had 
cooking, housework, farm work and fieldwork to complete between her waking hours of 4:30 
a.m. and 10:00 p.m. Her household labor accommodated to these demands: she cooked only 
with gas because there was no time to collect wood and she wore the same office clothes for a 
few days in a row to minimize washing. 93 Still, on most days she and her co-worker sat in the 
sweet shop for twenty minutes after they left the office to enjoy a moment of leisure and 
decadence with some warm gelabi (a deep-fried sweet) and chai. 
Varsha, in comparison, had not performed extensive farm work since she became a full-
time fieldworker. From her long bronze fingernails and the thickness of her torso compared to 
how she appeared in photos from four years back, one could see the manifestation of this 
lifestyle change. Unlike other females her age in her village, she did not wear a saree or clinking 
bangles because she had not married. Nor did she intend to. Her job of reviving “traditional” 
grains for elite consumer-based initiatives had enabled her to travel to Delhi, Gujarat and 
                                                          





Bijapur. At her organization she had found “very good people.” She explained, “People say that 
'life can't go on without marriage' but you can have very good life.” From various conversations, 
particularly with older women, I interpreted the sentiment “life can't go on” not as judgments of 
a female's lack of worth but as a practical assessment of the general human need to be socially 
connected and what that meant specifically within pahari networks of belonging. A great-
grandmother asked me, “What will happen to you when your parents die?” Another woman 
advised me not to get married because “you [in your circumstances/networks] don’t need to. If 
they say you need someone to take care of you when you’re old, tell them that you’ll end up 
taking care of him.” 
Radical as her choices seemed, in her own way Varsha adhered to the logic of social 
norms. She lived on her brother's property and was woven into the household fabric through 
practices of labor, gift giving and sharing. When she traveled from place to place within the 
village, she often brought something and took something, reproducing ways social bonds were 
affirmed and strengthened. Her job obligations animated this movement and also benefited 
from it.  
Unlike Heera who critiqued the gap between the performance of ideals and practical 
ethics in her organization (such as what was shown to funders and the reality that paharis, 
including herself and her colleagues, lived), Varsha's comments were positive and reiterated her 
organization's claims. The distinction paralleled the divergence of their organization’s 
leadership – Heera’s withheld making political claims while Varsha’s pronounced strong ones. 
Walking with me through her village one September afternoon, Varsha began snapping photos 
of women raking and men plowing. She gave directives – “Bend a little more,” “Smile,” “Do that 
again” – to make the photos “authentic.” Her role was one of transference: to freeze living 
practices into a still frame that would then become mobile and perform the work of 
representation. If funders wanted clear examples of effectiveness, for Varsha these supplied 




urban offices that she was “good,” suggesting that she understood her vulnerability within the 
organization’s hierarchy. Such vulnerabilities have intensified as India’s geopolitical and 
economic rise and its intense oversight pressures on organizations have provoked European- 
and US-based foundations to pull out of the country.94 The poor are no less poor, but there are 
rising middle classes and the rich are among the wealthiest in the world, capable of their own 
philanthropy. 
 Varsha introduced some people to me with: “Here is our 'organic gardener.'” Each time, 
the phrase rang strange, intimating possession as much as inclusion.95 It merged Varsha with 
her NGO and distinguished her from her neighbors. Of the many “organic gardeners” I met in 
the hills, rarely had anyone identified herself as such. For, this way of life was practical, or 
organic in the literal sense. Ironically, it was for that very reason, some farmers adopted 
chemicals that seemed effective. On the one hand, “organic farmers” can forge solidarities across 
spatial lines; on the other hand, it creates external and confining parameters of legibility. Varsha 
stayed close beside me during the week I visited her field sites. On three occasions when she 
briefly left I was able to ask “our organic gardeners” what they wanted for their children. Each 
answer reiterated the same problematic: “to get a job/education bahar [outside].”  
Varsha's effectiveness at her job and her commitment to it prevented her from 
apprehending such generational breaches in patterns of social reproduction. The projects she 
undertook – co-writing songs about pahari practices, educating people about the health benefits 
of pahari grains, training farmers on new methods, linking farmers to her organization which 
purchased certain foods to use on ecotourism sites or sell to elite markets – clearly contributed 
                                                          
94 Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014)’s Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights 
Support under Fire describes ways in which the Indian government is pressuring foreign NGOs 
to leave, in part to keep its actions private. 
95 Varsha might have portrayed herself and her fieldsite to me in a particular way because she 
saw herself as a representative and me as a foreigner. Her interactions with neighbors might be 




to family incomes and a sense of pride. At the same time, the way she lived her life, which was 





In late May, I encountered Rukmini Devi weeding mandua. She was with her twenty-two-year-
old daughter-in-law, Janaki, whose new husband had returned to Delhi for work. Though Janaki 
had been raised in a town and hardly ever farmed, she was obviously learning. Her mandua and 
madhira was sparse. “It’s like that,” she said. 
With more hands and land, Chauma’s family had sown more mandua than Rukmini’s. 
Still, 2014 was for them a humble year of harvest – fifty kilos, a small barrel’s worth. Save seed 
for next year, it was depleted by the middle of January. Chandra Devi and Chauma’s sister did 
the October reaping without her help. Nor was Chauma with them in the winter mornings or 
evenings to prepare or consume the mandua ki rotees (flat breads that contain mandua). I 
learned during my return in January 2015 that this was not because Chauma was married and 
living with her new husband.  
During one of their phone calls, her fiancé had joked that Chauma would “sleep on the 
floor not the cot” because her family was poor. She said, “If you talk like that now, what will you 
do when we’re married?” Her family called the engagement off. A display of agency both limited 
and profound, it reminded me of how, on a still day, when pahari farmers needed the wind’s 
help to separate the wheat from the chaff, they produced it by holding opposite ends of a bed 
sheet and whipping it around in circles; this could not change the weather, but within the 
confines of a courtyard it did the trick.96 Chandra sent Chauma to Delhi for a few months to stay 
with a relative. It would shelter her from potential gossip. Besides, Chandra said, “Why not?” 
                                                          
96 Wolf (1990) distinguishes between kinds of power – power to direct the course of one’s own 
circumstances, the circumstances of others, a set of relations, or social processes that 
structurally affect many lives. It is helpful to think of the causes and effects of global 




The seeds Rukmini gave Deepa’s mother yielded a thick crop cover in the two “good 
fields” where they were planted. Spared from wild boar and monkeys, they reaped “tasty” food 
that Deepa enjoyed eating but did not help to produce. At the end of January to everyone’s 
surprise, not least her own, Deepa agreed to marry. Someone and some family had passed her 
test. “Ajeeb hai! Ajeeb hai! Ajeeb hai! [It’s strange! It’s strange! It’s strange!],” she yelled into 
her receiver with such excitement that I could not miss it, even from 2,000 kilometers away. The 
wedding came within one short month. He lived in a different part of Kumaon. For now, she 
continues to work for the same NGO and, when it is convenient, stay at her parents’ home.  
 The relational threads connecting these lives and experiences suggest that even as 
“millets” accrue value as global or national commodities, in remote regions like the hills this 
might not elevate the status or economic value of the labor that produces them.97 Targeted 
solutions of raising the economic value and linking millets to the value chain can help certain 
individuals, groups or villages but are unlikely to resolve the broader issue of the social value of 
producing agricultural biodiversity. Nor do they address the underlying social contradictions 
related to: (1) how domestic and sustenance labor is organized in particular places, and (2) the 
imperative, yet undervalued, role it plays in the national economy. Furthermore, the terrain in 
which these crops grow is deeply ideological. Hence, NGOs and farmer groups in Uttarakhand 
and in the more central state of Andra Pradesh among other places have launched campaigns to 
re-draft millets as “Miracle Grains” or “Seeds of Truth.” Similar to Andean quinoa, the challenge 
is to have this new evaluative identity lodge on to the labor, knowledge and sensibilities of small-
scale producers rather than acts of elite consumption or interim processes.98  
 Hill geography poses particular difficulties. Not only because rough terrain heightens the 
importance of immediate forms of social organization and dependency, but also because such 
                                                          
97 Reflective of the bottlenecks in the global food system, the cachet and the profits of “added 
value” products might go to those situated in the middle of the “value chain.” (Howard 2009). 
98 As mentioned earlier, the Deccan Development Society of Andhra Pradesh has achieved some 




places have been made remote by infrastructures intended to support national and capitalist 
development.99 However, it is in these very places where a great deal of biological variation 
exists and is reproduced by small-scale farmers as they learn their place and make their place in 
the world. 
Why does small-scale agriculture – and the practice of biodiversity – continue to exist in 
a place labeled long ago as “unproductive” and “nonagricultural?” In the face of environmental 
disasters, the lack of infrastructure, the construction of big dams and rampant migration out of 
the hills – and considering that many families have stopped growing mandua or stopped 
farming altogether – why, then, do people still grow these crops and do paharis still farm? This 
is a question whose answer is not instrumental and cannot be traced to a distinct set of causes, 
but is suspended in a web of relations that give meaning to life and work. That web, not just its 
“outcomes,” comprises the practice of biodiversity. 
 
                                                          


















































































22. An example of a bakhalay (pahari home) – the section underneath has historically been 
meant for cows and buffalo. This is Prema’s (from Chapter Two) home. The dog in the photo 


















subaltern practice of BIODIVERSITY 
From “practice,” I turn finally to "biodiversity.” Pulling away from pahar (the hills) and 
maintaining a perspective “from the margins,” I analyze some of the major contentions around 
marginalized food grains. I examine what happens when mandua (ragi, finger millet, and 
eleusine coracana) leaves small-scale pahari production-consumption circuits as “(agricultural) 
biodiversity” in the form of seed, grain and genetic information. I examine the implications and 
potential consequences for mandua as “millets” move into the “center.”1 I also examine the 
implications and potential consequences for the integral practice of biodiversity as 
“agrobiodiversity,” particularly in the form of seeds, is increasingly compartmentalized, 
commodified and sold. 
 
 “(kheth) Anaaj/Beej"  
The title "(field) Grain/Seed” represents processes of material and ideological distancing and 
rupture. The parenthetical “field” signifies spatial, institutional and technological movement 
away from intimate links between production and consumption. The small farmer field becomes 
the source of biodiversity or "plant genetic material" and a potential destination for 
commodified seeds. In addition, here the integral -seed-(grain-) and -grain-(seed-), which is 
open to contingent pasts and futures in the pahari practice of biodiversity, develops a boundary 
of meaning and use as Seed/Grain. As this boundary sets, consumption emerges as a discreet 
end and “biodiversity” (as food and/or experience) gets reinvented in that image.  
                                                          
1 While aspects of what I describe bear similarities to other crops and places, like quinoa in Peru, 
the movement is nonetheless particular to historical and cultural contexts. For instance, 
Christine Folch (2010) traces a different trajectory of consumption in her work about why yerba 
mate “failed for centuries to penetrate the non-Latin American world and what changes have 
engendered new possibilities in the present day, as it traces the commodity's path through an 
alternative consumption/production circuit that evades the global north.” 
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In the Frame 
Previously, I argued that global and national economic value accrues through devaluing certain 
places, practices and lives; therefore, women farmers in “remote” regions and the crops they 
grow for sustenance exist at the interstice of marginalizing and accumulation processes. Here, I 
examine what happens when mandua leaves small-scale pahari production-consumption 
circuits as “(agricultural) biodiversity” in the form of seed, grain and genetic information: what 
happens when the lives, work and knowledge related to the practice of biodiversity crystalize 
into the mobile “millet,” a “biodiversity resource” or “plant genetic material.” This chapter 
illustrates how, as they grow in places and as they travel through space and time, seeds are 
practical and political sites of democratic struggle. Furthermore, I depict how “millets” become 
“public” through technological and institutional mechanisms that obfuscate information and cut 
off civil society access to plant life while making access easier for industry. This private via 
public trajectory also reflects shifts in temporal orientation towards an abstract future. Thus, the 
“added value” of millets not only relies upon earlier examined subtractions (including processes 
of rendering invisible) and socio-spatial divisions, but also on democratic divisions, deferments 
and ruptures.  
 
On Form 
Nine “Portraits” and nine “Passages” portray the forms of dislocation and containment that 
accompany the new mobility and social/economic value of marginalized grains. The "Portraits" 
that follow are descriptive frames. As they move from a kitchen in pahar to an NGO seed bank 
to a vault in the National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources, they do not follow an 
individualized "seed” or "grain," but produce an imaginative and practical depiction of what this 
progression entails, excludes and makes possible. The "Passages" of analytical text between 
Portraits illuminate processes that spatially, temporally or ideologically (dis)connect; in other 
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words they represent passages (as in movement) of time and space. Numbered “1.1,” “2.2,” “3.3” 
and so on (after Portraits numbered "1," "2," "3"...), they signify shadowed, incomplete, 
unofficial and unequal processes. Together, the Portraits and Passages create an "interrupted" 
journey, riddled with opacities, countercurrents and contradictions, as well as possibilities for 
reclaiming meaning, power and democratic life.  
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Portrait 1: From the Margins into the News 






 How as “millets” become “valuable” in new ways, they also constitute a terrain of 
resistance and appropriation 
 
                                                          
2 See Narayanan (2015), Kanjilal (2014), Sood and Jishnu (2012), Rao (2015), Kell (2015), 
Padma (2015), Kurmanath (2015), Kumar (2014), Singh (2014), Jena (2015), Menon (2015), 
Sinha (2015), Reddy (2015). The Hindu (2014), Parsai (2014), and Runyon (2013). 
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Currently in India, headlines mark the new media presence of “millets" almost daily as they 
transition from being “ignored” into becoming “Comeback Cereal[s].” As explained earlier, this 
trajectory was largely set in motion through the globalization of agriculture from the mid-1980s 
through GATT, plant biotechnological leaps since the mid-1990s (specifically the ability to 
commercialize transgenic seeds) and the expansion of "intellectual property rights" to 
corporations through multilateral WTO and UPOV mandates on member nations.3 These 
altered not only the political economic “potential” for marginalized food grains, but also their 
symbolic resonance in the global and national arenas.  
Through these headlines, certain ideological and political economic contours of the 
emergence of “millets” in the national and transnational arenas come into relief, revealing it to 
be a terrain of contention, resistance and appropriation: 
 First, beyond a source material for biotechnological innovation, industry is marketing 
“millets” and other marginalized food grains as a cure for the socio-environmental crises that 
the industry-dominated global food system has contributed to producing; these include climate 
change (global warming) and human illnesses like diabetes. The benefits of millets are more 
complicated than they seem when considered in context of the global food system. For example, 
corporations have started producing ragi (finger millet) biscuits marketed as “good for 
diabetics,” but these possess high quantities of sugar. Additionally, distributing “climate 
resilient” grains over far distances by using heavily carbon-producing transportation contributes 
in its own way to global warming. Corporations, unlike small-scale farmers, can easily move 
their sites of production or cater to new consumers if social or environmental conditions in a 
                                                          
3 Biodiversity has always comprised the basis for breeding innovations in capitalist agriculture. 
Darwin's theory of natural selection explains the need for a great pool of biological variation. 
Mendel’s observation of recessive and dominant genes opened the door, decades after his 
discovery, to the global wave of industrial agriculture known as the Green Revolution, starting in 
Mexico in the 1940s. (Kloppenburg 2004, Mulvany 2014, Shiva 2002). However, commercial 
plant breeding began before the Green Revolution: there was “pedigree breeding”in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries and hybrid breeding by the early 20th (in the USA).  
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particular place become tough, giving them less impetus to minimize socio-environmental 
impacts. In other words, even when millets leave the realm of small-scale production, they 
remain embedded in (new) social life and relations; their “benefits” must be considered 
practically and in context.  
“Millets” also represent civil society resistance to transgenic technologies and the global-
food system. For some, they have come to symbolize and become a mechanism for enacting a 
collective small farmer or “peasant” identity and a means to challenge the way farming labor has 
been the devalued in India. Thus, “dryland crops" become the "key to climate-resilient 
agriculture” and "declar[ing]" a "millet state" becomes a potential answer to the widespread 
tragedy of farmer suicides in India's cotton growing belt.4 Because of extreme rural distress and 
poverty within the global food system, creating local value chain programs could provide a 
necessary means to support small farmer livelihoods, while reviving local biodiversity. However, 
there is also the risk that profit-seeking measures, such as industry efforts to promote hybrid 
and transgenic seeds, will appropriate projects to create new markets and add intermediary 




Second, "agricultural biodiversity" now evokes the commodity aura. This "aura" appears 
to trail behind millets in headlines with words like “magic” or “plus;" it produces an atmosphere 
                                                          
4 In India’s cotton belt, buying transgenic seeds and chemical inputs has become a necessity for 
survival (CHRGJ 2011). 
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of authenticity and inherent allure crystallized in descriptions like "indigenous," "superfood" 
and "comeback.” Such descriptions infuse millets with a mystique that appears to be an essential 
quality. This quality appears to travel with seeds or grains into “town” and provokes people to 
"forget" their previous desires for "rice and wheat." On the one hand, the "magic" and "plus" of 




Third, the Indian government is now attempting to capitalize on crops it has long 
“underutilized.” As it does so, it faces new competition on the global stage from countries 
(including the US) that previously did not produce large quantities of these grains. In part, this 
is possible because millets can survive in “drought-prone” places like Colorado. Even in the face 
of compelling forces, the practice of biodiversity did not disappear and small-scale farmers 
continued to grow and rely upon millets despite their purported "underutilization." This is one 
reason why India has remained the largest national producer of millets even decades after the 
Green Revolution (Uttarakhand still produces over 8% of India’s finger millet). As the Indian 
government prepares to corner the global market and expand national consumption, it is 
making claims to seeds and grains it previously "ignored." For example, the Indian government 
has incorporated “millets” into the 2013 National Food Security Act and new agricultural 
policies.5 Consuming millets has gotten a “makeover”: it now presents as an expression of 




                                                          
5 I discuss this in in Chapter One. 
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Fourth, "biodiversity" and "millets" have become catalysts for rural and small farmer 
competition and solidarity. The headline “Can Millets Take Quinoa?” juxtaposes “quinoa” and 
“millets” as oppositional figures, as variously positioned actors try to find a new home in the 
confined place for “minor grains” on the global market. However, this confined place is also 
grounds for situated solidarity. Rural activists are aware of the historical threads of this 
phenomenon; they have developed political astuteness by learning from how their national 
governments implemented the Green Revolution in the post-Bretton Woods era. The fact that 
colonial rule morphed into a "neocolonial" global economy and system of multilateral 
governance has produced a framework for collective dissent born of apparently fragmented 
experiences.6 These connections have deepened and expanded transnationally in the 
information and "universal human rights" era, particularly because in many countries civil 




Fifth, "biodiversity" and "millets" have become contested temporal constructs that 
negotiate the relationship between human pasts and futures. On the one hand, these terms are 
hailed in projects to claim cultural heritage, land, seeds and citizenship — as a means to open a 
future, and a past, that seems to have been foreclosed or denied. On the other hand, they have 
become instruments in projects to appropriate “tradition” in order to “forget” the lessons of 
history. In both cases, the past and future do not represent progressive time but rather 
interwoven, and inalienable, threads. 
 
                                                          




Portrait 2: "Never. Unless–" 




For over forty years, a large wood and earthen vessel with a narrow covered top has 
inhabited the high ledge above the entrance to the kitchen. Made by “bude log" (an 
old person, an ancestor), it holds mandua seeds – at best enough for two seasons of 
sowing because one can never be sure what a season will bring, especially in the 
mountains. Depending on the time of year, the outcome of a harvest and how many 
hands there were to perform work in the fields, sometimes it is full, sometimes half 
full like now.  
"Most people don’t use it [the vessel] anymore,” Meera informed me while 
preparing mandua ki rotee (flat breads made of mandua flour mixed with wheat).The 
grain for the flour came from last October's harvest, which had totaled about one bori 
(150 kilos). But before taking any of it to the mill for grinding, Meera and her 
daughters had selected and saved seeds for the next season. What was meant for 
eating was stored in a metal canister sitting in a corner of the adjacent room.  
Though evidence of last year’s monsoon now streaked the walls, the house, 
which was made of stone, mud and wood, was built to protect people, seeds and 
animals from the midday heat, the hills' volatile temperatures and torrential monsoon 
rains. Like all things that serve a human purpose, it needed to be maintained. 
In a good season, Meera's family keeps and grows enough mandua grain to eat 
for the year. The rest, if any, they sell within the village to those families that grow less 
than they consume or that have stopped growing the crop entirely. They sell it for a 
giveaway price – far less than what they fetch for the gaas (fodder) that “improves” 
the taste and thickness of a cow’s or buffalo's milk. Last year, for example, Meera sold 
some mandua gaas for 200 rupees (about US$3.50) to farmers from a village not far 
away that had turned almost entirely to cash crop vegetables. This put some money in 
her pocket to buy things for her family like chai patti (tealeaves) and chawal (rice). 
After she threw the final rotee into a basket, Meera pantomimed the different 
ways she combines mandua flour with atta (wheat flour). She used two small piles of 
straw as her aid.  
"Sometimes I make two heaps of flour, one like this and one like this. Then I 
do this.” She pretended to separate the mandua and wheat and make a wheat rotee 
with a bit of mandua sprinkled in. 
"Or I do this." She took an almost equal amount of straw from each pile. She 
mixed them together as if making a ball of dough. 
 "Or I do this." She pretended to make a rotee from only the wheat pile, and 
then puts some straw from the mandua on top of its flat surface. She folded the rotee 
over it and rolled it out again, as if she were making aloo parantha (a popular Indian 
bread stuffed with potato). "It looks like it's made of wheat," she said, "but when you 
tear it open, the inside is dark." 
"How I make it depends on who is eating. Some people like it. Others don't, 
like my son. Then I put less…. I use it to make the wheat stretch longer.”  
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At best, her wheat harvest reaped enough for her family to consume for six 
months of the year. The rest she bought. However, when her brother-in-law moved 
out, he took the household BPL (Below Poverty Line/ration) card with him. She 
would get one, she said, but had not yet had time on the days the government official 
had come. Also, she was "not good at those things" (reading and writing Hindi) and 
did not have money to give a bribe.  
We ate the warm rotees with boiled potatoes and namak (spice and salt). It 
was, at 10:00 am, her first meal of the day though she had been up since 4:30 planting 
rice far down the path near the river. Her husband had not touched the food she had 
brought him. He was laying in a shaded part of the courtyard with a thin sheet 
covering his body from head to toe to keep away the flies. He had returned from Delhi 
last week with tuberculosis. Even if he got better, it would be a long time before he 
could work. 






 How the commodification of millets/agricultural biodiversity entails flattening and 
containing the seed’s identity  
 
"Never. Unless–" touches upon an ethic of small-scale producers. It is one described in books 
such as Renée Vellvé’s Saving the Seed, Jack Kloppenburg’s First the Seed and Vandana Shiva et 
al.’s The Seed Keepers, as well as in the publications of transnational peasant solidarity 
networks such as La Via Campesina and BEDE (Biodiversity: Exchange and Dissemination of 
Experiences).7 It evokes a code of production whose ubiquity in small seed systems and among 
those engaged in the practice of biodiversity enables social connections across vast and 
divergent cultural, historical and geographic differences.  
Specifically, "Never. Unless–" reflects a code of restraint and an acknowledgment of both 
uncertainty and hope. Meera and her family saved the “best” from the harvest as seeds. They set 
aside more than they could sow in a season; on the chance that unforeseen disaster or loss 
would leave them with nothing for the following harvest, they would still have something upon 
which to rely. In this case, it voices precarity and an awareness of potential desperation, 
suffering or death. However, if the next harvest is plenty or sufficient, then those unsown 
                                                          
7 BEDE (2011), Kloppenburg (2004), La Via Campesina (2013), Shiva et al. (1995) and Vellve 
(1992). 
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mandua seeds in the earthen vessel would be poured into the tin container of grain to be eaten 
and replaced with the new stock – reflecting a continuation of the cycle that often comes with 
both gratitude and relief. 
“Unless–” also carries implications that recognize other socio-ecological unknowns and 
the precarity of mandua itself. An elderly male farmer in Meera’s village explained this to me. 
What if, for example, there was no food and one could not go to others? Or what if one’s family 
had stopped growing mandua or farming altogether and no one else wanted the seeds? Within a 
couple of years, they would lose their ability to produce, and then they might be eaten. In the 
practice of biodiversity, seeds need to be reproduced to retain their vitality, to remain alive as 
seeds. Thus, their near-certain "death" would propel them into a new source of life as food.  
“Never. Unless–” exists in the practice of biodiversity in which "seed" is in fact "-seed-
" and "grain" is "-grain-.” The hyphens that trail ahead and behind each word intimate the 
other in the pair. These trailing lines hold the past, present and future in immediate 
proximity. When mandua “-seeds-“ move between farmers in pahar, or when “-seeds-“ are 
exchanged between small-scale farmers more broadly, the mandua grain is very proximate. 
In First the Seed, Jack Kloppenburg analyzes how transgenic and information 
technologies have made possible new forms of alienation in capitalist agriculture and plant 
breeding. For thousands of years seeds have been the common heritage of small farmers. Their 
renewable potential – the fact that farmers can harvest seeds and replant a crop from year to 
year – has been a site of resistance. Since the 1950s, breakthroughs in industrial agriculture 
opened new ways to commercialize seeds and homogenize plant traits (like high yielding "dwarf" 
varieties of rice) – in other words, they provided the technological means to intervene in the 
seed's renewable potential and create a desire and need in farmers to buy seeds and 
accompanying chemical inputs. Meanwhile, multilateral governance provided the institutional 
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means for the same through patents, plant breeders’ rights (PBR), and national seed 
certification laws.8  
Technological breakthroughs in genetic coding, splicing, cataloging and combining since 
the 1990s take this further. If by the 1930s corporations could produce hybrid seeds that would 
lose their vitality in subsequent replanting, new technologies enable them to genetically “design 
life” that only responds to specific chemicals they expect farmers to buy. Once again, the 
alienating potential of this technological revolution is propelled by institutional mechanisms; for 
example, many of the World Bank’s structural adjustment policies require governments to 
reform and tighten their intellectual property regimes.  
 Kloppenburg argues that alienation occurs at place of reproduction or renewal in a seed’s 
life, in other words where the hyphens connect -seed-grain-seed-. These hyphens signify what 
are actually branches in broader process: 
 
By severing the points of connection, industry appropriates the means of production (seeds), 
which it then sells to farmers. As we see in the portrait of mandua and Meera in the kitchen and 
in the tension between "never" and "unless–" another kind of splicing occurs, that of the seed’s 
and grain's dual identity within the small-scale circuit of production or the practice of 
biodiversity. 
                                                          




At every stage of production in the practice of biodiversity, a shadow exists, hailing a contingent 
past and future. Its identity is not discreet as a commodity, food or resource.  
As the cycle of production and consumption is severed and appropriated, the seed’s dual 
identity becomes flattened and delineated. This contains a seed's temporal potential and 
instability so that its identity as "seed" or "grain" might be fixed at specific moments in cycle of 
production and consumption. It is a way of controlling contingencies (or attempting to) and 
limiting certain forms of human/nonhuman potential. In addition, it works to eradicate the 




Portrait 3: A Dual Life 




The basic principle behind their work with seeds is that "if you plant just a handful, 
you get so much," explains Heera. She is a fieldworker. As she speaks, she spreads her 
hands wide apart to give a sense of how exponentially seeds can regenerate.  
 This burgeoning "seed bank" of a local branch of a national NGO is humble 
and located in the hills. Inside its walls, little evidence exists of the language and goals 
expressed in the Delhi headquarters or among its international funders, such as 
"plant genetic material," "food security" and "biodiversity.” When I interviewed her a 
month earlier, the Director had voiced concern over the corruption of scientific 
research and national legislation in India. "The playing field is uneven," she said.  
It is as if the seeds here have a dual life. On the on hand, they are the seeds 
Heera describes: they can be given away, planted here in the hills in the coming 
season, harvested and then replaced based on farmers' needs. On the other hand, they 
are resources and containers of genetic information to serve a generalized human 
need.  
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 Most of the time, the room where the seeds are stored is locked, and either 
Heera or her colleagues keeps the key. Lined up on the shelves that smell of freshly 
cut wood, seeds of dryland crops – now known in national and transnational circles 
for being "climate resilient" – fill or half fill small glass jars labeled in handwritten 
script with their name, place of harvest and month and year of collection. They 
include farmer-saved varieties of mandua (finger millet) and madhira (barnyard 
millet) and beans, rice, wheat, lentils and vegetables. 
 The point, Heera explains, is for farmers to give, take and return seeds. Just a 
little each time. If enough farmers do this, it might reverse the decades-long trend of 
diminishing pahari varieties. This repository relies upon farmers' active engagement 
and contributions. Without being reproduced in cycles of planting and harvesting, the 
seeds would lose their vitality within a few years.9  
 
 One afternoon about a week earlier Prema, a farmer from a neighboring 
village, visited the office because the previous year she had lost her entire mandua 
crop to suar (wild boar). Fieldworkers from this NGO had given a few informational 
sessions in her village. This is how she came to know they keep seeds. 
  She returned home that day empty-handed.  
 “What's the point? For my fields I need a dubba [box]. What can I do with 
such a small quantity? How does it help me?”  
 She was not worried about “genes” or “plant genetic material.” The next day 
she went to other farmers, looking for seeds.  
 
 
Passage 3.3  
 How locally-based but externally-owned gene/seed banks can potentially lead to seed 
dispossession/appropriation or reclamation 
 
I will start by noting a reciprocal relation: “Millets” are entering the national and transnational 
arenas through industry “added value” projects, food security legislation, “climate resilient” 
ventures, media portrayals and new forms of consumption. Meanwhile, national and 
transnational discourses and biotechnological projects are gradually expanding in the hills.10  
 If the remote parts of mountain regions offer a geography conducive to the “art of not 
being governed” and resistant to the “internal colonialism” of the state, as James C. Scott argues, 
in the previous chapters I depict how such places are also “made remote” – ideologically and 
                                                          
9 No family in Heera’s village owned a refrigerator (unless the family owned a store on the road 
and had a small one there). I met one family in a similar Garhwali village that did; the “current” 
was so often not working they left it unplugged and used it as a cabinet.  
10 As Rosset et al. (2013) and Mulvany 2014 explain, “agrobiodiversity” (in comparison to 
agricultural biodiversity”) is a term most often used in projects that see biodiversity as a 
commodity. I feel in this context, it is the apt term. 
 182 
materially – in processes of colonial, capitalist and national development.11 On the one hand, 
national and urban development relies on extracting “natural resources” like water and wood 
from the hills; on the other hand, little “investment” has been made to support “remote” rural 
social life. In the easier to access foothills – at the altitudes at which mandua and madhira 
mostly grow in Uttarakhand – NGOs have both addressed societal and infrastructural 
challenges and made use of them. Regardless, they are important sites through which 
transnational, national and local processes exist in tension, collide and change.  
 I write that seeds in this small seed bank have a “dual life.” On the one hand, they are 
farmer-saved and intimately connected to the terraced fields where pahari families sow and 
reap from year to year. They must be so to remain productive. The “field” here would not reside 
in parentheses, as in this chapter’s title, and the seed (or to follow an earlier thread, the “-seed-“) 
is entangled with an emergent and practical future. At the same time, however, a seed here is 
"plant genetic material" for those in Delhi or funders abroad. In other words, it is a container of 
information meant for an aim (food security) and group (the nation or humankind) that is 
detached from the immediacy of farmer field and pahari life. In this case, the small farmer field 
does reside in parentheses – “(field)” – in a contained (remote) realm separate from the seed’s 
imagined future. Though seeds here are given to farmers and rely on their labor, the 
protagonists and the decision makers are donors or officials who will likely never plant, touch or 
even see them.  
On the one hand, the seed’s mobility here involves horizontal movement among farmers 
(considering that the fieldworkers are also farmers). On the other hand, the seed’s mobility 
implies vertical movement between socio-spatial arenas.  
                                                          
11 See James C. Scott’s (2010) The Art of Not Being Governed.  
 183 
On the one hand, the lived effects and the living practice of biodiversity is what matters 
(an emphasis on a -seed-’s integrated and relational whole). On the other hand, it is the diversity 
of genetic information (an emphasis on the parts a seed possesses and on possessing them).  
On the one hand, the farmer-saved seed is renewable and enables farmers to resist forms 
of capitalist alienation and the -seed- is still reproduced through the non-alienated practice of 
biodiversity. On the other hand, as it makes the leap to become “plant genetic information (or 
material),” it can be appropriated into alienating projects.  
 
 
The identity of the seed here is ambivalent, and much rests on the intentions and transparency 
of those in charge of the NGO. The ambivalence in this case also stems from the geographic 
location of this repository: a village relatively far from the nearest city but accessible by motor 
road. It is, in other words, open to officials, foreigners, donors and paharis. At the same time, it 
is remote enough that space cannot be rapidly "conquered by time."12 This makes possible but 
slows down processes of incorporation into national and transnational projects. Fieldworkers 
like Heera help to both slow and propel the trajectory from “–seed-” to “Seed,” or “plant genetic 
material.” As local residents, they are socially embedded in rural networks and the practice of 
biodiversity; as employees, they are structurally situated at key places (despite their low rank) of 
national organizations. They, therefore, become conduits for the movement from the first 
                                                          
12 Harvey (1990) on “space-time compression.” 
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column (above) to the second. In contrast, “scaling up” small farmer networks and the practice 
of biodiversity would entail expanding the qualities listed in the first column rather than 
fundamentally transforming them.13 
 Seed repositories in the hills do not necessarily entail this movement and in fact have 
long played an important role. Pahari farmer-activist Vijay Jhardhari of Beej Bachao Andolaan 
(Save the Seeds Movement) writes about the history of village seed centers; they have been 
places where farmers contribute and take seeds depending on their needs.14 Generally, a group 
of farmers or a chosen person manages them (compared here to someone selected by an 
external organization) and they have relied on systems of local governance, like the village 
panchayat. Essentially, they have functioned like a protected commons. While local governing 
bodies continue to deny women and historically oppressed caste groups decision-making power, 
there are ways seeds – particularly those like mandua that have long had little to no economic 
value – traverse social lines in patterns of exchange.15 They were, and in many cases still are, 
places of transformational possibility – sites where social hierarchies are less rigid, and 
therefore places from which broader openings can be forged.  
 Moreover, the moral code of seed exchange in pahar advocates that one should give 
away more seeds than one has received. This ethic is not rooted in personal generosity (A gives 
to B, therefore B should give to C; or what many people call "paying it forward"), but in religious 
beliefs and the social value of what Valentine Daniel refers to as "excess" in his work with small 
farmers in Sri Lanka.16 In this case, "excess" is an engagement with and belief in a social 
abundance that is contingent upon the enactment of restraint. The seed houses Jhardhari 
describes were not "ex sitio" because they are embedded in the world of practice. Thus, they held 
                                                          
13 Holt-Giménez (2001). 
14 Jardhari et al (2012). 
15 I discuss this at length in the previous chapter. 
16 See Valentine Daniel’s (1993) “Tea Talk.” Certainly, this work broaches “excesses” of a 
different kind as well, in particular excesses of power (Trouillet 1992). 
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greater quantities of seeds so farmers like Prema could replant a field. These have diminished 
considerably for many reasons including rural to urban migration, the expansion of cash crops, 
urbanization of and tourism in Uttarakhand and the growing importance of material 
consumption. 
This NGO seed bank is not a farmer-led endeavor. Nonetheless, as Heera says, farmer-
saved seeds can multiply exponentially and farmers who come here are generally freely given a 
bit of seed. Thus, farmers can, over a few seasons, increase these small quantities, bringing them 
into the fold of farmer-to-farmer networks. Nevertheless, the question remains of what happens 
to the plant genetic material that might leave and how farmers would know. 
 
Portrait 4: To Make Less Remote 
Government Researcher and Scientist 
Agricultural Research Center, Uttarakhand 
August 2014 
 
"We call our trips 'explorations.' We go throughout Uttarakhand. Sometimes farmers 
join us. Our explorer groups fill out passport data sheets. When places are remote 
they mark the latitude and longitude and other geographic markers. They go by jeep. 
They walk far sometimes.  
 When we collect seeds or cuttings from farmers, we ask, 'What is the name? 
How many days to maturation?' Questions like that. In fact, some local landraces have 
better production than hybrids in Uttarakhand. They have resistance to diseases. We 
also get collections from farmers' fields. If plants are in standing fields at the maturity 
stage, we select them ourselves; if they are not in fields, then we take what farmers 
give us. If they are from a new village, we use mapping technology to complete the 
passport data.... 
How do we get seeds? We just talk to local people to make them understand 
things. But now sometimes they don't give seeds. Between fifteen years back and now 
is a hell of a difference. Before they didn't know things, now they do. They say, 'Why 
are you collecting our seeds?' We tell them it is not meant for any particular purpose. 
They cannot select the best because we are doing it in scientific way.  
Farmers come to us evaluate and register their seeds. There is protection for 
that. There is community monetary benefit for that. If a seed has a single measurable 
trait it can be registered with National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources.  
[Pointing]  
That is one of our experimental fields. Our seeds are self-pollinating. We do 
not do mixed cropping like farmers here, it's impossible to control. In some fields we 
combine crops, but we do it systematically. We have marked the plots and there are 
controls. They will have different harvest times, which will work out well for us 
logistically.... 
 186 
Yes, you can take photos. But only from here. No closer. Just from here. Do 
not photograph any details of the plants.... 
I can't say that.... I can't say that all these millet fields are without fertilizers....  
Listen, we are a state agricultural research center. We are one among thirty-
five throughout India. We can't do seed production on a huge scale. These are 
government seeds. We are working for farmers. We don't want to make money from 
them. Farmers can harvest and replant them. They can do this for a long time, for 
many cycles.  
  As of yet, we have not really made hybrid millet varieties because that requires 
some male sterility system. It is private investment that can bring out hybrids and 
develop methods by which you can create male sterility, like spraying a chemical. These 
are being tested in Uganda. But unless technology is foolproof and commercialized, it 
does not really exist.  
 We are making improved varieties to give to farmers using a pedigree method. 
We identify and cross elite lines, observe and select. We produce seeds that show some 
important difference. We do this for three years and have them tested and inspected by a 
certification agency. Only the fourth generation is released by the central government as 
breeder seed. Breeder seed must have 100% purity.  
 We give improved varieties to six or seven districts in the state. It can be 
challenging in this region. Some places are quite remote. We do it through tech 
demonstrations in farmer fields. Sometimes we give seeds out to a whole village. Or we 
choose randomly and give one packet to each farmer we meet, enough to grow on one 
nali of land. Sometimes we select fields near the road so other farmers will see it. Usually 
farmers in the hills don't use chemicals, even when we give them. Most of the crops here 
are grown in organic conditions... 
The truth is, millets have not gained much importance until recently, and even 
still they do not have much. They have more in southern part of the country. We call 
them “underutilized.” But there are still very little funds diverted for these crops. 
Mostly, everybody still wants rice and wheat. Still very little has been done for 
research and development. We only started millets breeding in the 1980s, this is late 
in comparison to other crops. We are slowly increasing the varieties of millets in the 
national registry. Someone must create a market. 
Why are they more important now? 
Well, because they are India's own crops. All small millets are grown here. 
Africa was their first home and Asia is their second home. They are nutritious, high in 
protein. They can give yield in dry conditions. They are underutilized. People have 
explored wheat, rice and other crops.  




Passage 4.4:  
 How government projects to collect pahari plant material also enable the geographic 
and social expansion of government and capitalist reach 
 
Government projects to collect "plant material" and distribute breeders’ seeds in the hills are 
also projects to expand government reach – in other words, they incorporate remote places into 
the nation-state. Though this border region and religious pilgrimage site has an extensive 
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military and tourist presence, these tend to be contained locales around which commerce, motor 
roads and government infrastructures have developed.17 Many places in the hills – even those 
that might appear near to "developed" areas on the map – continue to evade forms of state 
governance and capitalist agriculture.  
 These are among the reasons why pahari crop varieties are "underutilized.” This latter 
term, which the Indian government has used increasingly over the past two decades to promote 
research on “millets” among other crops, is a commentary on their relationship to the 
government (state and national) and industry. “Underutilized” crops have not visibly added to 
economic and productive value. "Underutilized" reflects an ideology that assumes a competitive 
arena, utilitarian aims and a lack of wholeness ("under" + "util"). However, mandua is not 
"underutilized" if one considers that, even if in decline, in the places it exists it does so wholly 
embedded in pahari life. If "underutilization" implies the absence of incorporation, that 
condition – and its idealized potential – now signifies a marketable cache in the "time of 
quality.”  
 "Utilizing" pahari crops necessitates making the places in which they grow less remote. 
It means incorporating them, the farmers who grow them and the places in which they grow into 
bureaucratic and governing structures. In the hills of Uttarakhand, where extension agents often 
do not venture into the interior but where village residents must travel for many things now 
essential to daily life, seeds and the activities around them can perform some of this work. On 
the one hand, as Kloppenburg suggests, the renewability of farmer-saved seeds continues to 
subvert capitalist processes. On the other hand, as computer technologies and plant 
biotechnology evolve and motor roads reach new areas, seeds also become agents of 
incorporation. They travel easily in bags and packets. Farmers can transport them to or from 
                                                          
17 Roads have also been built to facilitate the construction of dams. 
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agricultural centers and fairs; residents can do the work of carrying them into areas where 
scientists or officials may not want to go.  
Both “collection” and “dissemination” play a role in this. To collect material, scientists go 
on "explorations.” This colonial language evokes the impulse of government branches to expand, 
geographically and scientifically, into frontier territory in order to collect and claim “national” 
biodiversity resources. These resources in the field or on the plate become expressions of 
national pride and citizenship: they are “India’s own crops.” Their information is recorded as 
“passport data.” To “give them passports,” the terrain must be mapped and the information 
catalogued to become legible and accessible to government officials and scientists – an endeavor 
far more possible now than it was even a few years ago.  
Collection also relies on farmers to give seeds and information freely; in other words, it 
relies on “underutilization” or what is in fact the survival of non-economic forms of value and 
reciprocity that still dominate the movement of seeds in the hills. That “between fifteen years 
back and now is a hell of a difference. Before they didn't know things, now they do. They say, 
'Why are you collecting our seeds?'” reveals the way national and transnational skepticism about 
government has also touched down and created new forms of resistance. It also suggests a shift 
in how pahari farmers understand seeds, as the economic value and “importance” of 
“underutilized crops” grow. When the scientist explains, “We tell them it is not meant for any 
particular purpose,” this is very likely true. Because plant genetic information can now be 
compartmentalized, catalogued and stored away, and because so many pahari varieties are in 
decline, the goal becomes to collect as much as possible – without necessarily having a 
particular project in mind.  
 This research center also disseminates conventionally bred “100% pure” and “improved” 
seeds. “Purity” here means they have been stabilized and made uniform, and that the 
reproducibility and consistency of this uniformity has been tested in order to conform to 
national standards of “innovation.” These same qualities are absent in farmer-saved seeds; 
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indeed that absence is fundamental to the practice of biodiversity. The lack of uniformity in 
farmer-saved seeds essentially is biodiversity and the basis of plant breeding. The “plant 
material” that scientists in this research center use to produce improved millets derives from 
collections from various other parts of India, just as the material from collections here will be 
sent to other regions. This scientist explains that their seeds, which are not hybrid or transgenic, 
have the potential to be saved and replanted. However, once systems of dissemination and seed 
promotion are better established in the hills and once farmers begin to pay even nominal fees 
for seeds, other kinds of seeds, chemicals and exploitative sales techniques could expand – 
especially in light of new mapping and classification techniques.18  
Similarly, Shaila Seshia Galvin writes about how organic agricultural projects in the hills 
near Dehradun, Uttarakhand’s new capital, have played a role in “the new state formation” since 
the early 2000s. Uttarakhand’s first Forest and Rural Development Commissioner’s 
vision led to an ambitious declaration of the state as the “Organic Capital of 
India,” and he moved quickly to expand the area under organic cultivation, 
administer and implement organic programs, and build market linkages both 
domestically and internationally for smallholder organic farmers by establishing 
India’s first dedicated Organic Commodity Board. The Commissioner wrote his 
memo just over a decade after India embarked on a remarkable series of 
liberalizing economic and regulatory reforms, which opened its economy to far 
greater foreign investment and trade. In this context, he evidently saw the 
political and economic destinies of the new state as closely intertwined.19 
 
In part through collaborations with multilateral institutions, in particular the World Bank’s 
Integrated Watershed Development Project, the Uttarakhand state government has taken steps 
to create a state run organic certification agency and promote formal methods of composting 
that distinguish “current practices from past ones, when manure was collected in an open 
heap.”20 Thus, farmers who adopt state-promoted “organic by design” agricultural strategies are 
                                                          
18 The extension techniques this scientist are similar to those employed to promote transgenic 
cotton in Glenn Stone’s (2007) work in Warangal. 
19 Seshia Galvin (2014: 119).  
20 As Seshia Galvin (2015:124) writes, this government-run agency also provides third-party 
certification to organic producers in other regions of India.  
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“newly recognized as agentive by state institutions” and associated with formal education while 
those who have not, especially those in remote and poorer regions, are considered “organic by 
default” and denied their roles as cultivators and knowledge producers. They are relegated to 
“the past,” thereby effacing the multiple and diverse land practices that produce and sustain the 
diversity of plant and animal life in the hills. 
“This newfound agrarian subjectivity is clearly double edged, and just as being organic by 
design affords some cultivators opportunities for new forms of agrarian identity, at the same 
time it positions them as ‘subjects’ in a more Foucauldian sense.”21 If projects for state-
integration are eliciting ambivalent responses from farmers, the hills too pose challenges: many 
places are still remote, more so during the monsoon when roads fall apart, and extension agents 
end up using methods over which they have less control. Whereas in the plains, “display” plots 
have been used to mislead farmers who do not have similar quality land or access to resources, 
residents of the hills are highly aware of environmental and social variability; thus, they are less 
likely to assume that a crop will grow the same way in their fields as in another’s. Moreover, as 
this scientist says, pahari farmers often do not use recommended chemical inputs at all.22 Seeds 
might be carried long distances, but accompanying instructions and chemicals might not.  
 
 
Portrait 5: Deferring Democracy 
National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources 
New Delhi 
August 2014  
 
The establishment of the Bureau coincided with the advent of the Green 
Revolution and was in response to the realization of perceived effects of 
the Green Revolution on agrobiodiversity… The NBPGR played a pivotal 
role in the improvement of various crop plants and diversification and 
development of agriculture in India through germplasm introduction 
                                                          
21 Furthermore, she writes, “‘Organic by default’ builds on a longer legacy that diminishes 
cultivators as agents in making and shaping agrarian landscapes in the Uttarakhand Himalaya” 
(Ibid:126).   
22 I found that this government research institute does use chemicals (particularly nitrogen-
fixing) in at least some experimental plots, even though Uttarakhand has officially been an 
organic state since 2001. 
 191 
from various institutes/organizations located in foreign countries and 
germplasm collection from within the country and abroad and 
conservation thereof.23 
  
By the time it arrives in this conservation site holding 4 million accessions, of which 
but a small portion are “millets,” in this locale within India’s capital through which all 
plant material that enters the country for research should land, a seed has well 
acquired the identity of plant genetic material.24  
By the time it arrives here, teams from one of ten regional stations located in 
different regions that reflect the country’s climactic, environmental and geographic 
variation have explored, selected and collected the seeds from which it derives; they 
have planted, harvested, replanted and replicated their acquisitions under tightly 
controlled and monitored conditions, stabilizing it over three subsequent generations.  
 The seed that arrives here has been carefully harvested, with care and urgency, 
at that instance in its life when it was at the pinnacle of its vitality. And this was done 
by a person who knows that every moment of delay is a moment of depletion, a 
moment that harkens its demise, renders it susceptible to fungus and disease. At that 
moment it came into ripeness, the seed that arrives here was removed from warmth 
and heat. It was wrapped in a porous muslin cloth and exposed to cool, dry air so 
about half of its moisture could seep. By the time it arrives here, a seed has been 
weighed using a gravimetric method. It has been placed in a container that is 
impervious to moisture like a special insulated bag or aluminum foil. It has been 
characterized, evaluated, quarantined.  
 By the time it arrives here, a seed has been sealed in a packet with other seeds 
tested and marked as identical. The seed that arrives here and the seeds with which it 
is sealed should reap the same, predictable results under the same conditions.  
 A seed that arrives here is, in a way, a national treasure. It is kept like 
something valuable, in a national bank of safety deposits that relies on duplicate seeds 
instead of duplicate keys and stores them in faraway places such as Svalbard, Norway. 
It – the seed that arrives here – is itself a storehouse of information, information that 
can be replicated, isolated, used, multiplied and resuscitated sometime, somewhere. 
 The seed that arrives here is public material. Within guidelines, it is “open to 
anyone.” And anyone, “breeders and farmers,” can request seeds and it is a mandated 
duty of those who work here to provide it. The seed that arrived here through the path 
above described keeps company with private and public “deposits” maintained free of 
charge. The seed that arrives here might be distributed if a specific request has been 
made and if it is not available for any source – under the condition that some of what 
it reaps will be returned.  
 Inside a vault, the conditions for this seed are regulated as in a hospital’s ICU. 
The temperature of negative eight degrees Celsius is cold enough to slow its metabolic 
rate enough for "medium-term storage." At negative twenty, "long-term storage," it 
becomes almost dormant. Its metabolic lethargy “buys time.” Allows it to conserve 
energy. Prevents deterioration. So when and if it becomes useful or necessary, it can 
be warmed up and hauled back into productivity.  
 The seed that arrives here is made to biologically simulate death in the present 
in order to stave it off. Yet there is no getting around it, that condition of all life. 
                                                          
23 As written on the website of the National Bureau of Plant Genetic Resources. 
24 30-40% of seeds stored here are duplicates, as earlier they did not have the technology to test 
and classify duplicates that exists now. Plant material that enters the country for commercial, as 
opposed to research, reasons is covered by a different division. 
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Periodically, it must be taken out and tested to see if it is still viable, still alive, can 




Passage 5.5  
 How freezing plant genetic material for future food security or innovation also 
“freezes” certain democratic processes 
 
A national gene bank is an intervening place between producer and consumer, production and 
consumption. The slash in this chapter’s title (“Seed/Grain”) represents physical distance, 
temporal distance and social distance. It could be otherwise represented as “Seed-/-/-Grain,” 
where the hyphens reflect the space and time wedged into a plant’s life cycle that enables the 
national government (in this case) to “bank on” biodiversity as a future “food security” resource. 
Here the “Seed” is a storehouse of added value potentiality, one based on “freezing” – rather 
than speeding – productive time. It is also a bundle of genetic information that can be spliced 
and combined to create new life and new wealth. Unlike other forms of “natural” wealth that can 
be depleted or take a long time to regenerate, this resource can be both saved and used, given 
away and kept. Hence, it enables particular forms of cooperation and competition between 
government and industry, and it is a point of connection and disconnection between the 
government and populace. 
  Considering Portraits 1, 4 and 5, one finds that the movement from the family field to 
this public realm is, paradoxically, a trajectory towards privatization. While farmers even in 
remote hill regions are starting to develop skepticism about researchers who arrive on 
“explorations,” for the most part they do not treat -seeds- as private property or commodities. 
Embedded and utterly entangled in everyday life, -seeds- embody social relations and relations 
beyond the social; they are not generally treated as, or easily rendered into, things. The practice 
of seed reciprocity and exchange, particularly for crops largely “ignored” in capitalist 
agriculture, constitute part of those relations; many farmers, therefore, still give (their) -seeds- 
away. 
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 In contrast, despite the national bureau’s legal mandate of public access, it is far more 
difficult for small farmers to access seeds or control what becomes of them than it is for 
corporations, foundations, research institutes and other national governments. For example, it 
takes a great deal of time, money, family negotiation and social finagling for a woman farmer 
(especially if her family has cows or buffalo) to make the journey from a remote village in 
Uttarakhand to this vault in Delhi and feel comfortable entering it. Unless one is well versed in 
its language and classification system, knowing how to identify what one is asking for is like 
looking for a needle in a haystack. This is a task that organizations and individuals with money 
can train people specifically to do and for which they can use their social and institutional 
connections.  
 In the previous chapter, a close look into the practice of biodiversity from the “margins” 
of Uttarakhand underscored converging and intensifying environmental and democratic 
concerns. However, if agriculture is now widely recognized as a “major driver and victim of 
climate change,” it is a less recognized driver and victim of crises of representation in 
bureaucratic democracies.25 Since its Independence in 1947, India’s agricultural policies have 
been motivated by and have profoundly affected questions of democracy, class and civil society 
representation. India’s Green Revolution did not just increase domestic food production 
exponentially, but it also deflected growing rural unrest and demands for land reform and 
increased India’s GDP. However, now there is evidence that industrial crop yields in many 
regions have plateaued and India’s land, irrigation and biodiversity sources are drying up 
leading to problems of water grabbing; concurrently (and despite India’s expanding middle 
classes), rural class disparities have intensified.26  
                                                          
25 The quotation is from UNCTAD (2013). Because food is an inalienable necessity of human life, 
it has been throughout history both a source of political unrest and a barometer of political 
“stability.” Many rural movements through India, including Uttarakhand, now directly relate the 
issue of democracy to that of agriculture and the environment – in particular those around land 
rights (in both law and its implementation). 
26 Wagle et al (2012) examine water grabbing in the Indian state of Maharashtra. 
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 New methods of plant breeding, such as transgenics, offer new methods to stave off these 
problems; they technologically relieve socio-environmental symptoms that are becoming 
generalized and enable them to once again be spatially and socially contained – in other words, 
born by segments of the population least represented in and by government. Thus, a national 
gene bank can mitigate the loss of agricultural biodiversity even as agricultural policies 
reproduce the conditions of that trend. By orienting towards the future, the needs and 
experiences of people in rural areas appear to be less urgent. By centrally storing seeds so they 
can be transported and sown elsewhere (or used for breeding), the government can avoid 
dealing with the effects of climate change on particular places. The technology of freezing not 
only slows down the metabolic rate of plant life, but also helps to defer the government’s 
responsibility to segments of the populace. As “dormant” receptacles of “plant genetic diversity” 
(embodied work/labor and knowledge), seeds are depoliticized and severed from their 
connection to farmers’ lives (or the practice of biodiversity). 
  Socio-environmental contingencies cannot be practically contained, eradicated or 
perpetually deferred. As concerns about environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and 
climate change intensify, one might note a reciprocal move to construct highly controlled places 
for storage. If the very contingencies of socio-environmental life contribute to the planting of 
mandua in Uttarakhand and the social practice of “freely” giving seeds, those same conditions in 
"public realm" provoke attempts to shelter seeds from the mounting intensity of that variability. 
That mandua has declined in the hills marks the rural distress and environmental change that 
the current emphasis on gene banks does not resolve and from which, arguably, it deflects 
attention. Gene banks might or might not serve a necessary purpose based on today’s 
environmental realities. Regardless, it is important to interrogate how they function and the role 
they play in India’s democracy. 
 The practice of biodiversity by pahari farmers growing “climate resilient” crops suggests 
an additional concern. Farmers, like Meera in Portrait 1 and Prema in Portrait 3, who spend a 
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great deal of time observing environmental changes (that too, in a region known for its 
abundant biodiversity) save seeds every year. Every year they select the “best” specimens 
according to that season’s environmental and social conditions. By doing so, they are 
accommodating to changes both perceptible and imperceptible; they are also contributing to 
shaping the next season’s crops based on intuitive knowledge that comes out of persistent 
engagement. This develops a seed’s quality of “resilience.” Resilience is, in other words, a living 
attribute, forged, again, through persistent engagement. This is true also of “climate resilience.” 
It is not inherent to a seed or simply contained in its genetic code.  
 Seeds can be frozen. However, life in the present with all its precarity, cycles and 
transformations goes on. Despite recombinant possibilities and what plant biotechnological 
advances transpire, will “genetic information” that has been severed from practical life have a 
comparable ability to address evolving environmental conditions and human needs?  
 
 
Portrait 6: Between Scientists and Farmers 
Min. (Official in a Government Ministry), PC (author), Commentators 1-3 
Agricultural Branch, National Government Office, Delhi 
March 2014 
 
SETTING: South Delhi. A cool afternoon, just a couple of days before the city’s 
overnight shift to summer. PC enters a complex of government buildings. She walks 
through a set of gates after conversing with two armed guards. She passes a few 
pink buildings and one with a landscaped lawn and many guards, then crosses a 
small parking lot to arrive at a dilapidated green edifice. More guards inspect her 
identification, search her bag and ask if she has an appointment and whom she is 
there to see, before they make a call, motioning for her to proceed. At the entrance, 
she is given a form, and inside the lobby, she is asked to show it. She steps into a 
small elevator crammed with employees who all press different buttons. She gets off 
on the fifth floor. The space is dark and dingy, full of metal shelves and haphazard 
stacks of files. In an open closet, a sink is stained and dripping water. People work in 
cramped niches here and there. She walks to the end of a hallway lined with tattered 
cardboard boxes and more files. She knocks on a door and is told to enter. The office 
is surprisingly spacious. It is clean, well lit, with windows and two desks. One desk 
is empty. Behind the other sits a woman, here called Min.  
 
Min.:  I have very little time, you see, I have a last-minute urgent meeting. Anyway, I  
 do not understand why students keep coming to ask questions about GM.27  
                                                          
27 GM also indicates GMO, or genetically modified/transgenic seeds. 
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 It is true biodiversity and biotech is a concern of our Ministry. But we are not  
 concerned with just agriculture. Since 1986, we monitor various activities of  
 industry, mining, medical waste. At that time, biotech was just coming up. 
 
PC:  I am interested in what you make of the opposition of some farmers and  
 scientists to the fact that the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee, under  
 the direction of your Minister, has overturned the moratorium on GM field  
 trials for food crops?28 
 
Min:  I don’t know what you mean. The trials have been going on for many years.  
 There was a Supreme Court case and a Technical Expert Committee needed to  
 be made because a Public Interest Litigation was filed. Yes, there was a  
 complete ban at first, but not everyone agreed on the position. They added one  
 member, Dr. Paroda – on that basis the ban was lifted. They have been doing  
 field trials on GM crops for many years. The process was slowed down until  
 the matter was resolved but there was no ban by court.  
 
Commentator 1 (a Delhi-based journalist who writes about agriculture in India, 4  
 months later):  
I was among those who filed the complaint. It was this Ministry that insisted  
 on the appointment of Dr. Paroda. He is head of TAAS [Trust for  
 Advancement of Agricultural Sciences] and on that Board is the Chairman of  
 Mahyco, the Monsanto corporation’s partner in India. They added a member  
 who was GM friendly just to alter the makeup of the committee. 
 
PC:  I am confused, as you said there was a ban, then you said there was no ban. If  
 nothing has changed, why are people coming out against this now? You  
 must know that farmers from many states including Uttarakhand convened in  
 Delhi about a week ago for a National Seeds Festival to showcase thousands of  
 farmer-saved varieties including millets to show their contribution to India’s  
 agriculture. They did this in protest of the GM trials.29 
 
Min.:  Meetings were held to make an official pronouncement about twenty crops  
 including rice, sorghum, mustard, chickpea, brinjal, castor and ground nut –  
 mostly in state agricultural universities. We are not even that interested in  
 millets right now.  
 
PC:  But both ragi [finger millet] and pearl millet have been listed in newspaper 
articles as crops in the GM pipeline. Are you at all concerned that problems 
that have transpired with Bt cotton [a transgenic variety] might happen with 
other GM crops in India? For example, farmer suicides. 
 
Min.:  What suicides? There have been no suicides.  
 
PC:  The Center for Human Rights and Global Justice reported over 270,000 farmers  
 have committed suicide in India since 1995, especially in the cotton belt.  
 
                                                          
28 These events have been portrayed extremely differently by opposing media sources. 
29 Parsai’s (2013) article “Sovereign Seeds Showcase Unique Biodiversity” in The Hindu 
describes this event. 
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Min.:  There are a lot of socio-economic issues involved. What I meant is there are no  
suicides because of Bt cotton. Warangal [in India’s cotton belt where Bt cotton 
is heavily grown] is a drought prone region. Whether Bt existed or not, 
suicides would be going on. There are hectares of areas under Bt cotton. It 
cannot only happen, for example, that in only one pocket sheep are dying. In 
fact we had written to the state government asking would you like to withdraw 
approval for Andhra Pradesh and they said no. We don't know what is 
outcome. Every technology has pros and cons. We evaluate those and take a 
decision.  
 
PC:  I realized that 1995 is before Bt cotton was introduced. But what about this 
 trend? Some farmers I interviewed are not against “technology” per say, but  
criticize the way decisions are made about the course technology takes. 
 
Min.:  That is the activists’ point of view.  
 
PC:  But it is what many farmers are saying, and India is still a majority rural  
 population. 
 
Min. We go through a huge consultation process. We put information on the  
 website.... Of course, only technical persons can respond. But we put the  
 information there. We can only clarify, we can't control how much is  
 absorbed or what people do. 
 
PC:  One concern I have heard people voice is that there will be genetic  
 contamination between neighboring fields, so that even farmers who don’t use  
 GM will find their crops affected. I know the public interest lawsuit was filed  
 because even some scientists feel that adequate biosafety testing has not yet  
 been done and this might have irreversible consequences on existing biological  
 diversity, and possibly leave farmers susceptible to corporate lawsuits. 
 
Min.  People need to understand more about plants and biological materials and the  
 reproductive biology of organisms. Contamination isn't just because of Bt or  
 GM. Contamination has always existed. If a crop of a type of Puna rice is sown  
 next to a field of basmati, there could also be contamination. We must see the  
 flowering time of both, only if flowering time matches they are going to cross.  
 
PC:  So you are sure that GM technologies do not pose any difference or additional  
 risks compared to conventional breeding, even though some scientists and  
  farmers have doubts?  
 
Min.:  Listen, we are not worried about genetic contamination. For all these years  
 these various varieties of plants have been maintained, so there is an inherent  
 protection. If there was not inherent protection, we would already have only  
 monocultures. We must understand this if we talk about contamination. We  
 are taking isolation measures, and doing pre and post monitoring. People  
 don't understand about gene flow. 
  
PC:  That is very different from what I have heard. Is your background in genetics,  
 agriculture or environment?” 
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Min.:  [long pause]  
 
Commentator 2 (who works under a different government, after reviewing Min.’s 
professional title one day later):  
She is what you call a professional bureaucrat. Someone who worked her 
way through the ranks. In India, this is not easy. It involves a pretty exam. 
Then they are trained for two years nonstop in all fields of government, 
trained to be bureaucrats. They are put in charge of a small district and 
everything in that district – police, education, everything. Then they leave the 
district and work their way up a very hierarchal structure. Every three years 
they are made to shift positions, from department to department. Their jobs 
are guaranteed, regardless of whether the government changes hands. 
Unfortunately the system trains them not to look on the ground or think 
about whether something is feasible.  
 
Min.:  People still use petrol despite all the damage it does to the environment, we  
 did not go back to the bullock cart. Just because of people's opinions, science  
 cannot stop. Science must go forward.  
 
[Time runs out] 
 
PC (recounting story to Commentator 3, a scientist who has argued for the necessity 
of more bio-safety research before any decisions are made on GM field trials, in 
Uttarakhand one month later):  
When I got off the elevator on the first floor– 
 
Commentator 3:  
Let me guess. White men in suits were getting in and going to her floor. 
 
Me:  How did you know? 
 
Commentator 3:  
I can guess who you are talking about, you are talking about [Min.]. As an 
individual she is not so powerful or important, but she is in a convenient 
position to make some things happen.  
 
Me:  You mean, by taking bribes? 
 
Commentator 3:  
Does she take bribes? [laughs] What do you think?  
 
 
Passage 6.6:  
 How neoliberal governmental regimes are pulling millets and other pahari crops into 
the “public” realm while undermining the democratic rights of the farmers who grow 
them 
 
When I arranged to interview Min., I knew little about her other than that she had a position in a 
national government branch that covered issues pertaining to biodiversity and transgenics (GM 
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technologies). For a few weeks before, I had tried unsuccessfully to interview one of her 
colleagues and her superior; ultimately, she was the one who gave me time (or who had been 
assigned to do so). 
If Portrait 6 reads as theater, I want to first call attention to this political “stage” and 
consider the kinds of actions and practices of power that it encourages. As one of the 
commentator’s suggests, Min.’s ability to rise within a hierarchical structure depends upon her 
ability to perform a certain kind of “democracy,” one that keeps the messiness of social issues 
and social life at a distance. If in Chapter Two, the practice of biodiversity involves “messy” 
human relationships and human interactions with nonhuman life, here the practice of 
democratic governance related to biodiversity (as a resource, narrowly construed) involves 
detachment from that “messiness.” It is hollowed out of the complexities and the life that this 
work argues constitutes biodiversity itself. As the gene bank portrayed in the previous Portrait 
and Passage, this government setting is highly controlled. Moreover, it appears far more likely 
that someone who has power within its hierarchy will interact with white executives than with 
the people in Chapter Two. How people like Min. perform modernity here is highly constrained; 
and it is a kind of modernity that institutes economic wealth, whiteness and industrialization as 
prized human virtues. 
Within this setting, Min. is a concerning figure. She is accused of taking “bribes;” 
furthermore, she exhibits an apparent lack of concern, bordering on disdain, for the realities of 
rural life. For example, “going back to the bullock cart” maligns a technology that is still used in 
many rural areas because of practicality, environment, culture and available resources. Yet here 
the bullock cart is a symbol of rural “backwardness” (much like millets have been portrayed). 
Her job seems to entail avoiding serious engagement with the multiple environmental, social, 
political and economic concerns of segments of India’s rural polity.30  
                                                          
30 Similar patterns exist in the transnational arena. For example, at the UN Committee on Food 
Security 41, young US representatives from the Gates Foundation, who socialized with venture 
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Her attitude aligns with the questionable manner in which her Ministry appointed a new 
member of the Technical Expert Committee to override small farmer concerns.31 In other words, 
individual profit making (or ladder climbing) by those mandated to govern biodiversity issues 
dovetails with corporate (and likely also individual) profit making through the accumulation 
strategy of transgenic crops. Thus, as the “information age” of agriculture takes flight in India’s 
neoliberal economy, the government has developed new ways to use the institutional structures 
of democracy and to suppress the voices and bodies that in fact comprise India’s democracy.32 
Particularly after the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 2002 (an “activist” victory), 
timing has become key: the environmental ministry rescinded the moratorium on GM field 
trials, which had resulted from democratic contentions and information countering dominant 
refrains, through an almost too quick to debate structural intervention (replacing a key person 
on the commission). The rapidity of this move suppressed democratic uncertainties/debate as 
well as the potential freedom of information through the internet and social networks. As such, a 
present course of action became “history” and rendered “inevitable” (as the dominant refrains 
often are; here, one might recall Turner and Swaminathan’s words in Chapter One). In other 
words, it is only through controlling information that the Indian government is able to open its 
doors to information technologies; moreover, with its biodiversity “resources,” rising GDP, 
ability to invest and collaborate with industry and membership in BRICS, India – as a 
geopolitical entity – is poised to benefit. 
                                                          
capitalists "investing millions of dollars in Africa," facilitated side events with national 
representatives about their plans for the future of African agriculture. While "professional 
bureaucrats" and business representatives employ scientists and farmers to implement their 
ideas, the latter generally do not set the terms of the research or determine its parameters and 
timeframes. 
31 The appointment of Dr. Paroda happened during is happened during Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh’s (of the Congress Party) tenure. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s (BJP Party) 
government expanded these field trials in 2015. 
32 I describe India’s neoliberal economy in Chapter One. 
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Such a performance of neoliberal democratic governance falls into what Karine Peschard 
argues makes India fit the description of a “cunning” state.33 Her reading of India’s agricultural, 
biodiversity and seed legislation in relation to the civil society actions over the past two decades 
presents a compelling case that the Indian government has assumed a stance of legislative 
ambivalence so as to assuage civil society unrest without addressing the fundamental issues 
behind it. For example, India has passed conflicting legislation – like the 2001 Plant Varieties 
Protection and Farmers Rights Act, which in many ways protected farmers’ rights, and the 2013 
Seeds Bill, which undid many of the rights afforded by the former. Similarly, as seen here with 
the appointment of someone with strong agri-business affiliations to the Technical Expert 
Committee, the question of “how the decisions get made” becomes “an activist’s perspective” 
rather than a necessary question in a representative democracy.  
It is in fact through “democratic” means, and public-private partnerships, that agri-
business has managed to gain such a stronghold over global food production. On the 
multilateral stage, a parallel legal ambivalence abounds.34 In tandem with the Convention on 
Biodiversity which aims to protect “national” biodiversity resources, the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) or the “Seed Treaty” is, in the 
words of the Food and Agricultural Organization, 
a global response to promote the conservation of plant genetic resources and to 
protect farmer’s rights to access and have fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising out of their use. Sustainable use of plant genetic resources is fundamental 
for achieving food and nutrition security and for a progressive realization of the 
right to food.35 
 
Nevertheless, in September 2014, the transnational peasant network La Via Campesina wrote an 
open letter to the Secretary of the ITPGRFA stating: 
‘Farmers’ Rights’ is a core component of the Treaty, and as such its full 
implementation is a pre-requisite to achieving the Treaty objectives. However, 
                                                          
33 Peschard (2014). 
34 See the Third World Network and the Bern Declaration’s report International Contradictions 
on Farmers Rights (Shashikant and Meienberg 2015) 
35 As written on the FAO webpage. 
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there is much concern that the instruments and/or activities of UPOV and WIPO 
are not supportive of Farmers rights, and even undermine those Rights, thereby 
hindering implementation of the Treaty provisions.36  
 
In both the national and transnational arenas, legislative ambivalence (compounded by the 
compartmentalization of fundamentally related issues) works to create spaces for the agri-
business (or the “life science” industry) to use economic power and political alliances and for 
civil society groups to make opposing claims, such as by filing a public interest lawsuit to halt 
GM field trials. However, in many of these instances, industry has been able to use neoliberal 
infrastructures and wealth to ultimately win legislative battles. 
The biological and social attributes of seeds themselves produce kinds of ambivalence, as 
well as opportunities for actors within complex global and national networks to take advantage 
of them. Because seeds can be duplicated and distributed, they can be used simultaneously in 
projects that promote the practice of biodiversity among small-scale farmers and projects of 
industrial innovation that endanger it. The Indian government and multilateral institutions like 
the FAO now support both, in part because industrial innovation relies on practice of 
biodiversity for its source material. However, as this dialogue in Portrait 6 shows, many farmers 
and scientists have voiced public concerns about the potential consequences of this strategy 
down the line: transgenic seeds could “genetically contaminate” existing agricultural 
biodiversity in ways we might not foresee; genetic uniformity comes with new environmental 
vulnerabilities, not only for an individual species but also for related species and non-crop 
biodiversity; the socio-environmental changes wrought by transgenic seeds might serve to 
increase corporate power over the global food system (by precipitating new necessities) and 
thereby further jeopardize the livelihoods of small farmers and cause new food insecurities.37 In 
                                                          
36 La Via Campesina (2014). Civil society groups have also contested this (BEDE 2011). For more 
on contradictions on farmers’ rights in the transnational sphere, see the Bern Declaration 
(Shashikant and Meienberg 2015). 
37 The Center for Food Safety’s (2015) report “Monarchs in Peril” describes how the Monarch 
butterfly population has plummeted between 1995-2015 due to glyphosate spraying on 
milkweeds (their host plant) on the edge of farmers’ fields in the US Midwest. These butterflies 
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other words, it might foreclose possibilities for the futures of plant life and, simultaneously, 
possibilities for future democratic decision-making. 
These issues intersect with what the Millets Network of India (MINI) describe as the 
“grip of multiple crises” that prompted its formation and drives its mission:38  
 a hunger and nutrition crisis, in which the International Food Policy Research Institute 
ranked fourteen out of seventeen states [of India] as “alarming” and one as “very 
alarming” on its 2008 Hunger Index; 
 an agricultural crisis, in which more than 200,000 farmers committed suicide between 
2000 and 2009 according to the National Crime Records Bureau; and in which over the 
last fifty years, “the total area under millets declined by about 50%” and their production 
by more than 3 million tons;39 
 a water crisis, with the decrease of availability “especially in the arid and semi-arid belts, 
which in India comprise of more than 65% of the total area under cultivation;” 
 a food distribution crisis, in which “the current model of centralized procurement means 
that the grain in India travels about 2000 kilometers before being distributed;” and, 
 a crisis of democracy, in which “biotechnology companies have been hell-bent on 
introducing [genetically engineered] crops at all costs. Sometimes, they have attempted 
to subvert democratic institutions and spread misinformation among the general 
public.” 
 
 This suggests that the “information age” is not one in which information belongs to the 
people of India’s democracy; rather, it is a time of diminished choices. While the internet has 
contributed profoundly to information sharing and connections between rural groups from 
different regions of India (for example, the very active Revitalizing Rainfed Agriculture list 
serve), it has also been a “stage” for the performance of making information “public” even as it 
brought into new regimes of control. In this Portrait, one can see the prevalence of an 
accompanying neoliberal ideology, in which farmers are expected to be disciplined and proper 
modern (again narrowly conceived) liberal subjects. Consider Min.’s suggestion that because 
"the information is there" on the internet, it is farmer’s fault for not accessing it, even though it 
                                                          
are indicators of the overall health of their environment; they are an important part of the food 
chain; and they support predators and parasites. In other words, their endangerment signals the 
potential endangerment of other species. 
38 MINI (2015). 
39 As MINI explains, as millets are grown in “arid and semi-arid regions of the country, which 
comprise of more than 65% of its landmass, and are grown by [those] who constitute some of 
the most deprived and marginalized sections of the Indian population, this decline in the area 
under and the production of millets represents a serious comprise of the food security of India.” 
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is well known that much of India’s rural population do not have the means to do so.  It is as if 
democracy were a matter of individualized and uniform actions, despite highly divergent social 
conditions, rather than about social parity and distributive justice.40 
 
 
Portrait 7: Consuming Biodiversity  




Aaron from France has not seen his family or communicated with them in eight years. 
"What does it matter? We are always leaving, moving,” he said. This is why when he 
parts from people, and doesn't keep in touch. To explain, he cited the Buddhist 
philosophy of non-attachment. "Besides," he added, "in this lifetime, people have 
betrayed me." 
 Tall, wiry and missing a few teeth, he came to India for travel and never left. He 
stays mostly in the hills, away from the congested cities, the smog, the toxins. He lives off 
a yearly stipend from "a sponsor" he met years ago in Israel where he was a yoga teacher, 
and the cost living in this part of India measured in Euros makes this possible. He spent 
last year in the hills of Himachal Pradesh where “the winter was rough” and "sometimes 
we would lose electricity for a week. I couldn't even walk outside or find my way in the 
snow until someone set the path." 
 We met outside a restaurant of a small guesthouse where mandua flour, madhira 
grains and other organic pahari products were sold at tourist prices local farmers would 
find exorbitant. Unequivocally morose in demeanor, he brightened a bit when he learned 
about my interest in mandua. He was a “frequent consumer of millets,” he said. “If you 
want, you can eat mandua ki rotee here in this restaurant.” Most of all, he enjoyed 
“bajra” or pearl millet, once widely known in India as "poor man's staple food." Hardly 
grown here, it is common in other parts of India as well as parts of Africa. He mixes 
mandua – what he calls ragi – flour with bajra and corn when he cooks because “alone 
it can be tough.” He had spent a few months in Andhra Pradesh. "There, they eat a lot of 
ragi. Ragi balls. And in the south as well." 
Self-medicating with marijuana, he rolled the dried leaves in a transparent 
cellophane wrapper that "has no chemicals unlike the paper." He said, “This helps me 
breathe.”  
He used to be healthy. March 2011 was when he started feeling ill. He believed 
that illnesses like cancer were on the rise throughout the world "because of nuclear 
radiation and pollution.” He even got tested and found his immune system was down. 
After that, he gave up dairy because he worried about the concentrated radiation and 
chemicals that might be contained in a cow's milk. What he saw in the future for 
humankind was "corporations, money, materialism, pollution... a world headed for 
crisis."  




                                                          
40 Her words reflect a neoliberal ideology. 
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 How consumers who comprise emerging markets for millets want to consume not only 
the “nutritional qualities” of these grains, but also the “remote” life it appears to 
embody 
 
Though Aaron is in many ways a societal outlier, he articulates a sentiment about millets (and 
associated foods) that has become increasingly, and globally, prevalent: that they have the 
attributes of "healing.”  
 This Portrait with Aaron expands on issues touched on in Passage 1.1. Similar to how 
pahar represents (and, since the British colonial era, has been) an escape from urban life, 
consuming mandua and other "underutilized" crops represents an escape from the harms of 
capitalist agriculture and the global food system. They offer a sense of relief and salvation from 
the illnesses and stresses of capitalist consumption and temporal urgencies. They symbolize a 
way to be healthy in the midst of the unhealthiness of “modern life,” from its nuclear hazards to 
the fertilizers that are sprayed on fields.  
This sentiment itself is appropriated and (re)produced as an accumulation strategy; so, 
millets are woven into the very processes that produce them as a necessity and an alternative. 
Though quantity-based rubrics continue to dominate transnational and national agriculture and 
food policies and discourses, quality (and especially nutrition) has come into its moment in 
agriculture. High protein, high iron, low gluten and the other characteristics about these grains 
cited by current scientific and medical studies are no less true than they would have been forty 
years earlier when the infrastructures of rural life in the hills had not been dismantled to the 
extent they have now. Consumers’ needs and modes of profit making have precipitated this 
change.  
"Really, I think people want to consume a kind of life," suggested a seed activist in 
Dehradun, Uttarakhand during an interview. "But they want just a bit of it, not to accept it as 
part of them.” In other words, beyond matters pertaining to physical health, the allure of millets 
to new markets is the imagined lifestyle these grains evoke. Crops grown in the "peasant modes 
of production" and stamped, perhaps, with "geographic indicators" appeal to a generalized 
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disillusionment with capitalist ways of life and corporate consolidation in the global market (and 
for some, the global food system has become an emblem of what is wrong). Along with tourist 
forays into “remote” places, one can consume this “time away,” develop a taste for it and make it 
a contained part of one's physiology.  Millets’ perceived healthfulness reflects new performances 
of modernity and class: it signifies not only individualized self-care but also a kind of leisure 
(time away, in a place where the clock does not tick) that people have come to need in a time of 
government austerity, global competition and individualized discipline. 
However, as this work illustrates, the lives that produce mandua are not separate from 
the social or environmental stresses of modern life. Indeed the practice of biodiversity mediates 
and contends with those stresses in intimate and deliberate ways, and mandua (as well as its 
nutritional qualities) literally grows out of the work that entails. It is the fact that “remoteness” 
does not buffer places from the compulsions of global capitalism or offer farmers “time away” 
that accounts for the survival of “underutilized” pahari crops. Nevertheless, their production 
does embody forms of knowledge and sociality beyond capitalist relations and commodity 
logics, and this simultaneously accounts for their continued production. If, as one European 
entrepreneur told me, turmeric grown in the hills is "pahari gold" because the soil’s mineral 
content and the stress on plants in tough, rainfed conditions cause them to develop enhanced 
nutrients, then those qualities emerge out of the stresses on human life in those same places.  
 
 
Portrait 8: Two Tales of Theft 
En route from hills to town, Kumaon 
April 2015 
 
"Never put your money somewhere apart from you. If someone takes your bag, then 
what will you have?" the man on the other side of the open window warns as I pass 
my belongings to the driver on the roof of the jeep. "You should keep a small purse 
like this.” The man draws a small rectangle with his fingers and pretends to put it 
inside his shirt. "Otherwise, it causes trouble... People take things if you don't keep 
them close."  
 I climb in beside him. We are headed from a village in Kumaon to a pahari 
city about twelve kilometers away. Today we are pressed together even more tightly 
than usual. We are almost sitting on each other's laps. For a half hour before this jeep 
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came along, every ride that passed was full. In a month, Narendra Modi of the BJP 
will be announced as the winner of the national election for Prime Minister. But at 
present that outcome is unknown, and his rival Rahul Gandhi has landed in 
Uttarakhand by helicopter to campaign for the incumbent Congress party.  
My advice giver is a talkative man, who had lived all his seventy years in the 
same village. He explains that politics in this hill state swings back and forth in an 
anti-incumbent pendulum.  
 The man across from us, whose knees are wedged against mine, comments 
periodically on the state of the road, especially when the jeep makes a big bump and 
our heads hit the roof. He is saying things like, "Despite all the tourists who come, this 
road is hasn’t changed." 
Everyone else in the jeep come from farming families, so the conversation 
moves to crops. Eventually the man across me brings up the fact that "mandua can 
get a good price outside." 
 My advice giver retorts, "In Delhi, mandua is selling for 80 rupees [$1.10] a 
kilo, but here everyone in the family works hard and people don't have mandua to 
eat.” It recalled something I overheard a Greek traveler say the previous afternoon at 
a tourist restaurant, "Now companies want our olive oil. We have olive trees lining the 
streets and families here can’t eat it anymore."41 
As we near our destination, the jeep begins to crawl. Thousands of people from 
surrounding villages, predominantly men, jam the streets, holding up flags, chanting 
and wearing caps adorned with political symbol.  
 For some reason, my advice giver remembers his earlier warning. And he tells 
me this story: Once a man on the train fell asleep with his head on top of a bag that 
contained important papers and his wallet. And he slept well and sound. When he 
woke up, the bag was still there safely under his head. But a short while later, he 




 How the appropriation and commodification of pahari agricultural biodiversity is 
connected to, and distinct from, the appropriation and commodification of pahari 
forest biodiversity. 
 
In Portrait 8, a pahari man presents two warnings about theft. The story he tells about the bag 
in the train recounts the kind of theft in which someone physically takes something valuable 
away. It is theft in a literal sense. In comparison, the social effects that he relates to the high 
price of mandua in Delhi suggests a kind of theft that presents as profit and might not even be 
considered theft. If his first warning can be paraphrased: Guard your possessions. The second 
can be paraphrased: Be aware of the cost of wealth. In the first chapter I depict a general feeling 
of disillusionment with government in the hills; this man's warning, at a time when industry and 
                                                          
41 Regions in Peru and Bolivia are experiencing a similar phenomenon with quinoa. 
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the Indian government are gradually working to bring millets into the value chain, reflects 
skepticism about becoming “visible” or being included in such projects.42  
 The history of Uttarakhand, as I have written, has in many ways been a history of theft 
and resistance to theft. There were the violent abuses and taxes of the Nepali Gurkas in the early 
1800s, which led segments of the Kumaoni and Garhwali populations to align with the British. 
Later, British officials claimed "hills stations" like Mussoorie for Europeans only; they heavily 
deforested land to support export, industry, empire building and war while enacting forest 
policies that led peasants to protest and set fires, demanding access to local forests. The Indian 
government adopted those forest policies almost verbatim after Independence in 1947; the 
forest areas it auctioned to corporations to fell trees for construction projects led to the famous 
"Chipko" ("to hug," i.e. physically protect trees) movement of the 1970s and 1980s. One of its 
rallying cries was "jal jangal zameen" (water, forest, land).43 This motto lived on as activists 
turned their attention to hydroelectric dams, the largest of which – the Tehri Dam (completed in 
1986) – submerged thousands of acres of forests, many villages and a pahari city and involved 
blasting mountainsides to create the necessary motor roads. A forest activist in Kumaon, whom 
I interviewed in 2014, designed pamphlets that analyze how even the present forest rights policy 
– achieved through civil society protest – does not fulfill its purpose, and still enables theft for 
places outside pahar.  
 Importantly, from the late 1980s on, pahari activists also turned their attention to seeds 
and biodiversity, forming networks like Beej Bachao Andolaan (Save the Seeds Movement). 
Vandana Shiva started her organization Navdanya (nine seeds) – with Garhwal, Uttarakhand as 
one of its two initial sites.44 These moves reflect market "constrictions" at a moment of economic 
                                                          
42 Scott (2009). The rest of this passage moves away from forms of theft that derive from 
exporting mandua away from pahar to sell for consumption and analyzes its theft as 
agricultural biodiversity. 
43 This phrase is the subject of my concluding chapter. 
44 Refer to Navdanya’s website (http://www.navdanya.org/about-us/our-history) and the 
English website of Beej Bachao Andolaan (http://beejbachaoandolan.org/about/) 
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liberalization.45 The Indian government was just beginning to widen its doors to foreign 
investors. The launch of Uruguay Round of GATT, "the biggest negotiating mandate on trade 
ever agreed" that aimed to significantly "reduced barriers" to global trade in agriculture, was 
sparking widespread protests throughout India and the world, and fortified transnational 
peasant alliances against "agricultural globalization."46  
 Within a few years, the Indian government would launch small research programs to 
increase the productivity of "underutilized crops;" and within a few years, farmers groups in the 
plains of Andhra Pradesh, another millets-growing region, would launch the Millets Network of 
India.47 Within a few years, the WTO would form out of GATT, transgenic technologies would 
appear on the global market, national seed certification laws throughout the world would 
become more restrictive and seed corporations would rapidly consolidate and grow; and within 
a few years, transnational social movements including La Via Campesina would officially 
become a major counter-force in the multilateral sphere.48  
 If the "theft" from pahari forests and rivers falls under the man's first warning, that of 
seeds and agricultural biodiversity falls under the second. I do not intend to dig a trench 
between forest and field. Indeed, this work joins other scholarship in challenging the perceived 
separation between environment and agriculture and "nature" as separate from "humans;" that 
very distinction has led the national government to approach Uttarakhand as a nonagricultural 
zone.49 Pahari farmers practice (agricultural) biodiversity and maintain small seed systems and 
                                                          
45Polanyi (2001[1944]). 
46 Refer to the WTO website for more on the basic history of the Uruguay Round of GATT. For 
the history of the formation of the transnational peasant movement La Via Campesina see their 
20 year anniversary publication (Choplin 2013). 
47 MINI’s website contains a great many resources and publications. 
48 See Howard (2009). For more on transnational social movements, see Transnational 
Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization edited by Borras et al. (2008). 
49 See Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan (2000) and Münster et al. (2012) on the relationship 
between forests and fields or “agrarian environments.” Arnold (1996) analyzes the colonial 
history of the human/nature divide. As Shaila Seshia Galvin (2014) writes in her work on 
organic agriculture in Uttarakhand, agrarian life here is located “in a longer debate in the 
Himalayan region about environmental degradation” (p. 119). 
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intimate production-consumption circuits in close proximity to river, forests and forest labor. 
However, pahari farmers do not play such a formative role in producing the biodiversity of the 
forests; this is why strategies for “theft” of the latter (alienating paharis from forests or rivers) 
appear more literal.  
 As pahari farmers have reminded me many times, mandua would cease to exist if they 
stopped growing it; hence, it has declined or disappeared in places. In other words, agricultural 
biodiversity relies critically on human labor and knowledge. Therefore, strategies for theft and 
resistance also take a different form. For example, after human labor and knowledge has been 
effaced (to varying degrees) by some of the technological and institutional methods described in 
Portraits 4, 5 and 6, industry can acquire "genetic information" (for example, produce seeds that 
are "distinct, uniform and stable") and then patent their innovations (seeds) as intellectual 
"property" for which farmers in some countries have been jailed for “stealing.” We also see in 
Portraits 4, 5 and 6 how the Indian government collects seeds as a national resource (or 
possession), enabling it to also claim a right of ownership under the multilateral Convention on 
Biodiversity. However, throughout this chapter I show that farmer contribution cannot – in any 
practical way – be extricated from the qualities, information and materiality of agricultural 
biodiversity or "climate resilient" crops. It is on similar grounds that groups like La Via 
Campesina or the Uttarakhand-based Navdanya and Beej Bachao Andolaan make claims of 
theft against seed corporations and national governments.  
  
 
Portrait 9: Experiments in Democracy 




Sanjay had walked the thirteen kilometers from his home with some anticipation. 
 To get here, we had gained and lost upwards of 1000 meters to arrive at an 
altitude that was almost same – a lesson about the nonlinearity of movement that the 
mountains teach time again, one that becomes engrained for those who live in them. 
There were few clouds this day to temper the intensity of sun at the times we passed 
out of the shade.  
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As we walked, Sanjay had told me about how he had attended three events 
over the past twenty years in which pahari farmers displayed samples of different 
seeds; each time the diversity had plummeted and more varieties had disappeared. He 
attributed this to the inundation of industrially produced wheat and rice – both as 
seeds through Green and post-Green Revolution government “extension” efforts and 
as food through the Public Distribution System. Many pahari varieties, he added, 
were already “high yield,” or their yield was "high enough." He explained that every 
moment "longer" a seed sown here took to grow was a moment in which something 
important was happening, something that would determine its taste, nutrients and 
appearance and become the basis for the farmer's selection of seeds for the next cycle.  
I had met him a few months earlier, in April 2014, after befriending an NGO 
fieldworker who would later introduce him to me as her husband.50 I had soon 
discovered that he knew and worked with various activists I had met throughout the 
state, many who were linked with Beej Bachao Andolaan. Three were collaborators 
on this project he was taking me to see. Though their locales in the hills were far apart 
and could take days to traverse, they had established and were attempting to expand a 
network; cell phones, and occasionally the Internet, helped.51 Among the seeds they 
were concerned about were mandua (ragi, finger millet) and madhira (janghora, 
barnyard millet) and pahari farmer-saved varieties of dhan (rice), dhals, (lentils), 
rajma (beans) and gehu (wheat). Sanjay and those spearheading this project were 
mostly farmers; they generally saved seeds like other pahari farmers: in newspaper 
packets, bags, tins, baskets, clay pots – methods that required planting in the next 
cycle.  
 He has suggested to me a couple of months before that he could take me to 
this experimental site, one of four in Kumaon that he was overseeing. His sites, like 
those of his peers that comprised twenty in total, were located at different altitudes in 
different districts; all were places where the crops he was observing have historically 
grown. They wanted to work with fellow farmers to see which varieties grew best 
where. They wanted to have a sense of what kind of observable variations existed, 
which differences were practically, rather than genetically, significant, and if it made 
sense to have farmers exchange farmer-saved varieties across regions and 
microclimates in the state.  
 Most everything, he explained on the way, was directly in the hands of local 
residents; the plots were in villages; and they relied on unsupervised farmer labor and 
interest to maintain the plots. Their experiment did not use gene banks or controlled 
sites. Of course, most of them could not afford to hire people. Beyond that, they were 
interested in practical results, understanding that the success or failure in each 
instance would reveal more than plant conditions, but also social conditions. The two 
were interconnected.52  
 After a final steep climb into the village, we arrived at the terraced fields, 
labeled with numbers and names on small sticks or pieces of plastic, to find most of 
the mandua plots had not been weeded as needed. By now, about six weeks before the 
harvest, they should have been tall, even taller than I am, and sprouted the "baal" or 
head of the plant. But many of the plants were stunted and sparse. His face showed 
                                                          
50 She is Heera in Chapter 2. 
51 It is still very difficult to get an internet connection in many places in pahar, even with a 
modem.  
52 Similar techniques with grassroots NGOs promotion’of SRI or System of Rice Intensification. 
Some called participatory, this more than that. 
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some disappointment as he spoke to members of families nearby about what had 
happened. At the same time, he also seemed to take it in stride. 
 This is what happens in practical experiments, which contend with the 
variables of social and environmental life and which take culture to be fundamental to 
agriculture, rather than as a component to be eliminated and then reintroduced. To 
understand this means accepting the contingencies – uncertainty, hope, surrender, 
drama, precarity. It means that work to revive local seed varieties and set up new 
farmer-to-farmer networks across mountain slopes and valleys is work in the social 
terrain. 
 "I know at least two of the other sites are better,” he said. “We’ll do this 




 How with new forms of appropriation of pahari seeds and grains, new forms of 
resistance and practice are emerging 
 
Finally, attempts to create farmer-to-farmer networks to cultivate mandua and other pahari 
seed varieties are also attempts to open democratic and social possibilities. Such networks 
provide alternatives to gene banks and highly bureaucratic and industry-friendly models of 
development and democratic governance. This does not mean that these networks provide 
solutions devoid of violence, exploitation or discrimination, but that in some way they must 
contend with (rather than defer) these social issues.53 Such projects are initiated in their sites of 
implementation and therefore demand a level of practicality; to some extent, people must 
consider which bodies perform the labor involved, how and when. Thus, moments when the 
labor does not get done, as in the village that Sanjay and I visited, can provoke reflection about 
why and lead to a redistribution of responsibilities, a recalibration of social relationships and a 
focus on land rights. Moments of “failure” shed light on important social contradictions as local 
histories of patriarchal land and labor practices intersect with the demands of contemporary life 
in such a way as to bear down on women who are the primary agrarian practitioners and bearers 
of environmental knowledge yet whose families have meager economic and environmental 
                                                          
53 See Annette Desmarais’ (2003) analysis of gender in La Via Campesina and Bina Agarwal’s 
(2003) work on the Deccan Development Society in Andhra Pradesh.  
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means. There are opportunity here, in other words, to cultivate more equitable socio-ecological 
infrastructures.  
 Farmer networks also might embody aspects of the practice of biodiversity; in particular, 
modes of social organizing that emulate close and consistent attention to the temporalities and 
needs of multiple species in changing socio-environmental contexts. While small-scale and 
informally taught pahari land practices are often considered “from the past” and denied their 
coevality, they in fact display profound engagement with the present. For example, the 
collaborative experiment in seed production and sharing described in this Portrait articulates 
broad relational goals and heightened awareness of environmental and social uncertainty, not as 
an aberration but as a key aspect of life.  
Such attunement to the practical conditions of now is a way of being open to and 
working to shape the future. For, it attends to the social values that form and change through 
how people practice, or repetitively perform, ways of relating, making decisions, distributing 
resources and organizing work and labor in everyday life.54 Consider how in the “practice of 
biodiversity,” “biodiversity” inhabits a clause that is dependent on “practice.” It is the practice 
that produces and sustains a variety of human and nonhuman life. Given life in that precarious 
realm of “Never. Unless-,” farmer-saved seeds in small-scale systems must be sown, tended to 
and harvested in order to have futures. “Biodiversity” as a goal without this practice would fail; 
yet the practice would still produce and sustain diverse life even if this outcome were not stated 
as a goal. Working from this perspective, attention to the quality of human-human and human-
nonhuman relationships in the present might acknowledge tenuous futures but mindfully 
establish how people will face and experience them.  
Many of the collaborators whom Sanjay named on our walk were people with whom I 
had spent time during my five trips to Uttarakhand from 2011 to 2015. They were from far 
                                                          
54 Butler (2004). 
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reaching parts of the state. They were affiliated in different ways with grassroots organizations, 
local NGOs, national NGOs, transnational institutions and state and national government 
branches. In my time in Uttarakhand, I observed a slowly expanding network that was using the 
infrastructure established by development and social projects. This network challenged the 
paradigm of “organic by design”/“organic by default” (discussed in Passage 4) by intentionally 
(i.e. by design) working to expand pahari farmer practices in ways likely not foreseen by 
Uttarakhand state officials – ways that value practices perceived as “in the past” while at the 
same time working to transform them. 
What makes these experiments in democracy?  
 They have the potential to make issues of power, such as the gendered division of 
labor, household responsibilities, land rights and caste divisions, central to local 
governance. 
 They focus on the importance of everyday life and illustrate how democracy is 
created through how relationships are formed in the present.  
 They recognize the agency and contribution of small-scale farmers’ and women’s 
labor to India’s food production and variation in plant life and, therefore, to the 
fabric of India’s democracy. 
 They incorporate an attunement to interdependent and diverse forms of life and 
modes of human restraint as a counter to undifferentiated growth and GDP-
driven development models that are putting at risk India’s formative projects of 
representative democracy and redistributive justice.  
 They serve as a reminder that democracy itself is an experiment, whose 
conditions cannot ultimately be controlled or predicted. 
 
These farmer networks extend far beyond the “local” arena. Portrait 6 depicts how, in 
March, 2013, a National Seed Network officially announced its formation in response to the 
announcement that India would launch GM field trials. This National Seed Network connects 
farmer activists in Uttarakhand with those in other parts of India, and many people and 
organizations in it are already connected to other regional, national, transnational and 
transregional networks.55 As Elisa Da Vià writes based on her research in Europe, “these 
                                                          
55 NGOs have also helped provide social infrastructure for this network. Its formation, like that 
of La Via Campesina, could be understood as a constriction on the “free market” (Polanyi 2001 
[1994]. 
 215 
initiatives reassert the centrality of the social and ecological role of agriculture…beyond the 
reductionism of the market-based approaches to rural change.”56 The National Seed Network is 
a way to collectively address issues of biodiversity theft; it is also a way in which people from 
rural areas can share seeds and establish practices across the country.57 At the same time, 
farmer networks in the hills face and will face challenges due to migration, climate change and 
new social pressures and tastes. As profit-driven projects accelerate and dovetail with programs 
meant to help the rural poor, there is the question of urgency and time. And there are no 
guarantees. 
  
                                                          
56 Da Vià (2010:229). 



























































Conclusions and Openings                 "Jal, Jangal, Zameen" 
Water Forest Land 
 
 
A Small Rebellion 
 
In January 2015, I attended a “farmer's fair” on the main road that passes the Kumaoni village 
Gow, where much of this work takes place. A government official working in the capacity of an 
extension officer and a plant pathologist had come to inform villagers about an “improved” 
mandua (finger millet) variety that was available with fertilizer and spraying packs for a 
discounted price at an agricultural university about four hours away by bus. In some cases, they 
explained, they were distributing free trial packets of seeds and inputs. After that, interested 
farmers were expected to travel to the university or distribution sites to buy them for – at least 
initially – a highly discounted price.  
 The event lasted for more than two hours, and they kept people alert by distributing 
samosas and sweet chai. The tent had been set up outside, right off the motor road. With rows of 
chairs and a couple of long tables up front, where the two speakers, predictably both men, sat 
beside elected members of the local governing board. The government official spoke first and at 
length, then the scientist. Both lauded farmers for being important and for how much they 
knew. They also lauded the new varieties they were trying to promote, focusing on how much 
quantity the seeds could produce in small plots, as was common in pahar.  
 In the morning, word about the meeting had spread throughout Gow. I was there when a 
man told his daughter in law in the courtyard of their home. When he told her he was going, she 
laughed and said, "Who has time?" She had to collect her cows from where they were grazing 
near the forest. If the cows grazed in the wrong area, there was a village fine. Therefore, no one 
was no surprised to find the tent to be empty at first; most of the audience members were men 
who spent their days near the road and did not daily engage in agricultural labor, though they 
were instrumental in market transactions. However, more than an hour into the event, after the 
many introductions were made and as the government official was saying his piece, women – 
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who had finished their morning duties – trickled in. Some had even found time to change their 
clothes and fix their hair. People brought out more seats and set up additional rows. Soon, all 
the seats were occupied and some people had to stand.  
 This was all in time for the scientist's speech. He too spoke for an extended time. He 
described the travails of farming in the mountains, and people nodded their heads. He gave 
various compliments to pahari farmers, adding phrases like "You know all that already" to facts 
he was relaying. He spoke about how the market for pahari crops was expanding. He probed 
here and there to learn about the specific crops grown in this region; he appeared particularly 
interested in beans and lentils for which consumer interest was also growing. He stood up, and 
elaborated on the yield benefits of new mandua varieties in an impassioned way. Some people 
listened with discernible interest; others looked around and seemed bored. 
 Then, as he paused to take a sip of water, an older man seated in the back who had been 
quietly grumbling shouted out, “What's the benefit? Suar [wild boar] will eat it anyway!" In that 
instant, the event unraveled. People turned away from the stage to face each other. Everyone 
began talking at once. Mostly, they were talking about suar. About the problem of suar coming 
out of the forest in search of water to drink or food to eat and ruining their crops. About how 
there was a problem before but it was nothing compared to how extensive it had become. About 
how the fields in the village up the hill from Gow – where Prema and Deepa in Chapters Two 
and Three live – had been completely overturned in the past month as suar dug for worms 
where the wheat had been planted. One man joked that "high yield" would only mean more food 
for suar. This received nods and laughs.  
 The scientist got visibly flustered. He tried a few times to pull the conversation back to 
his main point. However, it was no use. The conversation had successfully derailed – or gotten 
on track – to the most pressing practical concern on farmers' minds. Eventually, he relented and 
changed his focus. And suar, rather than high yield mandua, became the protagonists. People 
brainstormed solutions, drawing from that they had heard about or seen: they talked about nets; 
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they talked about guns; they talked about building walls between forest and field. One might say, 
in other words, that the conversation was hauled back to practical life.  
 The concerns voiced by paharis that January afternoon also haul this work back to its 
beginning – to the opening of the first chapter – when Nirmila and other women of Gow go out 
at night in April 2014 night to scare away the suar who are destroying their wheat before the 
harvest. The concerns voiced that January afternoon orient this work, again, towards the 
present challenges of growing mandua and other "climate resilient" pahari crops in a rapidly 
changing social and environmental "surround." The concerns voiced that January afternoon 
contend, again, with problems of deforestation, forest monocropping (of pine trees for 
turpentine), river diversions and erratic monsoons that increasingly are becoming – and are 
being felt as – problems in the field. These concerns call attention to the social life around 
mandua and other pahari crops and the trends that are eroding the "soil" in which they grow. 
They arrive, again, at the juncture of place and contingent life.  
For, what becomes evident in this interaction, in this event gone awry (or set on track), is 
the difficulty – arguably, the impossibility – of escaping the questions these pahari "audience 
members" pose. What becomes evident is that ultimately commodities produced in highly 
controlled settings, such as the sanctuary of a lab, must be brought back into the fold of life 
outside deliberate controls – whether for productive or consumptive purposes.  
What becomes evident is how small-scale farmers, and paharis, are among those in our 
global society tasked with voicing and mediating obscured but unavoidable environmental 
crises. This is because they keenly observe and directly interact with a variety of nonhuman 
species every day; it is because they are engaged in practical labor on the land; it is because they 
live at the precipice of forest and field; it is because their relationship to globalization is fraught 
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and their lives are both marginalized and situated at the interstice of contradictions related to 
biodiversity, agricultural policy, food governance and national development.1 
Furthermore, what becomes evident is that “high yield” solutions for an individuated 
commodity crop do not resolve problems of production in places where the "yield" is down 
because of interrelated factors that even recombinant genes will not resolve.  
And that those engaged in the practice of biodiversity – in other words, those who 
contribute to maintaining the diversity of nonhuman life upon which all human life, and many 
other animal species, depends – live in precarious conditions wrought by intersecting social and 
environmental trends. And these conditions of precarity – such as that of suar coming so often 
into the fields (and the broader reasons why they are doing so) – cannot simply be fixed by 
technological means or added value endeavors such as commodifying grains and selling them in 
the global market.2  
 Moreover, what happened that January afternoon underscores the connection between 
"jal, jangal, zameen" – or water, forest, land. This phrase has an important history and a prolific 
life today in Uttarakhand. By briefly elaborating on it now at the conclusion of this work, I aim 
to highlight openings – or ways in which the things learned through this study of millets at the 
margins provides a looking glass for categorical, commodity and quantitative "added value" 
frameworks, and brings us to a place of onto-epistemological possibility and rural solidarities.  
 These openings are counter currents to capitalist processes that seek to "add value" 
through the forms of subtraction (exploiting labor, people, places and uncommodified relations 
while rendering them invisible) and division (socio-spatial segregation and bureaucratic 
compartmentalization). As such, they are also counter currents to evolving colonial relations 
                                                          
1 See Borras et al. (2009), Desmarais (2007) and Schneider and McMichael (2010). 
2 Kloppenburg (2004) makes clear that the political economy of plant biotechnology consists of 
institutional and technological processes. Therefore, it would make sense that both would need 
to be addressed. 
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that have been examined in overt and subtle ways throughout this work. These evolving colonial 
relations manifest in how:  
(a) contemporary global economic relations and transnational institutions emerged 
out of European empire building from the 1400s to the mid-1900s;  
(b) the Indian government adopted British colonial structures of governance and 
bureaucracy;  
(c) wealth and land accumulated among certain elite Indian groups through 
alliances with British officers;  
(d) gender, caste, and class relations in Kumaon and Garhwal were affected through 
the phases of British colonial rule;  
(e) Enlightenment ideals of progress have contributed to shaping modern India;  
(f) security (food, border, natural resource) has become a defining aspects of 
national sovereignty;  
(g)  both "whiteness" and "tradition" resonate as aesthetic ideals for foods and 
people;  
(h) India's food, agricultural and development policies are related to regional wars 
and territorial disputes that came out of political boundaries drawn by or 
negotiated with British colonial officers; and, 
(i) US hegemony over food production, food technologies, and transnational 
institutions in the post-Bretton Woods era ("neo-colonialism") has shaped the 
trajectory of "development" for newly independent nation-states. 
 
These relations inhere as spatial, bureaucratic, and ideological divisions that constitute the 
"fluidity" of globalization. As we see in this work, they produce social, ecological and ethical 
contradictions whose intensifying crises have not been resolved, and have been deferred, from 
within their onto-epistemological limits. 
 
 
"Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is an intersectional node 
 that challenges the “divisions” and “subtractions” of capitalism bound to particular 
“ideologies of nature.”3 
 
The example of the "derailed presentation" is an example of how methods of 
compartmentalization in industrial agriculture – for example, the isolation of the plant (as a 
composite of genetic material) from other forms of life – pose problems in hill regions, whose 
topography and (diverse) forms of life do not conform easily to human dictates, and in many 
ways require humans to conform. In contrast, paharis and hill people and small farmers who 
                                                          
3 Again, I draw from Neil Smith’s use of the term. 
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practice biodiversity more broadly tend to have an integrated approach to agriculture and the 
"human-nature" relationship. 
 Accordingly, the common pahari wisdom "jal, jangal, zameen" can be understood as an 
intersectional node that arises out of the practice of biodiversity in the hills. It is an 
environmental node, as it understands water, forest and land to be fundamentally joined. In this 
sense, it counters colonial and capitalist logics that compartmentalize elements of nature to be 
appropriated or administered separately; for example, through distinct ministries and laws that 
govern forests as separate from agriculture.4 It challenges the way these boundaries have served 
to displace tensions and problems from one perceived realm onto another realms or have 
overlooked issues that exist at liminal sites of connection; for example, suar ruining the fields. 
These liminal sites then bear a great deal of pressure from accrued displacements. 
 "Jal, jangal, zameen" is also an agrarian environmental node. Here, I borrow the 
phrase Agarwal and Sivaramakrishnan coined to emphasize that in the hills, the diversity of 
nonhuman life that humans play a foundational role in producing (here called the practice of 
biodiversity) and the diversity of nonhuman life in which humans play a less foundational role 
abut each other, and are both deeply rooted in social life.5 This counters the distinction of 
"agricultural" and "nonagricultural" zones based on productivity. It also challenges the notion 
that "resources" can be simply "natural," apart from human life.6  
 Processes of capitalist development and accumulation work by dividing elements of 
nature (denying environmental nodes) and alienating humans from these elements (denying 
agrarian environmental nodes). Such divisions and forms of classification perform some of the 
necessary work to make "fictitious commodities" (like land and labor, which do not in fact exist 
                                                          
4 David Arnold (1996) writes about the separation of "human" and "nature" in India and its 
colonial legacy. Also see Tim Ingold (1995), Donna Haraway (1999). 
5 See Agarwal and Sivaramakrishnan's (2000) introduction to the collection Agrarian 
Environments. 
6 See Neil's Smith's (1990) 
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for the market) appear as commodities on the global market.7 The commas in "jal, jangal, 
zameen," represent these (constructed) separations, which enable “surplus” value and "GDP" to 
be produced, whether through deforestation (for construction and development), hydroelectric 
dams (for urban and industrial expansion), land grabs (for geopolitical positioning or rents), or 
industrial agriculture (controlling the means of production and determining the modes of 
production upon the land). As each of these aspects of "nature" categorically individuates, it also 
appears to have its own essence detached from human life. 
 However, the commas in "jal, jangal, zameen" also signify shifting articulations and foci 
of dissent, as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
"Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is a rallying cry 
 that reveals the "margins" to be central to national and capitalist development. 
 
"Jal, jangal, zameen" has an important political history in pahar. Drawing from peasant 
protests during the era of princely and British colonial rule, it became one of the rallying cries of 
the Chipko forest movement, which spread through the hills of Garhwal and Kumaon in the 
1970s and 1980s. At this time it signified a local, customary, claim to forest access and anger 
about the ways the Indian government was restricting local forest use while auctioning trees to 
industry to build far away factories. By the 1980s, pahari activists were using this same collective 
phrase to protest the construction of major hydroelectric dams, in particular the Tehri Dam. In 
the 1990s, when Uttarakhand was still a part of the largely plain state of Uttar Pradesh, it 
became a pahari call for sovereignty.8 As discussed in the first chapter, at that time, many 
paharis argued for the capital to be in the hills between Kumaon and Garhwal; they envisioned 
this as a symbolic emblem of pahari identity and a way to prevent "neo-colonialism" by the 
Indian government and the plains.  
                                                          
7Karl Polanyi (1944) conceived of "fictitious commodities." Also see [seed paper]. 
8 See Kumar (2010). "Uttaranchal" became a state in 2000 and the name was later changed to 
"Uttarakhand." 
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 In March 2014, I visited Lakshmi Ashram, a girls' school that was started by Gandhi's 
disciple Sarala Devi. I went for a walk with one of the school's long-time teachers and activists. 
She still spent a great deal of time organizing residents of the surrounding villages to protect 
forests and promote "sarvodaya" (upliftment for all) through anti-alcohol endeavors. While she 
took me to the homes of various farmers who grew mandua and dhan (rice), she talked about 
her work, using the phrase "jal, jangal, zameen" repeatedly. Even when talking specifically 
about the forest, she did not disarticulate it from water or land. She said she saw my project as 
fundamentally related to her work for this reason. "Jangal," she explained, did not signify 
protecting forests from outsiders, as much as a consciousness about this integrated relationship 
– particularly because many villagers now depend on the commodification of wood, forest life, 
land and water for income and survival, even as they also understand biodiversity as practice. 
 In other words, paharis have historically used "jal, jangal, zameen" to make specific 
local claims as forms of appropriation change, as well as to voice a counter-hegemonic "ideology 
of nature."9 They have used it to highlight a certain aspect of the trinity and its connection to the 
others, and to rural pahari life. The changing forms of appropriation and dissent since Indian 
Independence have moved through each of these elements, along with the changing focus of 
national development (and what is appropriated to support it): in the Chipko forest movement, 
it called attention to the connection of jangal (forest) to local food security; a decade later, it 
protested how dams caused the loss of land, crops and forest (and propelled forest animals into 
the fields); now some of the same activists are using it to organize around local pahari seeds and 
crops, and specifically pahari millet varieties. 
 Though mandua is not any of these three, in the various ways depicted in the preceding 
chapters, it embodies their connection: Paharis cook mandua ki rotee [flatbreads made of 
mandua and wheat] with forest wood rather than gas because that is what makes it "taste good." 
                                                          
9 Smith (1990). 
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Mandua is a dryland crop that can survive without the kinds of irrigation that are not conducive 
to the geography of the hills. Mandua grows near forests. It grows in mixed fields with other 
pahari crops. Its decline in the hills stems partly from the construction of dams and loss of 
forest access, which have made life in pahar more difficult. Now, as millets are being 
commodified as food and seed, mandua signifies the appropriation of (agri)cultural heritage.  
 Like "jal, jangal, zameen," mandua is an intersectional node. It emphasizes human labor 
and life and the subaltern practice of biodiversity; it emphasizes the relationship of small-scale 
farmers to the places in which they live; it emphasizes the work of humans in producing 
biodiversity and sustaining life as part of "nature." In the hills where, as analyzed in Chapter 
Three, government or industrial seed distribution and acquisition is more difficult and create 
socio-environmental barriers to forms of accumulation and appropriation, this awareness is 
arguably more palpably felt and articulated in daily life. 
 
 
"Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is a political site  
 that emerges out of practical life (the practice of biodiversity) and challenges 
impractical ideals. 
 
Above I argue that "jal, jangal, zameen" has overtly political dimensions that challenge the 
ideological compartmentalization of capitalist development and seed commodification. 
However, what accounts for its relevance through various periods of pahari history? Its 
relevance is part and parcel of the resilience of mandua. Like mandua, it emerges out of the 
pahari practice of biodiversity.10  
 Even as paharis rely more on cash in everyday life and become more embedded in 
commodity relations, life in the rural hills still evokes and demands the integrated sensibility of 
"jal, jangal, zameen," which resides in and with capitalist relations and the financialization of 
everyday life. This is both because spoken wisdom like "jal, jangal, zameen" have become 
                                                          
10 See Marx’s (1977) Capital Volume One.  
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pahari colloquialisms and also because farmers here must think consciously about each of these 
elements many times every day, whether when they go to fetch drinking water from the spring in 
the morning or afternoon or when they move between the forest, field and home. 
 The political force of this cry emerges out of an evolving mode of life, a structure of 
feeling, a living practice that has remained collectively "true" through historical changes, just as 
mandua has continued to exist in the face of social and environmental currents propelling its 
decline. This truth exists as (everyday) life. It also reflects a consciousness that asserts a right to 
exist. It is both a practical expression and a (consciously) political one. It embodies a quality of 
emergent political awareness and power that comes out of small farmer practices. Thus, 
"millets" – a broad category initially defined by the relation, a perceived unimportance, to global 
capitalist agriculture –can become a crucible of transregional alliances. 
 
 
"Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is a "countertopographical" terrain of solidarity  
 that confronts and “constricts” the globalization of agriculture and food.11 
 
Since the mid-1980s when agriculture was introduced into global trade liberalization, there has 
been a remarkable rise of transnational social movements. The marginalized people, places and 
grains discussed in this work have been part of (and affected by) that change. If the “force of 
history” is comprised, as Gandhi suggested, of everyday acts of sustenance and meaning making, 
then aspects of that force have become visible. Disparate subaltern rural groups within a 
broader global economy are articulating deeply shared understandings that come of practical 
aspects of their work/labor on the land with nonhuman species as well as practical experiences 
of the globalized food and agricultural system. To return to Prema Devi’s theory of socio-spatial 
“islands,” people separated by oceans of culture, history, belief and language (and even actual 
oceans) are seeing themselves as inhabiting the same “island.” It is an “island” that does not 
                                                          
11 Katz (2001) 
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map onto dominating images of our world; it fits with what Cindi Katz calls 
“countertopographies,” or social lines that can transform the map. These lines do not join people 
by identity-based or abstract categories. They themselves can be imagined as “land practices” – 
for, they arise out of a deep, practical and historical human connection to places and ways of life 
whose roots run so deep as to become entangled with the roots of others. 
 In this work, we see how “forces of industry,” are enabled rather than constricted (to use 
Polanyi’s term) by mechanisms of bureaucratic democracy, which at every turn work against this 
expanding countertopographical movement. Because the globalization of food and agriculture, 
compounded by land and water grabs, has made rural lives so precarious (pushing sustenance to 
the brink of subsistence), people have physically abandoned and lost faith in rural places and 
farm labor. As Chapter Two depicts, this is true of many farmers in Uttarakhand; the migratory 
flow of people out and the “common sense” belief that the only viable or respectable future is 
elsewhere makes it difficult for rural activists, themselves susceptible to these realities, to 
harness the political will. There have been remarkable examples throughout this work of civil 
society groups stalling, reversing, changing or ushering national and transnational legislation. 
In many instances, however, these victories have been overturned, complicated or sidestepped 
through purportedly “democratic” structures of governance. Transregional 
countertopographical alliances that surpass the “nation” as a unifying construct still must 
contend with the nation-state as an economic and political unit whose power and “security” is 
deeply entangled with industry. 
  Significantly, one of the founding members of Beej Bachao Andolaan (Save the Seeds 
Movement) who had been involved in Chipko’s anti-dam efforts told me that most important to 
him was fostering “seeds” and “millets” as “a shared identity.” He recognized, in other words, 
the importance of the ideological terrain for people who do not have economic or political 
power. He felt it was important not to define this identity, but to understand it as a construct 
that was open to interpretation. Because it was tied to aspects of cultural heritage and 
 233 
sustenance labor, this identity of “saving seeds” was “shared” through points of practical, rather 
than abstract, connection – forged, for example, through physically saving and exchanging 
seeds. In this vision, the revival of plant species is not the aim; rather, the aim is to strengthen 
rural social life through what in this work I have called “the practice of biodiversity.” A woman 
who has been involved with local NGOs in Kumaon for a long time and who, since 2010, has 
affiliated with Beej Bachao Andolaan reminded me a few times that “aspects of cultural 
heritage” in rural Uttarakhand are infused with casteism and patriarchy. She is promoting 
efforts to re-structure local governance, decision-making and land practices; she sees “saving 
seeds,” and transforming how seeds are saved and sown, as a means of addressing these issues 
in everyday life. Similarly, Bina Agarwal has written about how the women farmers connected to 
the Deccan Development Society in Andhra Pradesh have collectivized land across caste lines to 
grow millets.12 
  At the end of Chapter Three, farmers and activists in Uttarakhand are initiating farming 
experiments to expand local seed exchanges across the state. Meanwhile, members of Beej 
Bachao Andolaan have linked up with the Millets Network of India (MINI), which itself 
emerged out of the Deccan Development Society in 2007. Since 2010, the Deccan Development 
Society has linked with La Via Campesina. At the same time, MINI is working to expand an 
Afro-Asian Millets Network, and in 2013 members of MINI and DDS attended the West African 
Regional Assembly of COPAGEN, a network of nine West African farmers: 
The Deccan Development Society has forged an alliance with African nations on 
the issue of millets and food sovereignty. Many West African nations are getting 
ready to follow in the footsteps of Deccan Development Society in relentlessly 
pursuing the model of agriculture that encapsulates ecological farming, 
biodiversity, food and nutritional security along with health and ecological 
security.13 
 
                                                          
12 Agarwal (2003). 
13 as quoted in Rao (2013). 
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Farmers and activists in Uttarakhand, including those linked with Beej Bachao Andolaan, have 
also joined (and helped to create) a National Seed Savers Forum, to foster farmer seed 
exchanges and political alliances across India. As described earlier, in the same week in March 
2013 the National Biodiversity Authority overturned the civil society-initiated moratorium on 
GM field trials, 
farmers from 17 States have arrived here with 2300 seed varieties they have 
conserved through generations to put them on display at the National Seeds 
Festival that opened here on Saturday…. The seeds of various crops, vegetables, 
fruits, tubers, and millets developed by the farmers proclaim the unique 
biodiversity of the country and back their demand to be treated on a par with 
agriculture researchers for minimum income security.14 
 
In addition, I met leaders of small NGOs throughout Uttarakhand that do not work in 
agriculture who have “joined” Beej Bachao Andolaan as a show of solidarity and a recognition 
that social issues ranging from domestic violence to dams are connected to land and seeds.  
Through all these example, seeds and millets help to “draw” these countertopographical 
lines, lines that intersect and overlap in the “messy” way of social life, directly connecting 
“remote” places whose relationship would otherwise be mediated (and disabled) through 
capitalist infrastructures. 
 
"Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is a method  
 to address intersecting socio-environmental crises. 
 
In the Opening of this work, I describe writing about the practice of biodiversity as a practice in 
itself. I say that “this has meant not only calling attention to what has been outframed… but to 
re-orient the process of framing… [in order to] either consciously problematize commodity 
logics and ‘inevitable’ refrains of history or ‘progress’ or… enter into spaces of nonlinear logic, 
‘extended family’ ways of relating and temporal attunement to multiple species modeled by 
pahari practices and philosophies.” 
                                                          
14 Parsai (2013).  
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 Though contentions abound about crises of climate change, agriculture, biodiversity, 
food, and seeds today, there is, undeniably, the recognition that these issues intersect in ways 
that the human population must immediately contend. The practice of biodiversity, situated at 
this subaltern site, opens a space to learn from and attend to other species on which our futures 
depend. It suggests that ways forward will be forged not only by the human “design,” but also by 
the human ability to listen and adapt. It also reminds that no abstract future humans imagine 
will assure its fruition or guarantee the quality of life in the present; however, the present we 
create in relation to each other and other species will open up to possible futures.  
 
 
Finally, "Jal, Jangal, Zameen" is a way of thinking about and forging democracy 
 through attention to practices, social relationships and everyday life  
 
I call the derailment of the presentation in the event that opens this concluding chapter “a 
rebellion” because it reflects an instance when the enactment of power in a space transformed; I 
call it “a small rebellion” because that transformation was neither planned nor structural in its 
effects. In this instance, knowledge emerging out of the practice of biodiversity became a 
collective statement that challenged the speakers’ assumptions. Here, one sees how practice is 
always already political and holds potential for rebellions.  
This interaction, in other words, can be understood as a democratic moment, in that the 
concerns of the “audience” temporarily overtook those of the “speakers;” the “receivers” of 
information revealed themselves to be the producers of knowledge. They did not ask to be heard 
but made themselves heard; each voice incited another. Unexpectedly, the practical and 
everyday concerns of people engaged in small-scale mixed crop agriculture gained preeminence 
over those of a government official and a scientist whose projects were fashioned in controlled 
laboratory settings and with narrow goals disconnected from the everyday realities of agrarian 
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production in the hills. This dissent erupted irrepressibly because the majority of those present 
intuited it to be truth. It was, in Raymond Williams’ terms, a “structure of feeling.”15 
 The lives in this ethnography show how small-scale agriculture and the practice of 
biodiversity in Uttarakhand is neglected and then celebrated, but never allowed to stabilize. This 
chronic instability of hill agriculture is a condition that has allowed capitalist and nation-
building projects to “subtract” different “resources” — plants, water, people, environmental 
services, food —from the hills in different historical moments.16 This is exacerbating social 
inequalities in “modern India” and increasing the pace and spread of environmental decline. At 
the onset of this work, I ask how India’s evolving model of progress, now strongly invested in 
income generation and trade liberalization, undermines the project of democracy upon which it 
embarked in the 1950s. Financially driven governmental models of progress have threatened 
India’s diversity of plant life and its diversity of human ways of life. Beyond impoverishing 
segments of India’s population and devaluing small-scale agrarian life, these models have 
impoverished democratic life.17 Nonetheless, in this opening event and in various places 
throughout this work, India reveals itself to be a place in which small rebellions, or democratic 
surges, can and do take place. During the years of this research, anti-corruption protests and 
campaigns alighted throughout India, bringing everyday life and experiences of the Indian polity 
into the foreground of institutional democracy.  
The practice of biodiversity reveals how the diversity of cultivated plant life (a social 
good and a “natural resource”) is an effect of human ways of life and that its production is 
coterminous with the production of social values, aesthetic sensibilities and understandings of 
need. Therefore, re-organizing those practices, for example, through experiments of seed 
sharing in Uttarakhand and India, has the potential to practically address or bring collective 
                                                          
15 Williams (1978, 1961). 
16 I thank Kalyanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan for this insight into my work. 
17 Shrivastava and Kothari (2012). 
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consciousness to issues of power, land distribution and economy, particularly in the local 
sphere; in other words, to transform human relationships (to “bend them towards justice,” in 
the words of the Martin Luther King Junior) through attention to their enactment in the present 
rather than through an obsession with determining what their futures will be. “People use what 
is available to make a place in the world” and, as Ruth Wilson Gilmore reminds, democracy is 
about making a place.18  
Like biodiversity, democracy is a practice, a practice in which everyday cultivation 
matters, a practice in which the diversity of life must be consciously maintained, a practice 
whose iterative performance produces social values, a practice that is about tending to the life 
and quality of the soil, and all it that is unseen, which nourishes all that grows. Our “thoughts 
can be far, but body must deal with what is near,” a teacher and former student at the Lakshmi  
Ashram in Kausani told me. Where did she learn this? I “learned this here, and I read some of 
Gandhi's works on my own.” This, she explained, is “zameeni soch (grounded thought) 
[compared to] hawa soch (wind thoughts) that can fly away.” In a vibrant democracy, one that 
cultivates zameeni soch, “common people” are recognized as the protagonists not the audience, 
and their voices do not derail events but set their course. If the practice of biodiversity in 
Uttarakhand is attuned to (and cultivates) the interdependence of various forms of life and 
temporalities, if it is predicated on philosophies of restraint in the present that are entangled 
with the acknowledgment of an unknown and emergent future and a living past, then it models 
qualities important for the practice of democracy.  
 “Food security” is and has been a recurring preoccupation for the Indian government. 
This is because food signifies a basic element of human existence that fundamentally depends 
upon human cultivation and knowledge, and is therefore, among other things, a baseline 
indicator of the quality of our social relationships and forms of governance. The basis of food 
                                                          
18 Gilmore (2008). 
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derives from the biological diversity of food crops that have been cultivated over thousands of 
years (and in the present) by small-scale farmers. As the farmers in this “small rebellion” 
suggest, no predominantly genetically based solution to crop yields produced in a controlled 
setting can contend with the complex and interrelated conditions of life and converging socio-
environmental crises. However, by contending with the latter, by understanding biodiversity 
and democracy to be animate, entangled and inseparable from the contingencies of the world at 
large, we can “make places” and possible sustainable futures. 
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Reflections on Methodology 
 
 
Between July 2011 and February 2015, I took five trips to India and spent about fifteen months 
visiting informally and conducting fieldwork. For much of that time, I was in pahar, in the state 
of Uttarakhand, and largely conducting participant observation and interviewing 
(predominantly women and girl) farmers about land practices. Half my time there involved 
visiting villages in both Kumaon and Garhwal at altitudes ranging from 2500 to 12000 feet for 
periods from a few hours to a few weeks. I returned to places – particularly in the Rudraprayag, 
Bhilangana, and Nagni regions of Garhwal and the Nainital and Almora districts of Kumaon – 
numerous times and in different seasons. Sometimes I resided with farmer-activist-scholars, 
sometimes with NGO fieldworker-farmers, sometimes in guesthouses, and often with farmers 
who do not associate with a political or environmental mission. For the other half of my time 
there, about eight months, I resided in one region in the Nainital District of Kumaon, about an 
hour and a half by bus to the small pahari city of Almora. . I also interviewed seed and 
environmental activists, NGO employees, and entrepreneurs in the cities of Dehradun, 
Rishikesh, and Haldwani (many of these were men). Interviews, site visits, conferences, and 
archival research often took me to Delhi (and once to Chennai) for one- to two-week stretches. 
For an additional two months, I conducted participant observation (often at conferences), 
interviews, and archival research in Rome and New York. 
By the end of “fieldwork,” I had spent significant periods over several seasons with ten 
women farmers. In addition, I interviewed (often more than once) and spoke with roughly forty 
other pahari farmers, and had countless informal, often brief but illuminative, conversations 
with many more. I conducted thirty-three interviews with non-farmers on the regional, national, 
and transnational level and about fifteen more with farmers-activists from different regions in 
India (including pahar). Because of the rural demographic in Uttarakhand and for cultural 
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reasons, my work focuses predominantly on women’s labor. Certainly, an area for further study 
would be the lives and labor of men who move between urban and rural spheres. 
 I experienced (at least once) every season of planting, weeding, harvesting, seed saving, 
cooking, and eating. Half my time there involved visiting villages in both Kumaon and Garhwal 
at altitudes ranging from 2500 to 12000 feet for periods from a few hours to a few weeks. I 
returned to places – particularly in the Rudraprayag, Bhilangana, and Nagni regions of Garhwal 
and the Nainital and Almora districts of Kumaon – numerous times and in different seasons. 
Sometimes I resided with farmer-activist-scholars, sometimes with NGO fieldworker-farmers, 
sometimes in guesthouses, and often with farmers who do not associate with a political or 
environmental mission. For the other half of my time there, about eight months, I resided in one 
region in the Nainital District of Kumaon, about an hour and a half by bus to the small pahari 
city of Almora. I did a homestay in one village and daily (and sometimes nightly) walked fifteen 
minutes down a hill and across a road, with its row of twenty-five or so small stores, to the 
neighboring village (as opens this work) where I focused my study and spent the bulk of my 
waking time.  
Physical mobility gave me social mobility: it enabled me to move between the two parts 
of my principle village of study – that which housed historically privileged “caste Hindus” 
(including those who appear in the beginning) and that which housed “Scheduled Castes” who 
have been historically subjugated. Caste prejudices made it difficult for me to live in one side 
and give considerable time and attention to the other. At the same time, moving between two 
villages on a daily basis illuminated relations between neighboring places, the incredible 
variation in social and ecological life that exists in the hills, and how the same policies impact 
“similar” places differently. This helped me to understand “village” as a relational entity. I was 
struck by how little interaction there was between adjacent places (I became a courier of news 
and seeds), even as those places might have daily interactions with towns and cities much 
farther away. These are things traditional maps cannot convey; I learned that distance has more 
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to do with the means and energy it takes to get somewhere than with measurements of 
kilometers or miles. 
The in between proved to be an important field site. Occasionally seeking out some of the 
very things that were transforming pahar in ways that marginalized many paharis – like going 
on treks that had “Himalayan views” or visiting “tourist places” where I has access to Wi-Fi to 
back up my field notes – also enabled me to learn relevant details by, for example, speaking to 
customers who bought Himalayan Finger Millet and the shop owners who sold it. In the 
process of traveling to and from places I had countless conversations – often with pahari men 
with whom I generally had less contact – that shed light on important issues (wedged together 
in a shared jeep for seven hours, a civil engineer stationed in Garhwal and I had a long 
conversation about the contested hydro-electric dam he was helping to design; I spoke with two 
young men who were working for telemarketing companies in Delhi; an elderly man discussed 
how the scourge of alcohol was contributing to out-migration). If I listed all these en route 
conversations, they would comprise a separate dissertation.  
Like many researchers, I relied on intuition. By “intuition,” I mean those moments when 
the intelligence of the senses pierces through consciousness as insight, epiphany, or a core 
feeling.1 While I had a set of concerns related to the circulation of ideas, people, seeds, 
commodities, power, and foods, I found fieldwork to be more like following a trail of emerging 
questions. This meant being as open as possible, pulling at the threads of footnote, not letting go 
of questions that haunted me, trusting “my gut” when deciding where and when to go and stay. 
This intuition guided me to be persistent in attempts to meet government officials, NGO leaders, 
and corporate or foundation representatives (even last minute cancellations informed me about 
how things worked) and I never regretted it – though I entertained my doubts en route as the 
passengers beside me vomited out the windows on winding mountain roads. However, relying 
                                                          
1 Merton and Barber (2006). 
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on intuition also means my own (socially situated) biases shaped the very “data” I collected and 
the manner in which I did. There is no getting around this, though in the process of writing and 
revising this work I have tried at the very least to recognize some of them and address them as I 
could. 
 Intuition led me to Gramsci's grave one October morning when I was in Rome for the 
UN Committee on Food Security 41. I found out that he was buried close to where I stayed. 
Reading Gramsci has taught me that what I am calling “intuition” is historically situated. The 
fact that I was in Rome at all had to do with its significance in transnational food security 
negotiations. Reading Gramsci has also taught me that what I am calling “my intuition” might 
be better described as the education of my senses – through transnational mobility I have 
claimed all my life as a U.S.-born citizen, through having the formal educational opportunities 
an upper middle-class childhood in the New York suburbs affords followed by an informal 
education teaching in public schools in Mississippi and New York and working in rural 
communities abroad, through leaving academia to learn something of the world only to return to 
it for the same reason. These facts about me also shaped much of what I could and could not do 
during the course of research. For example, being a woman gave me more access to women’s 
spaces in the field, homes and forests; but at the same time, it often restricted my movements in 
spaces dominated by men, many of which were spaces of power. 
 I had tried to go one evening but the cemetery was closed. I had stuck the small bunch of 
flowers I had plucked among the branches of a tree by the entrance so it blended in with foliage. 
When I returned the following morning the cemetery was open, and the flowers were still on the 
tree. However, they had wilted and were obvious. I was relieved inside to find markers to his 
grave.2 Nonetheless, the path was not clear and at times I needed to simply make a decision 
about whether to go straight or turn. Walking the dirt paths, I remembered Alice Walker's essay 
                                                          
2 Michael D. Jackson (2006) writes about following “in the Footsteps of Walter Benjamin.” 
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about looking for the grave of Zora Neale Hurston, the education of her senses had so fine-tuned 
her ear.3 I thought about Gramsci writing in his notebooks, analyzing a moment of possibility for 
the Communist Party in Italy from within a fascist prison. I thought about the many people who 
have read what he produced, and how they have influenced this work. Some might have 
furthered what he saw as his project, and others might have turned it into something he would 
not have foreseen. 
 When I found his tombstone, it felt as if I had just stumbled upon it. He had had visitors. 
Rocks and stones were painted with his initials or his name. Some visitors had brought potted 
plants. It struck me then that his notebooks might well have not “existed,” had his sister-in-law 
not smuggled them out of prison when he died. They could have been burned. That they do exist 
one might relegate to chance, luck, coincidence, destiny, faith, the ways in which things are not 
just economic(/ecological), but also indeterminate. This dwelling for the dead was plush with 
signs of life. Tombstones blended in with small boulders; grasses and wildflowers sprouted up 
out of every possible crevice; a tree was growing on Gramsci’s site; and the whole place had been 
taken over by stray cats. Noticing a warm human in their midst, a particularly well fed one 





                                                          
3 Walker (2003). 
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Appendix                SOME EVENTS  
 
 
“Long  *50 million years ago the Indo-Australian plate began its collision with the Eurasian 
pasts” *Part of Hindu epic Mahabharata 
believed to have taken place here 
*8th C Adi Shankara converts many 
Buddhists to Hinduism 
*“Millets” grown in mixed crop 
fields with dhals, oilseeds and 
other grains 
*75,000 years ago evidence of 
anatomically modern human here 
major civilizations dating back thousands 
of years BCE 
*Region ruled by various dynasties that 
also engaged in various wars 
*1200s Delhi Sultanate founded by 
Central Asian Turks in north 
*1300s Sultanate declines as other 
powerful states emerge 
*1500s Mughal Empire begins 
*1700s Mughal Empire declines, and 
Maratha, Sikh and Mysore Empires 
expand 
*1600s British East India Company 
established trade in Bengal 
*1700s to mid-1800s various parts 
annexed by British East India Company 
and British win “Battle of Plassey” 
*10,000 humans “domesticate” 
agriculture 
*around 7000 years ago humans 
begin to grow “millets” 
*around 4000 years ago humans 
begin to grow varieties of finger 
millet 
*1400s expansion of European 
Empires and Europeans wars 
throughout the world and 
Christopher Columbus calls corn 
“milho” (millet in Portuguese). 
“Pasts” *1803 major earthquake in 
Garhwal 
1803-1815 Nepali Gurka rule 
*1815 British East India Company 
won war with Gurkas and took 
over rule of Kumaon and forged 
close alliance with Kingdom of 
Garhwal 
*1857 British Crown takes over 
rule from British East India 
Company, establishing systems of 
forced labor, taxation, forest 
control 
*massive deforestation of forests 
in Uttarakhand to build war ships 
and railroads and for export 
*1929 Gandhi writes Anasakti Yog 
in Kumaon 
*1940s anti-alcohol and Gandhian 
Sarvodaya movements expand 
*Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 against British 
(Kumaoni Sepoys participate) leading to 
downfall British Easy India Company 
*British establish plantation agriculture 
for export, causing decline of local food 
crops 
*Famines intensify throughout British 
rule and tens of millions of people die of 
starvation 
*British promote and expand wheat as a 
“refined” grain, while millets are “coarse”  
*1947 Indian Independence/Partition 
India participated in war for Bangladesh 
to secede from Pakistan 
*British Empire becomes global 
driver of deforestation 
*Seed certification laws first 
created in the US to protect 
farmers, not industry 
*Anti-colonial liberation 
movements throughout the world  
*World War I  
*World War II 
*1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference launches a global 
restructuring 
*1940s multilateral institutions 
like the UN, World Bank, IMF, 
GATT created and GDP 
established as a global economic 
measure 
*US consolidates global power 
*1950s US Food for Peace 
Program 
*Monsanto produces chemicals 
and chemical weapons 
 Local (Kumaon and Garhwal) National (India) International/transnational  
1960s *Expansions of roads to border for 
military  
*1961 Indian government begins 
to draft plans for major hydro-
electric dams in the area 
*Local farmers note decline of 
millet varieties 
*Beginning of India’s Public Distribution 
System 
*US backs the expansion of agricultural 
universities throughout India, the first in 
what is now Uttarakhand 
*1962 India War with China at Kumaoni 
border and various military conflicts and 
wars within and at its northern border 
begin (and continue) 




*India launches Green Revolution of high 
yield varieties. MS Swaminathan plays a 
key role 
*India’s GDP gradually begins to rise 
1970s *Expanding “Chipko” anti-forest 
movement protests restricted 
forest access and commercializing 
forests 
*1970 Patent Act excludes agriculture 
from patentability 
*1974 India performs first nuclear bomb 
test 
*India participated in war for Bangladesh 
to secede from Pakistan 
*1974 the term “Food Security” 
officially coined at the FAO 
*1978 International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants (UPOV) seed certifications 
1980s *Chipko activists make dams a 
major point of focus 
*Contract farming in parts of 
Uttarakhand 
*Claude Alvarez accused Swaminathan of 
the great gene robbery and giving away 
20,000 local varieties of Indian rice 
*1984 Massive gas disaster caused by 
Union Carbide Pesticide Plant in Bhopal; 
forging networks of activists across India 
*1986 India passes Environmental 
Protection Act 
*Monsanto corporation hardly 
produced seeds 
*1987 Uruguay round of GATT 
begins 
1990s *1991 earthquake in Garhwal 
*Some Chipko activists and others 
in the region begin to turn 
attention to seeds and form Beej 
Bachao Andolaan (Save the Seeds 
Network) in response to GATT. 
*Vandana Shiva’s organization 
Navdanya forms in Garhwal (and 
nationally) also in response to 
GATT, and develops seed bank of 
local varieties. 
*1992 India signs Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD) 
*1992 India passes legislation to re-
invigorate local forms of governance 
(panchayat system) 
*India’s attempt to change patent law 
regarding agriculture meets with 
widespread protest, helping to 
incorporate farmers’ rights into India’s 
later WTO-compliant sui generis 
legislation 
*India’s GDP rises exponentially as it 
embraces a direct course of trade 
liberalization 
*1998 India performs second nuclear 
bomb test 
*1991 UPOV makes rules more 
restrictive on farmers, provoking 
protests (continuing today) 
throughout the world 
*1992 Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD) established to 
safeguard biodiversity and related 
“traditional” knowledge 
*1993 the transnational peasant 
network La Via Campesina forms 
in Mons, Belgium. 
*1995 Uruguay Round of GATT 
ends and World Trade 
Organization forms out of GATT 
with the goal of “reducing barriers 
to trade.”  
*Tariffs on agricultural 
commodities are significantly 
reduced, embedding them further 
in global trade 
*Transgenic seeds are 
commercialized 
*Corporations consolidate power 
over the global food system  
2000s *Uttarakhand becomes a state 
after a decade of struggle 
*Uttarakhand declared an “organic 
state” 
*Uttarakhand establishes tax 
free/low tax industrial zones to 
attract business 
*Tehri Dam completed after 30 
years, over 100,000 people were 
relocated; towns and villages, and 
large swaths of forest were 
submerged 
*Migration intensified and now 
whole families leave for towns, so 
*2001 Indian activists launch Right to 
Food movement in connection with a 
transnational network of RTF 
movements  
*2001 India passes its sui generis  
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers 
Rights Act (PPVFR), among the most 
protective of farmers’ rights  
*2002 Freedom of Information Act 
(Right to Information) 
*2002 Biodiversity Act and Indian 
government forms National Biodiversity 
Authority 
*Monsanto biggest seed producer 
in world 
*UN Summit declares goals 
including to eradicate extreme 
poverty and hunger and achieving 
gender equality  
UN launches “Zero Hunger” 
campaign 
*2001 ITPGRA or international 
“Seed Treaty” established to 
protect farmers’ rights 
*2001 La Via Campesina 
announces seeds as one of its main 
foci (“Our Seeds Our Future”) 
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many villages becoming “ghost 
towns”  
*Uttarakhand becomes the second 
fastest state economy in India 
*Beej Bachao Andolaan begins to 
turn special attention to millets 
because of biodiversity loss and 
information that the government 
plans to disseminate packets if 
industrially produced millet seed 
with chemicals. 
*Beej Bachao Andolaan connects 
with Millets Network of India 
*US and Delhi-based business 
processing companies outsource 
labor here creating jobs 
 
*2004 India drafts controversial Seeds 
Bill that works against many of the farmer 
protections in the PPVFR 
*2005 India passes law to expand tax free 
“SEZ” or Special Economic Zones 
(strongly linked to local land 
dispossession) for industry  
*2005 India passes National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act 
*2006 India passes Forest Rights Act 
*2006 Hindu Succession Act legislated 
gender equality in land inheritance 
*2007 Millets Network of India (MINI) 
forms out of Deccan Development 
Society (DDS) in Andhra Pradesh (also 
linked to La Via Campesina). 
*National urban market for millets grows 
*MS Swaminathan Research Foundation 
conducts studies on millets throughout 
India 
*the term “BRIC” (later BRICS) 
coined to describe emerging 
economies including India that 
now produce 20% of the world’s 
Gross World Product 
*2006 Gates Foundation and 
Monsanto Corporation and other 
partners launch plans for “AGRA” 
or a “Second Green Revolution in 
Africa,” which promotes hybrid  
and transgenic varieties of 
marginalized food grains for small 
farmers 
*2007-2008 Food prices spike 
erratically, causing “food riots”   
*ICRISAT launches Project 
HOPE  to “harness” millet and 
sorghum production in Asia and 
Africa in the face of drought 
*Global elite market for millets 
grows 
2010s *2013 a “cloud burst” 
*US and Delhi-based business 
processing companies move labor 
to other places or experience 
problems from rapid growth and 
pull out, contributing to 
unemployment  
*2015 construction of more 
branches of State Banks on motor 
roads 
* Delhi area becomes home to offices of 
half the world’s Fortune 500 companies  
*9 million fewer farmers than a decade 
before 
*2011-2012 Indian government launches 
Initiative for Intensive Nutritional 
Security through Millets Promotion 
(INSIMP) 
*2012 the Global Hunger Index ranks 
India 66th out of 81 countries. 
*The civil society Environmental Support 
Group files a public interest lawsuit 
against the National Biodiversity 
Authority citing the Biodiversity Act 
resulting in a moratorium on transgenic 
field trials. 
*2013 the Seeds Bill and the 
Biotechnology Regulation Authority of 
India (BRAI) Act promote industry 
interests and undermine farmers’ right 
*2013 Nalanda, Bihar cites record yields 
through organic grain production 
*2013 National Food Security Act 
includes millets 
*Millets Network of India begins seed 
sharing with Senegal as part of efforts to 
launch an Afro-Asian Millets Network 
*2014 number of farmers in India falls in 
absolute numbers for the first time 
*2014 BJP candidate Modi wins election  
*2014 MS Swaminathan, father of India’s 
Green Revolution, promotes “Evergreen 
Revolution” and advocates for both 
transgenic technologies and 
*2011 The Second Committee of 
the UN reports that the 
conditions of those people living 
in extreme poverty in developing 
countries has declined and cites 
rural development to be of critical 
importance 
*UN launches “Zero Hunger” 
Campaign 
*2014 India’s Food Security Act 
and subsidies for farmers creates 
stalls  WTO trade agreement in 
Bali   
*2014 at UN Climate Summit 
agriculture is listed as a key area 
of concern and action 
*Civil society groups protest the 
“Global Alliance for Climate 
Smart Agriculture” as being 
ambiguous and industry-friendly 
*2015 UN Framework 




agrobiodiversity including in millet 
production 
*National seed network declares its 
official formation after India announces 
transgenic field trials will begin 
*2015 Indian government employs 
eminent domain law to seize land for 
industrial “agriparks” 
*2015 MS Swaminathan holds conference 
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